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I.	  Introduction	  	   Estimates	  place	  80%	  of	  the	  45.2	  million	  forcibly	  displaced	  persons	  globally	  as	  being	  hosted	  by	  developing	  countries.	  Traditionally,	  these	  nations	  serve	  as	  a	  transit	  point	  for	  asylum-­‐seekers	  waiting	  to	  either	  return	  to	  their	  home	  country	  or	  be	  resettled	  to	  a	  third	  country.	  However,	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  displacement	  can	  stretch	  on	  for	  years	  (if	  not	  decades)	  and	  developed	  countries	  do	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  accommodate	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  asylum	  applicants.	  While	  both	  the	  UN	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees	  (UNHCR)	  and	  UN	  Convention	  Relating	  to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees1	  are	  dedicated	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  refugees,	  many	  refugee-­‐hosting	  countries	  have	  still	  not	  signed	  the	  Convention,	  and	  limit	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  UNHCR	  to	  fulfill	  its	  mandate.	  As	  a	  result,	  asylum-­‐seekers	  and	  refugees	  are	  left	  in	  limbo,	  languishing	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  legal	  framework	  to	  guarantee	  their	  right	  to	  protection.	  This	  not	  only	  comprises	  a	  concerning	  violation	  of	  human	  rights,	  but	  can	  also	  impede	  the	  success	  of	  more	  permanent	  arrangements.	  Access	  to	  basic	  rights	  and	  services	  can	  vary	  widely	  between	  countries,	  and	  this	  access	  can	  dramatically	  impact	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  a	  displaced	  population.	  Variability	  between	  lived	  experiences	  and	  outcomes	  for	  refugees	  is	  not	  always	  attributable	  to	  different	  national	  policies	  or	  cultural	  contexts,	  but	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  situations	  that	  should,	  theoretically,	  yield	  similar	  results.	  An	  important	  question	  is	  then	  how	  and	  why	  the	  lived	  experiences	  of	  refugees	  are	  different	  in	  countries	  with	  seemingly	  similar	  formal	  policy	  responses	  and	  national	  contexts.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Henceforth	  referred	  to	  as	  “the	  Refugee	  Convention”	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   Furthermore,	  there	  is	  a	  well	  defined	  and	  rigorous	  international	  standard	  established	  regarding	  the	  treatment	  of	  refugees	  rooted	  in	  human	  rights	  norms.	  On	  a	  theoretical	  level,	  determining	  why	  asylum	  policy	  decisions	  are	  made	  and	  how	  policy	  differences	  impact	  outcomes	  is	  crucial	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  refugees’	  human	  rights.	  Functionally,	  this	  knowledge	  can	  also	  aid	  countries	  in	  making	  policy	  choices	  that	  will	  minimize	  the	  impact	  of	  an	  undesirable—but	  often	  unavoidable—situation.	  As	  protracted	  refugee	  crises	  continue	  to	  develop	  across	  the	  world	  and	  permanent	  solution	  options	  remain	  limited,	  determining	  best	  practices	  becomes	  critical	  to	  mitigating	  human	  rights	  violations.	  This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  explore	  the	  creation	  of	  asylum	  policies	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  and	  gauge	  the	  outcomes	  of	  these	  policies	  on	  the	  refugee	  population	  and	  argue	  for	  the	  value	  of	  utilizing	  local	  integration	  during	  protracted	  refugee	  situations.	  To	  do	  so,	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  case	  of	  Burmese	  refugees	  in	  Southeast	  Asia,	  with	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia	  as	  case	  studies.	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  that,	  despite	  similar	  formal	  policy	  responses,	  a	  few	  key	  differences	  exist	  between	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia	  in	  their	  handling	  of	  asylum-­‐seekers,	  and	  that	  these	  differences	  result	  in	  vastly	  different	  lived	  realities	  for	  refugees.	  I	  attribute	  these	  discrepancies	  to	  differences	  in	  informal	  policy	  implementation	  and	  argue	  that	  certain	  of	  these	  informal	  approaches	  are	  more	  in	  keeping	  with	  international	  human	  rights	  standards—and	  thus	  more	  favorable—than	  others.	  These	  informal	  mechanisms	  have	  helped	  contribute	  to	  better	  outcomes	  for	  refugees	  living	  in	  Malaysia.	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A.	  The	  Refugee	  Crisis	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  The	  protracted	  refugee	  situation	  occurring	  in	  this	  region	  is	  one	  of	  the	  longest	  standing	  in	  the	  world,	  stemming	  from	  persistent	  political	  and	  ethnic-­‐related	  violence.	  Burma	  ranked	  sixth	  among	  the	  top	  ten	  source	  countries	  of	  refugees	  in	  the	  world,	  with	  approximately	  479,600	  Burmese	  people	  living	  as	  refugees	  or	  in	  refugee-­‐like	  situations	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2013	  (UNHCR).	  This	  figure	  excludes	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  stateless	  persons,	  internally	  displaced	  persons,	  unregistered	  asylum	  seekers,	  and	  Burmese	  individuals	  fleeing	  persecution	  that	  are	  now	  living	  in	  neighboring	  states	  as	  undocumented	  migrant	  workers.	  These	  individuals	  are	  fleeing	  the	  Burmese	  government’s	  aggressive	  use	  of	  “forced	  labor,	  extortion,	  land	  confiscation,	  and	  forced	  agricultural	  practices”	  (Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  2008).	  Religious	  and	  ethnic	  minorities	  are	  especially	  vulnerable	  to	  persecution	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  government,	  as	  the	  nation	  has	  been	  rife	  with	  internal	  conflict	  and	  civil	  war	  since	  its	  independence	  in	  1948.	  Burma	  was	  ruled	  by	  a	  military	  dictatorship	  under	  the	  State	  Peace	  and	  Development	  Council	  (SPDC)	  from	  1962	  to	  2011,	  and	  the	  military	  retains	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  influence	  in	  the	  country’s	  current	  presidential	  republic	  system.	  Poor	  living	  conditions	  and	  ethnic	  conflict	  have	  been	  exacerbated	  by	  a	  low	  level	  of	  economic	  development,	  partially	  due	  to	  extensive	  economic	  sanctions	  levied	  against	  the	  SPDC	  by	  Western	  nations.	  Although	  these	  sanctions	  have	  since	  been	  lifted,	  Burma	  is	  the	  poorest	  member	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  Southeast	  Asian	  Nations	  (ASEAN),	  and	  ranked	  150th	  out	  of	  187	  countries	  on	  the	  Human	  Development	  Index	  (HDI)	  in	  2013.	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Although	  the	  international	  community	  has	  heralded	  recent	  governmental	  reforms	  as	  promising	  steps	  towards	  democracy,	  human	  rights	  organizations	  continue	  to	  document	  abuses,	  and	  ethnic	  minorities	  and	  political	  dissenters	  continue	  to	  stream	  across	  the	  border	  into	  the	  neighboring	  states	  of	  Bangladesh,	  India,	  China,	  Thailand,	  and	  Malaysia.	  These	  nations	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  accommodate	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  more	  than	  1	  million	  Burmese	  that	  fled	  since	  1988.	  Of	  these,	  only	  about	  255,000	  have	  applied	  for	  asylum	  in	  the	  last	  decade.	  Despite	  efforts	  by	  nations	  like	  the	  US	  and	  Australia	  to	  prioritize	  Burmese	  refugees	  in	  resettlement	  schemes,	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  asylum-­‐seekers	  (many	  undocumented)	  remain	  in	  Southeast	  Asia,	  primarily	  in	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia.	  Although	  these	  nations	  have	  similar	  formal	  policy	  responses	  for	  handling	  asylum-­‐seekers,	  their	  reputations	  within	  refugee	  social	  networks	  are	  vastly	  different.	  Qualifying	  how	  and	  why	  these	  reputations	  came	  about	  and	  gauging	  the	  impact	  of	  any	  actual	  differences	  on	  resettlement	  outcomes	  is	  an	  important	  step	  in	  understanding	  refugee	  flows	  and	  developing	  a	  proactive	  international	  response.	  Substantively,	  this	  is	  a	  massive	  humanitarian	  crisis	  that	  stands	  to	  drive	  demographic,	  economic,	  and	  policy	  changes	  within	  the	  region;	  and	  the	  value	  of	  understanding	  the	  success	  of	  different	  approaches	  cannot	  be	  understated.	  As	  the	  US	  plans	  to	  drastically	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  Burmese	  refugees	  admitted	  for	  resettlement	  each	  year	  and	  Australia	  espouses	  increasingly	  restrictive	  immigration	  policies,	  it	  has	  become	  clear	  that	  the	  focus	  on	  finding	  durable	  solutions	  must	  shift	  towards	  options	  in	  countries	  of	  first	  asylum.	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II.	  Background	  
A.	  Terminology	  States	  can	  be	  classified	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  in	  relating	  to	  their	  role	  in	  asylum-­‐seeker	  flows.	  “Origin”	  or	  “home	  countries”	  are	  the	  source	  of	  refugee	  flows,	  “asylum”	  or	  “transit	  countries”	  serve	  as	  the	  first	  destination	  for	  an	  asylum-­‐seeker	  after	  fleeing	  his	  or	  her	  country,	  and	  a	  “resettlement”	  or	  “third	  country”	  serves	  as	  the	  final	  destination.	  Southeast	  Asia	  is	  primarily	  home	  to	  origin	  and	  asylum	  countries,	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  refugees	  in	  recent	  years	  leaving	  Burma	  and	  fleeing	  to	  neighboring	  nations.	  There	  are	  three	  recognized	  durable	  solutions	  for	  displaced	  persons—repatriation,	  integration,	  and	  resettlement.	  Repatriation,	  according	  to	  the	  stipulations	  of	  the	  Convention,	  must	  be	  voluntary	  and	  involve	  no	  significant	  risk	  to	  the	  life	  or	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  persons	  returning	  to	  their	  country	  of	  origin.	  Integration	  involves	  allowing	  refugees	  to	  legally	  integrate	  into	  the	  country	  of	  first	  asylum.	  Finally,	  resettlement	  to	  a	  third	  country	  can	  be	  utilized	  if	  the	  first	  two	  options	  prove	  to	  be	  unfeasible.	  Of	  these,	  the	  UNHCR	  and	  other	  international	  humanitarian	  organizations	  advocate	  primarily	  for	  repatriation.	  The	  legal	  status	  and	  motivation	  behind	  migrating	  determine	  which	  term	  is	  appropriate	  to	  identify	  different	  populations	  and	  identities.	  “Migrant”	  is	  a	  broad,	  catchall	  term	  for	  any	  person	  that	  has	  left	  his	  or	  her	  home.	  Migrants	  are	  further	  distinguished	  by	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  left	  their	  home	  voluntarily,	  with	  “migrant	  worker”	  and	  “economic	  migrant”	  used	  generally	  to	  denote	  the	  latter.	  The	  term	  “displaced	  persons”	  refers	  to	  all	  people	  who	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  relocate,	  and	  can	  be	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further	  broken	  down	  into	  “refugees”	  and	  “asylum	  seekers.”	  A	  refugee	  is	  someone	  that	  has	  undergone	  a	  status	  determination	  process	  to	  ensure	  they	  meet	  the	  criteria	  to	  be	  legally	  considered	  a	  refugee.	  An	  asylum	  seeker	  is	  someone	  that	  has	  fled	  persecution	  and	  is	  outside	  of	  his	  or	  her	  home	  country,	  but	  has	  not	  received	  formal	  recognition	  as	  a	  refugee.	  “Protracted	  displacement	  situations”	  refer	  to	  “those	  which	  have	  moved	  beyond	  the	  initial	  emergency	  phase	  but	  for	  which	  solutions	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future.”	  These	  situations	  “are	  the	  combined	  result	  of	  the	  prevailing	  situations	  in	  the	  country	  of	  origin,	  the	  policy	  responses	  of	  the	  country	  of	  asylum,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  sufficient	  engagement	  in	  these	  situations	  by	  a	  range	  of	  other	  actors.”	  (Loescher	  and	  Milner	  9)	  Increasingly	  restrictive	  migration	  policies	  have	  led	  to	  the	  proliferation	  of	  human	  smuggling	  operations—which	  are	  often	  critical	  tools	  of	  escape	  for	  refugees	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  (Palmgren	  2011).	  “Human	  smuggling”	  refers	  to	  an	  operation	  whereby	  migrants	  knowingly	  enter	  into	  an	  illegal	  agreement	  in	  which	  they	  pay	  to	  be	  illegally	  snuck	  across	  a	  border.	  This	  is	  distinct	  from	  “human	  trafficking,”	  in	  which	  victims	  are	  deceived	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  exploitation	  in	  the	  destination	  country	  (Gallagher	  2002).	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  Southeast	  Asia	  the	  distinction	  between	  these	  two	  processes	  is	  often	  blurred.	  Finally,	  I	  use	  the	  name	  Burma	  in	  this	  paper,	  rather	  than	  the	  official	  name	  Myanmar.	  I	  use	  the	  name	  Burma	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  preferences	  of	  many	  Burmese	  opposition	  leaders,	  the	  refugee	  families	  I	  work	  with,	  and	  my	  friends	  from	  Burma	  to	  not	  recognize	  the	  name	  change	  imposed	  by	  the	  military	  junta.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  follow	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the	  standards	  of	  the	  Forced	  Migration	  Review,	  and	  use	  “the	  term	  ‘Burmese’	  is	  used	  for	  any	  person	  originally	  coming	  from	  Burma,	  while	  the	  term	  ‘Burman’	  is	  used	  for	  people	  from	  the	  ethnic	  majority	  group.”	  
B.	  International	  Law	  and	  the	  UNHCR	  The	  right	  to	  seek	  asylum	  from	  persecution	  is	  established	  in	  the	  14th	  Article	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  Although	  this	  declaration	  is	  non-­‐binding,	  it	  establishes	  the	  standard	  of	  states’	  conduct	  in	  international	  law,	  and	  is	  an	  integral	  source	  of	  authority	  for	  the	  human	  rights	  regime.	  To	  protect	  this	  right,	  the	  United	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees	  (UNHCR)	  was	  established.	  The	  organization’s	  main	  objective	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  persons	  can	  exercise	  the	  right	  to	  seek	  asylum,	  and	  is	  the	  primary	  authority	  in	  determining	  who	  qualifies	  as	  a	  refugee	  and	  which	  practices	  are	  respectful	  of	  this	  right.	  Although	  a	  number	  of	  relevant	  international	  and	  regional	  instruments	  for	  protection	  have	  been	  developed,	  the	  UNHCR	  derives	  its	  authority	  primarily	  from	  the	  1951	  UN	  Convention	  Relating	  to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees	  (the	  Refugee	  Convention).	  	  The	  Refugee	  Convention	  established	  the	  criteria	  for	  receiving	  refugee	  status	  under	  international	  law.	  The	  Convention	  states	  that	  a	  refugee	  is	  a	  person	  who:	  owing	  to	  a	  well-­‐founded	  fear	  of	  being	  persecuted	  for	  reasons	  of	  race,	  religion,	  nationality,	  membership	  of	  a	  particular	  social	  group	  or	  political	  opinion,	  is	  outside	  the	  country	  of	  his	  nationality,	  and	  is	  unable	  to	  or,	  owing	  to	  such	  fear,	  is	  unwilling	  to	  avail	  himself	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  that	  country	  or	  return	  there	  because	  there	  is	  a	  fear	  of	  persecution”	  (Convention	  Relating	  to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees	  Article	  1).	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To	  be	  considered	  a	  refugee,	  a	  person	  must	  be	  officially	  granted	  refugee	  status.	  The	  status	  determination	  process	  is	  conducted	  either	  by	  states	  themselves	  or	  the	  UN	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees	  (the	  UN	  Refugee	  Agency),	  and	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  candidate	  meets	  the	  above	  conditions.	  Reasons	  for	  persecution	  outside	  of	  those	  specifically	  delineated	  within	  the	  Convention	  are	  not	  considered	  valid,	  and	  applicants	  are	  screened	  to	  determine	  if	  their	  migration	  was	  economically	  motivated.	  	  States	  are	  not	  obligated	  to	  provide	  asylum,	  and	  are	  only	  bound	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Convention	  if	  they	  are	  signatories.	  Within	  Southeast	  Asia,	  only	  Cambodia	  and	  the	  Philippines	  are	  parties	  to	  the	  Refugee	  Convention.	  In	  non-­‐signatory	  countries	  there	  are	  no	  guidelines	  for	  the	  treatment	  of	  asylum-­‐seekers,	  and	  they	  are	  accordingly	  often	  lumped	  in	  with	  undocumented	  migrants.	  This	  approach	  not	  only	  denies	  asylum-­‐seekers	  access	  to	  the	  rights	  guaranteed	  to	  them	  by	  the	  Refugee	  Convention,	  but	  also	  criminalizes	  them	  under	  harsh	  immigration	  laws.	  Criminalization	  under	  the	  law	  and	  in	  public	  discourse	  by	  government	  officials	  leaves	  asylum-­‐seekers	  vulnerable	  to	  arrest,	  detention,	  and	  expulsion;	  regardless	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  their	  claims	  (Palmgren	  2011).	  Globally,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  marked	  shift	  towards	  policies	  focusing	  on	  immigration	  law	  enforcement	  and	  security,	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  protecting	  the	  rights	  of	  asylum-­‐seekers	  (Frelick	  2001).	  Although	  neither	  Malaysia	  nor	  Thailand	  have	  ratified	  the	  Refugee	  Convention,	  both	  have	  signed	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  Discrimination	  against	  Women	  (CEDAW)	  and	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child	  (CRC).	  These	  treaties	  pertain	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  refugee	  women	  and	  children	  living	  within	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these	  countries,	  but	  also	  establish	  the	  illegality	  of	  refoulement.	  	  The	  principle	  of	  non-­‐refoulement	  is	  defined	  within	  the	  1951	  Refugee	  Convention,	  which	  states	  that:	  “No	  Contracting	  State	  shall	  expel	  or	  return	  (“refouler”)	  a	  refugee	  in	  any	  manner	  whatsoever	  to	  the	  frontiers	  of	  territories	  where	  his	  life	  or	  freedom	  would	  be	  threatened	  on	  account	  of	  his	  or	  her	  race,	  religion,	  nationality,	  membership	  of	  a	  particular	  social	  group	  or	  political	  opinion.”2	  The	  principle	  of	  non-­‐refoulement	  is	  also	  considered	  customary	  international	  law,	  and	  both	  Malaysia	  and	  Thailand	  are	  thus	  obligated	  to	  follow	  its	  basic	  tenets.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Convention	  Relating	  to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees,	  United	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees,	  adopted	  July	  26,	  1951.	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III.	  Literature	  Review	  	   A	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  refugee	  policy	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  outcomes	  for	  asylum-­‐seekers	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  undertaken.	  This	  is	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  reliable	  data	  and	  measurement	  issues	  inherent	  to	  working	  with	  populations	  operating	  in	  the	  extralegal	  realm.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  work	  that	  has	  been	  done	  to	  address	  human	  rights	  violations	  and	  poor	  living	  conditions	  for	  asylum-­‐seekers	  in	  the	  region,	  analyze	  potential	  economic	  benefits	  of	  refugee	  flows,	  and	  explain	  current	  policy	  responses.	  	   In	  analyzing	  the	  policy	  responses	  of	  my	  case	  study	  countries,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  how	  these	  policies	  came	  into	  being	  and	  how	  they	  fit	  into	  global	  migration	  policy	  trends.	  Frelick	  (2001)	  explores	  some	  of	  the	  breakdown	  between	  the	  ideals	  delineated	  by	  international	  law	  and	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  and	  states’	  actual	  policies.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  international	  human	  rights	  regime	  has	  not	  yet	  developed	  any	  instruments	  to	  effectively	  compel	  states	  to	  respect	  the	  rights	  of	  refugees.	  Frelick	  critiques	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  as	  establishing	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐refoulement	  to	  bar	  states	  from	  forcibly	  returning	  refugees,	  but	  not	  developing	  a	  corollary	  right	  to	  asylum	  so	  asylum-­‐seekers	  would	  be	  guaranteed	  somewhere	  to	  go.	  This	  perspective	  is	  helpful	  in	  contextualizing	  the	  policy	  responses	  of	  many	  Southeast	  Asian	  nations,	  which	  seem	  to	  waiver	  between	  violating	  and	  protecting	  human	  rights	  in	  their	  implementation	  of	  migration	  policy.	  Furthermore,	  Frelick’s	  work	  helps	  to	  locate	  these	  policy	  responses	  within	  a	  global	  context,	  and	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  an	  international	  trend	  towards	  emphasizing	  enforcement	  and	  security	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  protecting	  refugees.	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia	  both	  fit	  perfectly	  within	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Frelick’s	  framework,	  which	  helps	  to	  explain	  their	  use	  of	  restrictive	  policies	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  policies	  on	  refugee	  flows.	  	   While	  Frelick’s	  work	  is	  useful	  in	  understanding	  why	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia	  have	  failed	  to	  ratify	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  and	  utilize	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  their	  asylum	  policies,	  it	  does	  not	  speak	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  national	  frameworks	  addressing	  refugees.	  Stern	  (2014)	  explores	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  national	  migration	  policy	  addressing	  refugees	  and	  asylum-­‐seekers,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  conventional	  factors	  taken	  into	  account	  during	  this	  process.	  The	  comparative	  importance	  of	  legal	  obligations,	  economic	  and	  political	  concerns,	  and	  ethical/moral	  considerations	  is	  emphasized.	  Stern	  expands	  this	  model	  to	  evaluate	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  state’s	  self-­‐image,	  particularly	  within	  liberal	  democracies.	  She	  documents	  the	  value	  that	  these	  governments	  place	  on	  principles	  of	  asylum,	  humanitarianism,	  and	  human	  rights;	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  practice	  failing	  to	  align	  with	  theory.	  Although	  this	  study	  was	  done	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  very	  liberal	  democracy	  (Sweden),	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  basic	  principles	  also	  apply	  to	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia,	  as	  both	  have	  democratic	  elements	  of	  governance	  and	  rhetorically	  support	  human	  rights.	  	  	   Some	  work	  has	  also	  been	  done	  to	  explore	  the	  negative	  impacts	  of	  restrictive	  asylum	  policies.	  Koser	  (2000)	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  links	  between	  restrictive	  asylum	  policies	  and	  increased	  instances	  of	  human	  trafficking.	  Koser	  argues	  that	  different	  asylum	  policies,	  utilization	  of	  trafficking,	  and	  refugee	  vulnerability	  are	  all	  intertwined,	  and	  that	  blame	  for	  increasing	  vulnerability	  lies	  more	  with	  asylum	  policies	  than	  traffickers	  or	  asylum-­‐seekers.	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   In	  terms	  of	  the	  beneficial	  impacts	  of	  less-­‐restrictive	  policies,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  works	  on	  this	  topic	  done	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  argues	  that	  irregular	  migration	  in	  the	  context	  of	  labor	  is	  so	  pervasive	  that	  states	  need	  to	  start	  regulating	  it	  rather	  than	  blocking	  it	  entirely	  (Battistella	  and	  Asis	  2002).	  The	  study	  went	  on	  to	  show	  that	  irregular	  migration	  provides	  the	  cheap	  labor	  necessary	  for	  economies	  to	  be	  flexible	  and	  sustain	  continued	  growth.	  The	  authors	  argue	  that	  the	  duration	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  demonstrate	  its	  worth	  to	  recipient	  countries—if	  the	  migration	  were	  detrimental,	  countries	  would	  have	  seen	  widespread	  economic	  consequences	  long	  ago.	  	  	  	  Another	  study	  conducted	  by	  Porter	  and	  Haslam	  performed	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  mental	  health	  surveys	  addressing	  issues	  specific	  to	  refugees	  worldwide.	  They	  compiled	  the	  findings	  to	  identify	  the	  factors	  that	  lead	  to	  improved	  mental	  health	  outcomes	  for	  displaced	  persons.	  Porter	  and	  Haslam	  established	  clear	  causal	  linkages	  between	  factors	  like	  permanent,	  private	  accommodation;	  economic	  opportunity	  (right	  to	  work);	  and	  being	  granted	  greater	  cultural	  freedom	  to	  better	  mental	  health.	  The	  three	  factors	  listed	  are	  all	  key	  components	  of	  my	  definition	  of	  a	  liberal	  policy	  approach.	  These	  findings	  demonstrate	  that	  liberal	  policies	  not	  only	  economically	  benefit	  host	  countries	  and	  carry	  inherent	  short-­‐term	  benefits	  for	  refugees—they	  also	  contribute	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  wellbeing	  and	  health	  of	  asylum-­‐seekers.	  	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  work	  has	  been	  done	  assessing	  the	  merits	  and	  shortcomings	  of	  different	  specific	  asylum	  approaches.	  Loescher	  and	  Milner’s	  work	  on	  refugee	  crises	  and	  responses	  found	  that	  camps	  have	  “serious	  implications	  for	  the	  human	  rights	  and	  livelihoods	  of	  refugees”	  (9).	  	  They	  argue	  that	  prolonged	  encampment	  has	  led	  to	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the	  violation	  of	  a	  number	  of	  basic	  human	  rights,	  and	  that	  as	  a	  result	  refugees	  become	  dependent	  on	  aid	  and	  “lead	  lives	  characterized	  by	  poverty,	  frustration,	  and	  unrealized	  potential”	  (10).	  However,	  Loescher	  and	  Milner	  also	  raise	  concerns	  about	  undocumented	  urban	  refugees	  living	  in	  fear	  of	  arrest	  and	  without	  access	  to	  proper	  housing,	  employment,	  or	  social	  services	  (10).	  An	  even	  fuller	  body	  of	  work	  exists	  documenting	  the	  successes	  and	  failures	  of	  different	  durable	  solutions.	  However,	  the	  bulk	  of	  this	  work	  has	  been	  focused	  on	  resettlement	  and	  repatriation,	  mirroring	  the	  attention	  of	  states	  and	  the	  UNHCR.	  To	  put	  integration	  back	  on	  the	  table,	  Fielden	  and	  Crisp	  show	  that	  it	  has	  been	  used	  successfully	  in	  a	  number	  of	  contexts.	  They	  demonstrated	  that,	  even	  in	  protracted	  refugee	  situations	  with	  countries	  prioritizing	  repatriation,	  policy	  reversal	  has	  led	  to	  highly	  successful	  integration	  efforts	  (78).	  These	  findings	  are	  pertinent	  for	  the	  current	  situations	  in	  both	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia.	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IV.	  Theory	  The	  ideal	  policy	  approach	  for	  protecting	  the	  rights	  of	  refugees	  is	  one	  that	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  tenets	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  and	  international	  human	  rights	  law.	  This	  could	  be	  deemed	  a	  liberal	  policy	  approach	  (as	  opposed	  to	  a	  restrictive	  approach)	  as	  it	  allows	  refugees	  free	  access	  to	  asylum	  countries	  and	  guarantees	  a	  number	  of	  rights.	  I	  will	  utilize	  the	  liberal	  approach	  prescribed	  by	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  as	  an	  ideal	  that	  countries	  should	  strive	  towards	  in	  both	  developing	  and	  implementing	  migration	  policies.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Refugee	  Convention,	  the	  most	  important	  right	  for	  a	  refugee	  is	  protection	  from	  refoulement,	  or	  forced	  return	  to	  the	  country	  of	  origin	  (Article	  33).	  	  The	  refoulement	  of	  refugees	  is	  a	  serious	  violation	  of	  human	  rights,	  and	  will	  accordingly	  be	  addressed	  as	  the	  most	  important	  indicator	  of	  the	  liberalness	  of	  a	  state’s	  policy	  approach.	  A	  second	  critical	  tenet	  of	  the	  Convention	  states	  that	  refugees	  should	  not	  be	  penalized	  for	  entering	  a	  country	  illegally	  if	  they	  are	  fleeing	  persecution	  (Article	  31).	  A	  state	  that	  has	  liberal	  asylum	  policies	  intuitively	  cannot	  detain	  or	  arrest	  refugees	  for	  reasons	  relating	  to	  illegal	  immigration.	  Finally,	  asylum-­‐seekers	  must	  have	  access	  to	  the	  UNHCR	  or	  some	  other	  body	  that	  conducts	  status	  determination.	  Without	  this	  infrastructure	  in	  place	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  determine	  legitimate	  refugees.	  These	  three	  core	  tenets	  will	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  evaluation	  of	  the	  liberalness	  of	  states’	  asylum	  policies.	  Once	  a	  refugee	  has	  been	  certified	  as	  per	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Convention,	  he	  or	  she	  is	  entitled	  to	  further	  rights	  within	  the	  asylum	  country.	  States	  must	  facilitate	  the	  freedom	  of	  mobility	  and	  grant	  refugees	  whatever	  identity	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documentation	  necessary	  to	  travel	  within	  or	  outside	  of	  the	  country.	  Outside	  of	  this,	  it	  is	  generally	  expected	  that	  refugees	  receive	  the	  same	  treatment	  as	  nationals	  of	  the	  asylum	  country.	  The	  Convention	  goes	  on	  to	  list	  a	  number	  of	  rights	  associated	  with	  this	  principle,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  not	  always	  feasible—particularly	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  developing	  nation.	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia	  have	  both	  expressed	  concerns	  over	  adopting	  policies	  that	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  condoning	  local	  integration,	  a	  durable	  solution	  that	  both	  have	  ruled	  out	  of	  the	  question.	  	  This	  paper	  asserts	  that	  a	  liberal	  asylum	  policy	  approach—defined	  as	  one	  in	  which	  asylum	  seekers	  are	  granted	  the	  basic	  rights	  enshrined	  in	  the	  Refugee	  Convention—both	  makes	  a	  country	  a	  more	  attractive	  place	  to	  seek	  asylum	  and	  generates	  comparatively	  better	  outcomes	  for	  refugees.	  I	  have	  dubbed	  an	  approach	  meeting	  these	  standards	  to	  be	  semi-­‐integrative,	  as	  it	  allows	  refugees	  and	  asylum	  seekers	  to	  access	  local	  services	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  economy,	  but	  does	  not	  grant	  them	  full	  legal	  status,	  require	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Convention,	  or	  guarantee	  all	  of	  the	  rights	  delineated	  within	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  (such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  housing	  or	  public	  assistance).	  While	  a	  semi-­‐integrative	  approach	  is	  far	  from	  ideal	  due	  to	  its	  inability	  to	  guarantee	  refugees	  access	  to	  all	  of	  their	  rights,	  it	  is	  superior	  to	  the	  policies	  of	  restriction	  and	  confinement	  currently	  utilized	  by	  many	  states.	  Semi-­‐integration	  will	  also	  likely	  appeal	  more	  to	  developing	  countries	  that	  are	  wary	  of	  ratifying	  the	  Refugee	  Convention,	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  set	  of	  general	  guidelines	  for	  these	  countries	  as	  they	  formulate	  their	  asylum	  policies	  through	  administrative	  frameworks.	  Finally,	  this	  approach	  seeks	  to	  meet	  states	  halfway	  by	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balancing	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  refugee	  population	  against	  state	  concerns	  about	  integration	  and	  burden	  sharing.	  A	  semi-­‐integrative	  approach,	  despite	  its	  shortcomings,	  offers	  many	  benefits	  to	  asylum	  seekers	  and	  host	  countries	  alike.	  It	  better	  prepares	  refugees	  for	  other	  permanent	  solutions	  because	  it	  provides	  greater	  access	  to	  education	  and	  job	  opportunities,	  which	  increase	  autonomy	  and	  help	  refugees	  build	  the	  skills	  necessary	  to	  be	  successful.	  This	  approach	  also	  allows	  host	  countries	  to	  benefit	  from	  refugee	  labor	  and	  reduce	  enforcement	  costs	  for	  crackdowns	  on	  undocumented	  workers.	  This	  approach	  further	  benefits	  host	  countries	  by	  allowing	  them	  to	  improve	  their	  international	  standing	  and	  reputation	  for	  respecting	  human	  rights.	  However,	  while	  ad	  hoc	  administrative	  responses	  can	  work	  when	  guided	  by	  international	  law	  or	  organizations,	  a	  coherent	  national	  policy	  would	  do	  more	  to	  streamline	  the	  asylum	  seeking	  process,	  ensure	  the	  adequate	  protection	  of	  refugees,	  and	  benefit	  transit	  countries.	  Adopting	  a	  semi-­‐integrative	  approach	  can	  be	  an	  important	  first	  step	  towards	  achieving	  this	  goal.	  	  An	  important	  distinction	  exists	  between	  formal	  policy	  and	  its	  implementation,	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  distinction	  on	  the	  lived	  outcomes	  for	  refugees	  in	  each	  country	  is	  pronounced.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  differences	  in	  implementation	  between	  Malaysia,	  and	  Thailand	  contribute	  to	  significant	  disparities	  in	  outcomes	  for	  refugees,	  with	  more	  liberal	  policies	  yielding	  overall	  better	  outcomes.	  	   Intuitively,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  asylum-­‐seekers	  would	  gravitate	  towards	  countries	  with	  policies	  that	  guarantee	  them	  more	  rights.	  As	  informal	  networks	  drive	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much	  of	  refugee	  migration,	  better	  living	  conditions	  in	  one	  country	  can	  quickly	  translate	  into	  a	  redirection	  of	  migration	  flows.	  It	  follows	  logically	  that	  the	  same	  liberal	  approaches	  that	  draw	  refugees	  to	  a	  certain	  country	  then	  produce	  comparatively	  better	  outcomes	  than	  countries	  with	  more	  restrictive	  approaches.	  Aside	  from	  the	  inherent	  benefits	  of	  some	  of	  the	  indicators	  I	  will	  use	  to	  gauge	  liberalness	  (e.g.	  education,	  gainful	  employment),	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  factor	  also	  lead	  to	  improved	  outcomes	  for	  host	  countries	  themselves.	  The	  argument	  for	  linking	  liberal	  policies	  to	  overall	  better	  outcomes	  also	  finds	  support	  in	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  studies	  done	  on	  refugee	  mental	  health	  post-­‐displacement.	  	  Multiple	  studies	  found	  better	  mental	  health	  among	  refugees	  positively	  correlated	  with	  residing	  in	  private,	  permanent	  accommodations,	  having	  the	  right	  to	  work,	  and	  being	  granted	  greater	  cultural	  freedom	  (Porter	  and	  Haslam	  2005).	  	  	   I	  also	  explore	  the	  historical,	  social,	  and	  political	  contexts	  that	  led	  to	  each	  state’s	  current	  policy	  approach	  in	  dealing	  with	  asylum	  seekers.	  While	  a	  variety	  of	  domestic	  and	  international	  factors	  contribute	  to	  these	  approaches,	  I	  find	  that	  the	  government’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  UNHCR	  and	  susceptibility	  to	  international	  pressures	  serve	  as	  the	  most	  accurate	  predictors	  for	  a	  liberal	  asylum	  policy.	  	  
Hypothesis	  1:	  A	  history	  of	  cooperation	  with	  the	  UNHCR	  and	  concerns	  about	  
international	  image	  contribute	  to	  more	  liberal	  asylum	  policy	  approaches.	  
	  
Hypothesis	  2:	  More	  liberal	  asylum	  policy	  approaches	  create	  better	  outcomes	  for	  
asylum-­‐seekers	  and	  transit	  countries.	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V.	  Methodology	  I	  selected	  Thailand,	  and	  Malaysia	  as	  my	  case	  studies	  because	  both	  of	  these	  nations	  are	  geographically	  proximate	  to	  Burma,	  and	  are	  therefore	  often	  the	  first	  (and	  sometimes	  final)	  stop	  on	  a	  Burmese	  refugee’s	  journey.	  These	  countries	  have	  espoused	  similar	  formal	  policy	  responses	  to	  the	  protracted	  refugee	  crisis;	  have	  similar	  cultural	  and	  economic	  backgrounds,	  governmental	  structure,	  and	  obstacles	  to	  development.	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia	  also	  hosted	  about	  the	  same	  number	  of	  refugees	  and	  asylum-­‐seekers	  in	  2012.	  Neither	  country	  has	  ratified	  the	  Convention	  and	  both	  have	  working	  partnerships	  with	  the	  UNHCR,	  although	  the	  structure	  of	  these	  partnerships	  differs.	  Furthermore,	  neither	  of	  these	  countries	  have	  legal	  asylum	  frameworks,	  thereby	  establishing	  a	  policy	  context	  in	  which	  refugees	  cannot	  legally	  work	  nor	  attend	  school.	  However,	  both	  of	  the	  chosen	  countries	  have	  different	  approaches	  for	  temporarily	  settling	  refugees	  and	  enforcing	  migration	  law,	  which	  highlights	  the	  differences	  I	  am	  most	  interested	  in	  identifying.	  To	  measure	  outcomes,	  I	  utilize	  NGO	  reports	  and	  other	  works	  documenting	  living	  conditions	  in	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia.	  To	  bolster	  this	  information,	  I	  interviewed	  8	  local	  Burmese	  refugee	  families	  in	  Orange	  County.	  Five	  of	  these	  families	  lived	  in	  Thailand,	  and	  the	  other	  3	  lived	  in	  Malaysia	  before	  being	  resettled	  to	  the	  US.	  I	  conducted	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  interviews	  with	  these	  families	  during	  which	  I	  asked	  a	  number	  of	  in-­‐depth	  questions	  regarding	  their	  experiences	  while	  in	  transit.	  The	  interview	  questions	  are	  included	  in	  Appendix	  III.	  These	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  the	  interviewees’	  native	  tongue	  through	  the	  use	  of	  two	  local	  interpreters.	  I	  recruited	  interviewees	  through	  personal	  networks	  within	  the	  local	  refugee	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community.	  Interviewees	  were	  contacted	  initially	  by	  a	  community	  leader	  to	  see	  if	  they	  would	  be	  interested	  in	  participating,	  before	  being	  referred	  to	  me,	  contacted	  by	  an	  interpreter	  to	  go	  over	  the	  basic	  details	  of	  the	  study,	  and	  then	  finally	  interviewed	  after	  providing	  their	  verbal	  consent	  to	  participate	  in	  their	  native	  tongue.	  To	  get	  a	  sense	  of	  both	  outcomes	  and	  policy	  dynamics,	  I	  conducted	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  interviews	  with	  officials	  from	  the	  UNHCR	  in	  both	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia	  this	  summer.	  My	  time	  with	  a	  protection	  office	  at	  UNHCR	  Bangkok	  was	  rather	  brief,	  and	  so	  I	  supplement	  my	  narrative	  in	  that	  chapter	  with	  a	  more	  thorough	  literature	  review.	  I	  was	  fortunate	  enough	  to	  have	  a	  rather	  in-­‐depth	  interview	  at	  UNHCR	  Malaysia,	  which	  was	  the	  source	  of	  much	  of	  Malaysia	  Part	  I.	  Both	  officials	  requested	  anonymity.	  The	  table	  below	  represents	  all	  interviews	  conducted	  for	  this	  project:	  
	   Duration	   Date	   Location	  
UNHCR	  Malaysia	  Official	  	   ~5	  hrs.	   7/05/14	   Kuala	  Lumpur,	  Malaysia	  
UNHCR	  Bangkok	  Official	  	  
	  
~1	  hr.	   7/11/14	   Bangkok,	  Thailand	  
Karen	  Refugee	  Family	  
(Thailand)	  
1	  hr.	   2/10/15	   Chapel	  Hill,	  NC	  
Karen	  Refugee	  Family	  
(Thailand)	  
1	  hr.	   2/12/15	   Chapel	  Hill,	  NC	  
Karen	  Refugee	  Individual	  
(Thailand)	  
1.5	  hrs.	   1/29/15	   Carrboro,	  NC	  
Karen	  Refugee	  Family	  
(Thailand)	  
1	  hr.	   2/20/15	   Chapel	  Hill,	  NC	  
Karen	  Refugee	  Individual	  
(Thailand)	  
2	  hrs.	   3/3/15	   Chapel	  Hill,	  NC	  
Chin	  Refugee	  Individual	  
(Malaysia)	  
1.5	  hrs.	   2/27/15	   Phone	  
Mon	  Refugee	  Family	  
(Malaysia)	  
1.5	  hrs.	   2/20/15	   Durham,	  NC	  
Karen/Burmese	  Refugee	  
Family	  (Malaysia)	  
1.5	  hrs.	   2/27/15	   Chapel	  Hill,	  NC	  Table	  1:	  Interview	  log	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A.	  Challenges	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  challenges	  associated	  with	  attempting	  to	  quantify	  refugee	  flows,	  living	  conditions,	  and	  policy	  effects.	  Particularly	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Southeast	  Asia,	  many	  asylum-­‐seekers	  remain	  deliberately	  undocumented	  (and	  uncountable)	  out	  of	  necessity.	  As	  a	  result,	  data	  on	  irregular	  migrants	  often	  underestimates	  the	  “degree	  and	  volume”	  of	  actual	  numbers	  (Koser	  2009).	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  also	  impossible	  to	  know	  how	  many	  may	  have	  a	  valid	  claim	  to	  asylum	  and	  how	  many	  are	  economic	  migrants.	  Even	  making	  this	  distinction	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  is	  difficult	  in	  the	  current	  context	  of	  mixed	  migration,	  in	  which	  people	  move	  for	  a	  number	  of	  varied	  and	  intertwined	  reasons	  (Klaauw	  2010).	  Even	  migrants	  who	  are	  registered	  in	  some	  way	  are	  difficult	  to	  track	  statistically	  as	  legal/illegal	  status	  can	  change	  quickly.	  Finally,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  detrimental	  to	  the	  study	  of	  this	  phenomenon,	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  comparable	  data	  over	  time	  and	  between	  different	  locations.	  Although	  the	  refugee	  situation	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  protracted	  in	  the	  world,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  adequately	  tracked	  statistically	  until	  the	  last	  few	  years.	  Even	  now,	  a	  clear	  and	  universally	  accepted	  methodology	  is	  absent	  amongst	  researchers,	  resulting	  in	  widely	  varying	  estimates	  of	  the	  same	  measure.	  	   Aside	  from	  the	  general	  data	  collection	  issues	  endemic	  to	  the	  study	  of	  this	  topic,	  I	  ran	  into	  a	  few	  specific	  issues	  within	  my	  analysis.	  One	  of	  my	  objectives	  is	  linking	  liberal	  policy	  approaches	  with	  increased	  “popularity”	  among	  asylum-­‐seekers	  and	  improved	  outcomes	  for	  refugees.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  knowing	  the	  actual	  number	  of	  asylum-­‐seekers	  in	  a	  country	  at	  a	  given	  time	  is	  nearly	  impossible.	  Beyond	  this,	  however,	  there	  is	  no	  mechanism	  by	  which	  to	  control	  for	  other	  factors	  that	  may	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influence	  refugee	  flows.	  Secondly,	  statistics	  and	  case	  study	  comparisons	  do	  little	  to	  indicate	  agency.	  Asylum-­‐seekers	  traditionally	  have	  very	  little	  say	  in	  the	  direction	  their	  flight	  from	  persecution	  takes,	  and	  therefore	  they	  may	  not	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  consciously	  choose	  between	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia.	  	   Another	  key	  objective	  of	  this	  study	  deals	  with	  the	  outcomes	  for	  refugees	  associated	  with	  liberal	  asylum	  approaches.	  I	  tried	  to	  use	  some	  third-­‐party	  reports	  to	  keep	  these	  sections	  somewhat	  objective,	  but	  also	  relied	  heavily	  on	  interview	  data.	  The	  interviews	  proved	  to	  be	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  schedule,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  refugee	  families	  I	  spoke	  with	  were	  reticent	  to	  discuss	  their	  experience.	  Compared	  to	  the	  experiences	  detailed	  in	  reports	  I’d	  read,	  I	  found	  that	  interviewees	  were	  surprisingly	  positive	  about	  their	  experiences	  on	  the	  whole.	  One	  of	  my	  interpreters	  explained	  that	  interviewees	  were	  unlikely	  to	  open	  up	  to	  me	  due	  to	  a	  cultural	  stigma	  against	  complaining	  as	  well	  as,	  for	  refugees	  from	  Thailand,	  a	  learned	  shyness	  around	  foreigners.	  It	  was	  rare	  for	  foreigners	  to	  be	  allowed	  in	  the	  camps,	  she	  explained,	  and	  residents	  were	  instructed	  not	  to	  speak	  to	  journalists.	  For	  whatever	  reason,	  I	  did	  find	  the	  refugees	  from	  Thailand	  to	  be	  overall	  more	  taciturn	  than	  their	  counterparts	  from	  Malaysia,	  and	  they	  seemed	  less	  willing	  to	  critique	  living	  conditions	  or	  the	  RTG’s	  role	  in	  handling	  refugees.	  	   Finally,	  the	  possibility	  of	  any	  true	  quantitative	  comparison	  between	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia	  is	  nonexistent.	  Not	  only	  is	  much	  of	  the	  data	  widely	  inaccurate	  and	  present	  only	  in	  very	  small	  sample	  sizes,	  it	  is	  based	  primarily	  on	  anecdotal	  evidence	  and	  NGO	  reporting.	  Rigorous	  studies	  of	  how	  many	  refugee	  students	  receive	  an	  adequate	  education	  while	  in	  an	  asylum	  country,	  or	  how	  many	  legitimate	  asylum-­‐
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seekers	  are	  unjustly	  detained	  or	  deported	  are	  nonexistent.	  While	  firsthand	  accounts	  and	  NGO	  reporting	  were	  valuable	  tools	  in	  constructing	  this	  paper,	  this	  information	  is	  often	  sensationalized	  to	  serve	  humanitarian	  or	  political	  goals,	  and	  cannot	  be	  counted	  as	  wholly	  representative.	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  a	  huge	  disparity	  in	  the	  amount	  that	  has	  been	  written	  about	  Burmese	  refugees	  in	  Thailand	  compared	  to	  what	  has	  been	  written	  about	  Malaysia.	  Because	  Thailand	  has	  been	  dealing	  with	  the	  crisis	  for	  longer,	  and	  relies	  on	  extensive	  humanitarian	  assistance	  from	  international	  NGOs	  and	  donor	  countries,	  a	  number	  of	  reports	  gauging	  the	  impact	  of	  different	  strategies	  and	  their	  results	  on	  the	  population	  have	  been	  published.	  Malaysia,	  however,	  has	  yet	  to	  establish	  a	  network	  of	  interrelated	  organizations	  that	  even	  remotely	  resembles	  the	  scale	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  operation	  in	  Thailand.	  Further,	  the	  fact	  that	  refugees	  are	  living	  both	  amongst	  the	  local	  community	  and	  a	  much	  larger	  migrant	  community	  in	  Malaysia	  makes	  it	  harder	  to	  single	  them	  out	  for	  analysis.	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VI.	  Asylum	  Policy	  in	  Thailand	  
A.	  Background	  Thailand	  has	  served	  as	  the	  primary	  transit	  and	  destination	  country	  for	  displaced	  persons	  from	  Burma	  since	  1984.	  Thailand	  is	  a	  popular	  destination	  for	  asylum	  seekers	  due	  to	  its	  geographic	  proximity	  and	  predominantly	  Buddhist	  population,	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  Burmese	  asylum	  seekers	  are	  Buddhist.3	  Thailand	  also	  attracts	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Burmese	  migrating	  for	  economic	  reasons	  due	  to	  its	  strong	  economy,	  enjoying	  a	  low	  unemployment	  rate	  of	  0.7%	  and	  only	  13%	  of	  the	  population	  living	  below	  the	  poverty	  line.	  	  	  Of	  Thailand’s	  67	  million	  residents,	  approximately	  90%	  are	  Thai,	  1.3%	  are	  Burmese,	  and	  8%	  hold	  other	  nationalities	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook	  2014).	  However,	  this	  total	  excludes	  the	  roughly	  500,000	  stateless	  people	  living	  within	  Thailand—a	  population	  that	  includes	  displaced	  Rohingya	  from	  Burma	  and	  the	  children	  of	  Burmese	  refugees	  born	  within	  Thailand.	  This	  total	  also	  excludes	  undocumented	  migrant	  workers	  and	  asylum	  seekers	  currently	  residing	  in	  Thailand—a	  population	  estimated	  to	  be	  between	  2	  and	  3	  million	  people,	  predominantly	  of	  Burmese	  origin	  (US	  TiP	  Report	  2014,	  372).	  Thailand	  is	  urbanizing,	  with	  approximately	  34%	  of	  the	  population	  currently	  residing	  in	  urban	  locales,	  a	  figure	  that	  is	  increasing	  by	  about	  2%	  annually	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook	  2014).	  Outside	  of	  border	  towns,	  many	  undocumented	  Burmese	  seek	  out	  these	  growing	  urban	  centers	  as	  a	  source	  of	  work	  and	  cheap	  housing.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  a	  full	  breakdown	  of	  religious	  demographics	  within	  the	  Thai	  refugee	  camps,	  please	  refer	  to	  Figure	  1	  in	  Appendix	  I.	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The	  annual	  Trafficking	  in	  Persons	  Report	  produced	  by	  the	  US	  government	  downgraded	  Thailand	  to	  Tier	  3	  status	  in	  2014	  due	  to	  its	  status	  as	  a	  regional	  hub	  for	  forced	  labor	  and	  sex	  trafficking,	  primarily	  of	  Burmese	  migrants	  (TiP	  Report	  2014).	  Subgroups	  of	  the	  Burmese	  population	  affected	  by	  trafficking	  include	  economic	  migrants	  and	  refugees	  detained	  for	  being	  caught	  outside	  of	  the	  camps	  without	  proper	  documentation.	  
B.	  Asylum	  Policy	  Thailand	  has	  neither	  ratified	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  nor	  developed	  a	  national	  framework	  for	  handling	  asylum-­‐seekers.	  Refugees	  and	  asylum	  seekers	  are	  thus	  subject	  to	  the	  regulations	  of	  the	  Thai	  Immigration	  Act	  of	  1979,	  with	  one	  key	  exception:	  Section	  17	  of	  the	  Immigration	  Act	  gives	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  (MOI)	  authority	  to	  grant	  exemptions	  to	  standard	  immigration	  customs	  in	  special	  circumstances.	  This	  authority	  was	  used	  to	  establish	  camps	  especially	  designated	  for	  Burmese	  “persons	  fleeing	  fighting”	  (Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  2008).4	  The	  Royal	  Thai	  Government	  (RTG)	  uses	  this	  term	  in	  lieu	  of	  refugee	  or	  asylum-­‐seeker	  to	  further	  underscore	  its	  eschewing	  of	  international	  standards	  regarding	  the	  treatment	  of	  refugees.	  The	  exemption	  to	  the	  Immigration	  Act	  only	  holds	  as	  long	  as	  Burmese	  remain	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  9	  officially	  designated	  refugee	  camps	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border.	  All	  those	  found	  outside	  of	  the	  camps	  are	  considered	  “illegal	  immigrants”	  and	  are	  subject	  to	  deportation,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  in	  need	  of	  asylum	  (Green	  et.	  al	  31).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  RTG	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  residents	  of	  the	  camps	  as	  “refugees,”	  in	  keeping	  with	  their	  aversion	  to	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  and	  recognizing	  any	  legal	  claims	  of	  these	  individuals.	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The	  RTG’s	  primary	  objective	  is	  to	  provide	  temporary	  shelter	  until	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  Burma	  has	  stabilized	  (Lang).	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis,	  the	  RTG	  continually	  underscored	  the	  temporariness	  of	  the	  camp-­‐based	  arrangement,	  and	  currently	  views	  repatriation	  and	  resettlement	  as	  the	  only	  two	  viable	  durable	  solutions.	  In	  2011,	  following	  a	  series	  of	  discussions	  with	  the	  Burmese	  government,	  the	  chief	  of	  Thailand’s	  National	  Security	  Council	  announced,	  “I	  cannot	  say	  when	  we	  will	  close	  down	  the	  camps	  but	  we	  intend	  to	  do	  it”	  (Chitradon).	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  reluctance	  to	  allow	  local	  integration,	  Thailand	  is	  currently	  utilizing	  a	  camp-­‐based	  approach	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  influx	  of	  Burmese	  seeking	  asylum	  within	  its	  borders.	  As	  of	  June	  2014,	  there	  were	  approximately	  140,000	  individuals	  residing	  within	  the	  9	  official	  refugee	  camps	  along	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  border	  (The	  Border	  Consortium).	  Approximately	  50%	  of	  this	  population	  is	  unregistered,	  due	  to	  a	  government-­‐imposed	  moratorium	  on	  the	  registration	  process	  intended	  to	  stem	  the	  tide	  of	  new	  arrivals.	  To	  facilitate	  this	  encampment	  approach,	  the	  RTG	  relies	  on	  the	  international	  community	  in	  donors	  to	  engage	  in	  responsibility	  sharing	  by	  providing	  the	  bulk	  of	  humanitarian	  relief	  received	  by	  camp	  residents	  (Chantavanich	  121).	  The	  resulting	  framework	  is	  one	  of	  interdependency	  between	  NGOs,	  Community-­‐Based	  Organizations,	  the	  UNHCR,	  and	  the	  RTG	  and	  is	  seen	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  administration—camp,	  provincial	  and	  national.	  This	  network	  of	  organizations	  is	  responsible	  for	  everything	  from	  “coordination	  of	  services,	  child	  protection,	  resettlement,	  donor	  interests,	  and	  general	  information	  updates”	  (Thompson	  27).	  	  A	  sophisticated	  network	  of	  international	  and	  domestic	  actors	  is	  necessary	  to	  support	  the	  refugee	  population	  due	  to	  harsh	  restrictions	  imposed	  by	  the	  RTG	  on	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refugees’	  freedom	  of	  movement,	  which	  “prohibit	  residents	  from	  leaving	  the	  camps,	  or	  earning	  income”	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  2).	  Camp	  access	  is	  also	  restricted	  for	  foreigners,	  including	  aid	  workers	  and	  journalists,	  who	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  visit	  the	  camps	  without	  first	  registering	  with	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  (MOI).	  The	  imposition	  of	  these	  restrictions	  has	  not	  only	  resulted	  in	  increased	  confinement	  and	  deteriorating	  conditions	  within	  the	  camps,	  but	  has	  also	  led	  to	  a	  near	  complete	  dependence	  on	  aid.	  Refugees	  are	  reliant	  on	  aid	  organizations	  to	  supply	  them	  with	  food	  rations,	  clothing,	  shelter,	  medicine,	  and	  basic	  education.	  The	  increasing	  dependence	  on	  aid	  coupled	  with	  the	  protracted	  nature	  of	  the	  crisis	  has	  led	  to	  donor	  fatigue	  and	  has	  limited	  the	  potential	  for	  future	  durable	  solutions	  to	  be	  implemented	  successfully.	  	  	  	   Outside	  of	  the	  camps,	  Thailand	  frequently	  arrests,	  detains,	  and	  deports	  asylum	  seekers	  and	  UNHCR	  recognized	  refugees,	  imposing	  hefty	  fines	  and	  demanding	  bribes	  from	  these	  at	  risk	  individuals	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  120).	  De	  facto	  refugees	  living	  outside	  of	  the	  camps	  have	  no	  access	  to	  legal	  documentation	  or	  protection.	  This	  treatment	  of	  displaced	  persons	  Thailand	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  international	  human	  rights	  standards	  and	  has	  created	  an	  unnecessary	  burden	  for	  both	  the	  refugee	  population	  and	  the	  RTG	  itself.	  
i.	  History	  
Thailand’s	  development	  of	  its	  asylum	  policy	  could	  be	  broadly	  described	  as	  one	  that	  is	  responsive,	  rather	  than	  proactive,	  with	  clear	  purpose,	  and	  formulated	  through	  the	  use	  of	  increasingly	  restrictive	  ad	  hoc	  mechanisms	  (Vungsiriphisal	  et.	  al.	  42).	  This	  piecemeal	  response	  is	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  unexpected	  duration	  of	  the	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conflict	  in	  Burma.	  Past	  refugee	  situations	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  were	  fairly	  temporary,	  and	  refugee	  populations	  typically	  repatriated	  to	  their	  home	  country	  once	  the	  initial	  conflict	  was	  resolved.	  Throughout	  the	  Indochinese	  refugee	  crisis	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  Thailand	  received	  a	  great	  number	  of	  refugees	  from	  neighboring	  countries,	  but	  similarly	  recognized	  these	  people	  on	  a	  “humanitarian	  and	  not	  legal	  basis”	  (Chantavanich	  121).	  An	  Asylum	  Act	  was	  proposed	  in	  Parliament	  during	  this	  time,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  pass,	  and	  no	  similar	  legislature	  has	  been	  proposed	  since	  (Vungsiriphisal	  et.	  al.	  42).	  Thailand	  has	  thus	  modeled	  its	  response	  to	  and	  expectations	  of	  the	  Burmese	  population	  around	  the	  assumption	  that	  they	  will	  eventually	  be	  returning	  to	  Burma.	  As	  such,	  when	  the	  first	  refugees	  began	  crossing	  the	  border	  in	  1984,	  the	  RTG	  did	  not	  develop	  a	  comprehensive	  strategy	  to	  respond	  to	  these	  initial	  refugee	  flows.	  The	  RTG	  instead	  opted	  to	  allow	  refugees	  to	  organize	  and	  manage	  themselves	  along	  the	  border	  during	  the	  initial	  years	  of	  the	  conflict.	  Basic	  services	  were	  provided	  to	  the	  refugee	  population	  by	  NGOs	  during	  this	  time,	  and	  the	  Committee	  for	  Coordination	  of	  Services	  to	  Displaced	  Persons	  in	  Thailand	  (CCSDPT)	  managed	  these	  efforts.	  During	  the	  initial	  period	  of	  Burmese	  seeking	  asylum	  in	  Thailand	  the	  refugee	  population	  operated	  autonomously,	  without	  screening	  policies	  or	  admissions	  protocol—refugees	  simply	  moved	  across	  the	  border	  and	  created	  small	  settlements.	  The	  RTG	  was	  forced	  to	  rework	  this	  hands-­‐off	  approach	  as	  the	  Burmese	  military	  began	  gaining	  control	  of	  the	  borderlands	  and	  conducting	  raids	  in	  Thailand.	  Finally,	  following	  the	  attack	  and	  burning	  of	  12	  settlements	  between	  1995	  and	  1998,	  the	  RTG	  was	  forced	  to	  shift	  its	  refugee	  policy	  from	  one	  of	  benign	  neglect	  to	  containment	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(Thompson	  26).	  The	  RTG	  pursued	  this	  objective	  by	  consolidating	  refugees	  into	  9	  officially	  designated	  camps,	  and	  establishing	  a	  fenced-­‐in	  and	  highly	  monitored	  perimeter	  around	  these	  camps	  (Thompson	  26).	  Refugees	  were	  no	  longer	  free	  to	  come	  and	  go	  from	  the	  camps	  at	  will,	  and	  crossing	  the	  border	  ceased	  to	  be	  the	  only	  barrier	  to	  receiving	  asylum	  in	  Thailand.	  The	  RTG	  solicited	  the	  help	  of	  the	  UNHCR	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  crisis,	  and	  allowed	  the	  agency	  to	  establish	  a	  permanent	  presence	  on	  the	  border.	  The	  RTG,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  UNHCR,	  also	  established	  Provincial	  Admissions	  Boards	  (PABs)	  in	  1998	  and	  endowed	  them	  with	  the	  power	  to	  govern	  admissions	  into	  the	  camps	  (Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  2008).	  	  These	  boards	  were	  made	  up	  primarily	  of	  members	  from	  local	  provincial	  governments,	  with	  one	  UNHCR	  representative	  usually	  involved	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  Camp	  management	  was	  further	  formalized	  in	  2004	  by	  the	  Thailand	  Burma	  Border	  Consortium	  (TBBC)5	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Camp	  Management	  Project	  to	  fund	  the	  (formerly	  volunteer-­‐based)	  administrative	  management	  of	  the	  camps	  (Thompson	  27).	  By	  2005,	  despite	  initial	  misgivings	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  RTG	  that	  it	  may	  unintentionally	  serve	  as	  a	  pull	  factor	  for	  greater	  numbers	  of	  refugees	  to	  cross	  the	  border,	  third	  country	  resettlement	  programs	  were	  introduced	  within	  the	  camps.	  The	  largest	  of	  these	  was	  a	  group	  resettlement	  scheme	  arranged	  between	  the	  Thai	  and	  US	  governments,	  which	  successfully	  resettled	  over	  73,000	  refugees	  from	  Thailand	  to	  the	  US	  between	  2005	  and	  2014.	  However,	  although	  it	  is	  still	  responsible	  for	  the	  formal	  registration	  process,	  the	  RTG	  also	  stopped	  officially	  registering	  refugees	  in	  2005.	  Thus,	  even	  those	  living	  within	  the	  camps	  and	  following	  the	  spirit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Now	  simply	  The	  Border	  Consortium	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of	  Thailand’s	  asylum	  policy	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  illegal	  camp	  residents	  and	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  the	  same	  services	  and	  protection	  guaranteed	  to	  those	  that	  are	  registered.	  Therefore,	  despite	  mass	  resettlement,	  the	  camp	  population	  has	  remained	  consistently	  near	  140,000	  people	  as	  the	  unregistered	  population	  continues	  to	  grow.	  The	  Border	  Consortium	  has	  had	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  verification	  exercise	  to	  determine	  the	  population	  within	  the	  camp	  deserving	  of	  receiving	  aid,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  legal	  status	  according	  to	  the	  RTG.	  The	  differential	  in	  estimates	  between	  TBC	  and	  the	  RTG	  is	  approximately	  50,000	  people	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  25).	  	  One	  major	  step	  forward	  in	  Thailand’s	  asylum	  policy	  came	  in	  2009,	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  a	  provision	  that	  would	  allow	  for	  birth	  certificates	  to	  be	  issued	  within	  the	  camps.	  Thailand	  is	  a	  signatory	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child,	  which	  provides	  for	  birth	  registration	  for	  all	  children	  born	  within	  a	  country’s	  borders.	  The	  Convention	  was	  successfully	  used	  to	  increase	  protection	  for	  Thai-­‐born	  refugee	  children,	  despite	  staunch	  political	  opposition.	  This	  use	  of	  international	  law	  to	  influence	  domestic	  policy	  may	  prove	  a	  hopeful	  sign	  for	  further	  measures	  to	  increase	  protection.	  
ii.	  UNHCR	  
The	  UNHCR	  remained	  uninvolved	  in	  managing	  the	  Burmese	  refugee	  crisis	  until	  the	  RTG	  assumed	  control	  of	  the	  camps	  in	  1998.	  Up	  until	  this	  point,	  refugees	  interacted	  with	  a	  number	  of	  other	  local	  and	  international	  NGOs	  in	  the	  capacity	  of	  receiving	  temporary	  humanitarian	  support	  (Thompson	  26).	  Because	  Thailand	  has	  not	  ratified	  the	  Refugee	  Convention,	  UNHCR’s	  actions	  are	  limited	  to	  those	  that	  are	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requested	  or	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  RTG.	  With	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  PABs,	  the	  RTG	  solicited	  the	  help	  and	  expertise	  of	  the	  UNHCR.	  However,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  partnership	  was	  hindered	  by	  differing	  objectives—the	  UNHCR’s	  primary	  concern	  was	  the	  protection	  of	  Burmese	  asylum	  seekers,	  while	  the	  RTG	  was	  focused	  on	  protecting	  national	  security.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  UNHCR	  was	  relegated	  to	  observer	  status	  for	  several	  years	  (Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  2008).	  Finally,	  after	  several	  well-­‐publicized	  incidents	  of	  the	  Thai	  army	  forcibly	  returning	  new	  arrivals	  across	  the	  border,	  the	  UNHCR	  was	  able	  to	  negotiate	  a	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  with	  the	  RTG	  and	  “was	  given	  a	  mandate	  for	  protection	  and	  monitoring”	  while	  service	  provision	  was	  coordinated	  through	  the	  Committee	  for	  Coordination	  of	  Services	  to	  Displaced	  Persons	  in	  Thailand	  (CCSDPT)	  (Thompson	  26).	  Under	  its	  current	  arrangement	  with	  the	  RTG,	  UNHCR	  is	  allowed	  to	  monitor	  conditions	  in	  the	  camps,	  but	  cannot	  maintain	  a	  permanent	  presence,	  provide	  direct	  assistance,	  or	  register	  refugees	  within	  them.	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  a	  UNHCR	  official	  described	  the	  situation	  in	  Thailand	  as	  “It	  is	  not	  that	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  exercise	  our	  mandate:	  we	  cannot	  exercise	  our	  mandate.”	  (87)	  UNHCR	  has	  been	  further	  limited	  by	  restrictions	  imposed	  by	  the	  RTG	  regarding	  when	  and	  where	  status	  determination	  procedures	  can	  occur.	  Burmese	  refugees	  can	  only	  allowed	  to	  be	  processed	  within	  the	  9	  official	  camps,	  and	  only	  by	  PABs.	  The	  UNHCR	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  provide	  assistance	  to	  Burmese	  urban	  refugees	  or	  asylum	  seekers	  visiting	  its	  Bangkok	  office,	  or	  to	  registered	  refugees	  caught	  outside	  of	  camps	  and	  sent	  to	  immigration	  detention	  centers.	  Even	  in	  instances	  where	  UNHCR	  is	  able	  to	  issue	  asylum	  seeker	  or	  refugee	  identification	  cards—a	  process	  that	  reportedly	  takes	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months	  or	  even	  years—these	  documents	  do	  not	  protect	  the	  holders	  from	  arrest	  or	  deportation.	  Once	  a	  migrant	  has	  been	  arrested,	  UNHCR	  has	  very	  limited	  access	  to	  Immigration	  Detention	  Centers,	  and	  is	  unable	  to	  conduct	  status	  determination	  within	  the	  centers.	  	  The	  marginalized	  position	  of	  the	  UNHCR	  has	  thus	  resulted	  in	  “little	  ability	  to	  counter	  the	  Thai	  government’s	  ad	  hoc	  policies	  of	  containment	  and	  provides	  virtually	  no	  protection	  to	  Burmese	  asylum	  seekers	  outside	  of	  the	  camps”	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  7).	  UNHCR	  has	  been	  able	  to	  cause	  some	  minor	  shifts	  in	  the	  RTG’s	  response	  to	  asylum	  seekers,	  but	  the	  RTG	  maintains	  that	  the	  two	  are	  not	  equal	  working	  partners,	  and	  has	  actively	  moved	  to	  restrict	  the	  UNHCR’s	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  mandate.	  This	  relationship	  dynamic	  has	  not	  only	  hindered	  the	  UNHCR’s	  ability	  to	  implement	  effective	  protection	  mechanisms,	  but	  also	  completely	  eliminated	  the	  possibility	  of	  any	  advocacy	  efforts	  or	  collaboration	  on	  policymaking.	  The	  UNHCR	  Bangkok	  regional	  office	  echoed	  frustration	  with	  the	  RTG	  and	  an	  inability	  to	  effect	  significant	  policy	  changes.	  Rather	  than	  a	  collaborative	  or	  consultative	  relationship	  with	  the	  RTG,	  a	  UNHCR	  representative	  described	  their	  relationship	  as	  adversarial.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  agency	  on	  the	  part	  of	  UNHCR	  was	  reflected	  in	  my	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  the	  local	  Burmese	  population.	  Many	  were	  unfamiliar	  with	  the	  name	  UNHCR,	  or	  simply	  knew	  of	  “the	  UN”	  as	  the	  organization	  that	  helped	  them	  apply	  for	  resettlement.	  Some	  appeared	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  UN	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  some	  aid	  sporadically,	  but	  was	  otherwise	  uninvolved	  within	  the	  camp.	  When	  asked	  if	  the	  UN	  maintained	  an	  office	  or	  consistent	  presence	  within	  the	  camp,	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respondents	  seemed	  unsure.	  Some	  testified	  that	  they	  had	  to	  leave	  the	  camp	  and	  travel	  to	  the	  UN	  office	  during	  the	  series	  of	  interviews	  required	  for	  resettlement.	  	  However,	  despite	  unfavorable	  country	  circumstances,	  a	  report	  by	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  also	  condemns	  the	  UNHCR	  Thailand	  office	  for	  an	  unwillingness	  to	  respond	  quickly	  to	  incidences	  of	  publicized	  abuses	  or	  deportations,	  and	  for	  its	  general	  unresponsiveness	  to	  the	  specific	  needs	  of	  refugees	  and	  asylum	  seekers	  in	  need	  of	  protection	  (88).	  While	  the	  UNHCR	  is	  hampered	  by	  the	  antagonism	  of	  the	  RTG,	  it	  has	  also	  done	  nothing	  to	  address	  the	  stoppage	  of	  camp	  registration	  and	  discontinuation	  of	  the	  only	  formal	  means	  for	  Burmese	  refugees	  to	  attain	  refugee	  status.	  Further,	  UNCHR	  has	  failed	  to	  use	  Thailand’s	  membership	  on	  UNHCR’s	  Executive	  Committee	  as	  leverage	  to	  motivate	  further	  progress.	  Membership	  on	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  is	  open	  to	  states	  “with	  a	  demonstrated	  interest	  in,	  and	  devotion	  to,	  the	  solution	  of	  the	  refugee	  problem.”	  However,	  despite	  Thailand’s	  continued	  poor	  response	  to	  both	  the	  refugee	  crisis	  in	  general	  and	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  UN,	  it	  has	  been	  allowed	  to	  retain	  its	  membership	  on	  this	  Committee	  and	  faced	  no	  sanctions.	  
iii.	  Factors	  Influencing	  Policy	  Development	  
A	  number	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  influences	  have	  conspired	  to	  shape	  the	  Thailand’s	  asylum	  policy,	  many	  of	  which	  are	  consistent	  both	  throughout	  Thailand’s	  history	  and	  amongst	  other	  refugee	  hosting	  nations.	  These	  factors	  led	  to	  the	  refusal	  to	  sign	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  and	  the	  ad	  hoc	  administrative	  approach	  that	  have	  come	  to	  be	  hallmarks	  of	  the	  RTG’s	  response	  to	  the	  refugee	  situation.	  This	  approach,	  functioning	  in	  lieu	  of	  a	  formal	  asylum	  policy,	  pays	  little	  regard	  to	  the	  rights	  or	  needs	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of	  the	  refugee	  population	  itself,	  instead	  focusing	  on	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  political	  demands.	  The	  assumed	  temporariness	  of	  the	  Burmese	  refugee	  crisis	  has	  also	  proved	  key	  in	  this	  regard,	  as	  it	  resulted	  in	  a	  policy	  framework	  characterized	  by	  unsustainable	  short-­‐term	  solutions.	  Internally,	  through	  a	  changing	  political	  environment	  and	  domestic	  policy	  context,	  Thailand’s	  response	  to	  the	  refugee	  crisis	  has	  been	  primarily	  guided	  by	  a	  concern	  for	  national	  security.	  The	  cross-­‐border	  attacks	  that	  led	  to	  the	  initial	  consolidation	  of	  the	  camps	  caused	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  concern	  within	  the	  RTG	  and	  local	  Thai	  population	  living	  along	  the	  border.	  It	  also	  reinforced	  the	  RTG’s	  conception	  of	  the	  refugee	  crisis	  as	  primarily	  a	  security	  concern,	  due	  to	  the	  illegality	  of	  entry.	  Because	  of	  this,	  although	  a	  variety	  of	  ministries	  are	  involved	  in	  refugee	  issues,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  (NSC)	  was	  designated	  the	  leading	  government	  organization	  in	  charge	  of	  coordinating	  the	  RTG’s	  response	  (Vungsiriphisal	  et.	  al.	  37).	  Thai	  policy	  has	  thus	  always	  prioritized	  security	  concerns	  over	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  refugees	  themselves.	  The	  RTG	  has	  also	  remained	  sensitive	  to	  public	  opinion	  regarding	  refugees,	  which	  has	  been	  typically	  negative.	  Thai	  communities	  along	  the	  border	  tend	  to	  blame	  neighboring	  camps	  for	  increased	  competition	  for	  low-­‐skilled	  jobs,	  pollution,	  the	  spread	  of	  disease,	  and	  higher	  crime	  rates	  	  (Vungsiriphisal	  et.	  al.	  52).	  These	  concerns,	  while	  largely	  unfounded,	  have	  only	  strengthened	  the	  NSC’s	  claims	  that	  a	  confinement	  policy	  is	  the	  best	  approach.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  mediate	  any	  tension	  between	  Thai	  and	  refugee	  populations,	  RTG	  has	  developed	  restrictions	  so	  that	  the	  “level	  of	  humanitarian	  assistance	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  exceed	  the	  living	  standards	  of	  the	  Thai	  host	  communities”	  (Benner	  et.	  al	  25)	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Enforcing	  the	  confinement	  policy	  also	  coincides	  with	  the	  RTG’s	  concern	  for	  maintaining	  the	  temporariness	  of	  the	  refugee	  population’s	  stay	  in	  Thailand.	  The	  RTG	  has	  been	  the	  most	  consistent	  on	  this	  front,	  with	  continued	  aversion	  to	  any	  activities	  that	  might	  seem	  to	  support	  the	  idea	  of	  local	  integration,	  including	  vocational	  training	  programs,	  improved	  employment	  opportunities,	  or	  Thai	  language	  classes	  for	  camp	  residents	  (Vungsiriphisal	  et.	  al.	  49).	  Objections	  to	  local	  integration	  are	  purportedly	  rooted	  in	  concerns	  about	  creating	  a	  ‘pull	  factor’	  that	  could	  potentially	  draw	  thousands	  of	  more	  internally	  displaced	  Burmese	  across	  the	  border,	  but	  are	  also	  rooted	  in	  concerns	  about	  maintaining	  the	  cultural	  integrity	  of	  Thailand’s	  border	  towns.	  	  The	  lag	  between	  the	  start	  of	  the	  refugee	  crisis	  in	  1984	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  first	  durable	  solution	  program	  (the	  group	  resettlement	  scheme)	  was	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  similar	  fears	  about	  the	  resettlement	  program	  serving	  as	  a	  pull	  factor.	  Finally,	  in	  recent	  years	  refugee	  policy	  has	  taken	  a	  backseat	  to	  increasing	  domestic	  political	  unrest.	  Thailand	  saw	  it’s	  twelfth	  military	  coup	  during	  the	  beginning	  of	  2014,	  which	  threw	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  the	  country’s	  administrative	  framework	  into	  disarray.	  Despite	  growing	  concerns	  among	  refugees	  that	  this	  shift	  may	  result	  in	  mass	  involuntary	  repatriation,	  the	  junta	  has	  so	  far	  maintained	  its	  commitment	  to	  adhering	  to	  international	  standards	  governing	  voluntary	  return	  and	  there	  have	  been	  no	  formal	  changes	  in	  refugee	  policy.	  However,	  the	  military	  has	  increased	  enforcement	  of	  existing	  confinement	  policies,	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  refugees	  to	  travel	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  camps.	  These	  measures	  will	  likely	  serve	  to	  increase	  aid	  dependency	  and	  tensions	  within	  camps	  as	  refugees	  have	  reduced	  opportunities	  to	  become	  self-­‐reliant	  (The	  Border	  Consortium	  5).	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   In	  terms	  of	  external	  policy	  influences,	  Thailand	  has	  been	  working	  towards	  an	  improved	  relationship	  with	  the	  Government	  of	  Myanmar	  in	  recent	  years,	  and	  considers	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  confinement	  policy	  to	  be	  a	  galvanizing	  factor	  in	  this	  progress.	  The	  RTG	  has	  expressed	  fears	  that	  signing	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  or	  allowing	  for	  greater	  freedom	  of	  movement	  to	  and	  from	  the	  camps	  would	  be	  “seen	  as	  an	  unfriendly	  act	  by	  Myanmar”	  (Vungsiriphisal	  et.	  al.	  54).	  The	  RTG	  is	  also	  wary	  of	  the	  Convention	  because	  it	  would	  allow	  Thailand	  to	  be	  called	  before	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  on	  refugee	  issues,	  and	  could	  lead	  to	  expensive	  changes	  in	  policy.	  The	  Convention	  of	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child	  was	  already	  used	  successfully	  to	  force	  the	  RTG	  to	  make	  policy	  concessions	  that	  elicited	  fears	  of	  local	  integration;	  there	  is	  concern	  that	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  would	  be	  used	  likewise	  (Vungsiriphisal	  et.	  al.	  57).	  Further,	  the	  RTG	  views	  the	  “application	  of	  external	  standards	  or	  norms	  [to	  domestic	  refugee	  policy]	  as	  an	  encroachment	  on	  Thai	  sovereignty	  and	  contradictory	  to	  national	  interests”	  (Green	  et.	  al	  31).	   	  
iv.	  Durable	  Solutions	  
The	  RTG,	  many	  international	  NGOs,	  and	  research	  institutes	  within	  Thailand	  have	  traditionally	  presented	  resettlement	  and	  repatriation	  as	  the	  only	  two	  viable	  options	  for	  finding	  a	  durable	  solution	  to	  the	  Burmese	  refugee	  crisis.	  However,	  both	  of	  these	  solutions	  are	  problematic	  from	  both	  a	  practical	  implementation	  and	  human	  rights	  perspective.	  Although	  the	  RTG	  has	  pushed	  an	  agenda	  of	  reducing	  its	  long-­‐term	  commitment	  to	  the	  displaced	  persons	  residing	  within	  its	  borders,	  its	  narrow	  focus	  on	  shifting	  the	  burden	  of	  this	  population	  onto	  other	  states	  overlooks	  the	  agency	  and	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capacity	  for	  self-­‐sustainment	  and	  innovation	  displayed	  by	  the	  Burmese	  population.	  In	  addition	  to	  fulfilling	  its	  international	  legal	  obligations	  to	  provide	  refuge	  to	  persons	  fleeing	  from	  persecution,	  Thailand	  stands	  to	  benefit	  economically	  from	  considering	  a	  third	  durable	  solution—local	  integration.	  A	  survey	  of	  camp	  residents	  has	  indicated	  that	  local	  integration	  is	  the	  most	  popular	  option,	  especially	  for	  residents	  that	  have	  been	  living	  in	  the	  camps	  for	  more	  than	  10	  years.	  Of	  those	  surveyed,	  12%	  would	  prefer	  to	  return	  to	  Burma,	  45%	  wanted	  to	  resettle	  in	  third	  countries,	  and	  41%	  would	  like	  to	  stay	  in	  Thailand6	  (Vungsiriphisal	  et.	  al.	  77).	  These	  results	  are	  likely	  due	  to	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  including	  the	  long	  average	  length	  of	  stay	  for	  most	  Burmese,	  safety	  concerns	  regarding	  repatriation,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  information	  about	  resettlement.	  Despite	  being	  championed	  by	  the	  RTG	  and	  international	  community,	  both	  of	  these	  durable	  solutions	  have	  experienced	  a	  number	  of	  unique	  problems	  during	  their	  implementation	  in	  Thailand.	  
a.	  Repatriation	  
In	  2010	  Burma	  underwent	  a	  number	  of	  promising	  changes—a	  civilian	  government	  was	  formed,	  several	  ceasefires	  were	  negotiated,	  sweeping	  social	  development	  reforms	  were	  promised,	  and	  opposition	  leader	  Aung	  San	  Suu	  Kyi	  was	  released	  from	  house	  arrest.	  With	  hopes	  for	  a	  nationwide	  ethnic	  reconciliation,	  the	  international	  community	  responded	  by	  lifting	  several	  economic	  sanctions	  that	  had	  been	  imposed	  against	  Burma	  since	  the	  early	  1990s.	  While	  many	  humanitarian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  study	  oversampled	  refugees	  who	  had	  already	  applied	  to	  resettle,	  thus	  the	  percentage	  in	  favor	  of	  resettlement	  is	  likely	  overstated	  
	   41	  
organizations	  and	  asylum	  countries	  took	  this	  as	  a	  hopeful	  sign	  for	  future	  repatriation,	  a	  durable	  solution	  may	  not	  easy	  to	  engineer.	  According	  to	  the	  stipulations	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Convention,	  refugees	  must	  return	  to	  their	  home	  country	  voluntarily,	  or	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐refoulement	  has	  been	  violated.	  A	  survey	  conducted	  by	  the	  Karen	  Refugees	  Committee7	  following	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  ceasefire	  found	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  Karen	  refugees	  still	  did	  not	  want	  to	  return	  to	  Burma.	  Of	  the	  roughly	  6,000	  surveyed,	  46%	  wanted	  to	  resettle	  to	  a	  third	  country,	  27%	  wanted	  to	  live	  in	  Thailand	  outside	  of	  the	  camps,	  and	  27%	  would	  return	  home	  if	  peace	  were	  guaranteed	  (Saw	  Eh	  Na).	  Although	  few	  refugees	  have	  reportedly	  returned	  to	  Burma	  either	  temporarily	  or	  permanently	  according	  to	  The	  Border	  Consortium,	  the	  UNHCR	  has	  still	  developed	  a	  Framework	  for	  Voluntary	  Repatriation.	  The	  RTG	  has	  indicated	  its	  intent	  to	  follow	  the	  guidelines	  delineated	  within	  the	  Framework	  and	  to	  allow	  UNHCR	  to	  coordinate	  the	  eventual	  return	  process.	  However,	  despite	  these	  preparations,	  UNHCR	  reports	  misgivings	  amongst	  the	  refugee	  population:	  “while	  the	  majority	  of	  refugees	  do	  retain	  a	  strong	  desire	  and	  intention	  to	  return	  home,	  the	  current	  mood	  is	  one	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  resulting	  anxiety”	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  60).	  This	  statement	  seems	  to	  contradict	  both	  the	  findings	  of	  studies	  conducted	  to	  determine	  refugees’	  feelings	  about	  different	  durable	  solutions	  as	  well	  as	  the	  situation	  described	  by	  my	  interviewees,	  which	  indicate	  a	  clear	  preference	  for	  resettlement	  or	  local	  integration.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Survey	  conducted	  in	  the	  Tham	  Him	  refugee	  camp	  in	  Southern	  Thailand.	  6,195	  Karen	  refugees	  were	  polled	  about	  their	  preferences	  for	  the	  future,	  they	  were	  presented	  with	  three	  options	  representing	  the	  three	  available	  durable	  solutions.	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Of	  the	  people	  that	  do	  want	  to	  return	  to	  Burma,	  many	  no	  longer	  can.	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  land	  has	  been	  claimed	  by	  the	  state,	  villages	  have	  been	  relocated,	  and	  ethnic	  conflict	  has	  continued	  unabated	  in	  several	  states.	  Additionally,	  landmines	  contaminated	  a	  number	  of	  the	  townships	  from	  refugees’	  home	  states,	  making	  return	  and	  inhabitance	  there	  impossible.	  A	  large	  number	  of	  refugees	  have	  no	  legal	  status	  within	  Burma,	  and	  worry	  that	  their	  return	  would	  render	  them	  inhabitants	  of	  a	  country	  in	  which	  they	  have	  no	  rights.	  Refugees	  have	  retained	  extensive	  networks	  between	  the	  camps	  and	  Thailand,	  and	  are	  thus	  well	  aware	  of	  “signs	  that	  the	  reform	  process	  is	  backtracking”	  back	  home	  (The	  Border	  Consortium	  5).	  Many	  subsequently	  felt	  that	  nothing	  had	  changed	  at	  home,	  and	  there	  was	  nothing	  to	  indicate	  that	  conditions	  had	  improved	  enough	  to	  encourage	  their	  return.	  There	  are	  currently	  about	  400,000	  Internally	  Displaced	  Persons	  in	  Burma,	  underscoring	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  people	  no	  longer	  have	  homes	  or	  villages	  to	  return	  to.	  Furthermore,	  living	  within	  the	  camps	  in	  Thailand	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  subversion	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Burmese	  government.	  Refugees	  reported	  a	  fear	  of	  being	  associated	  with	  the	  camps,	  because	  Burmese	  military	  and	  police	  often	  assumed	  linkages	  to	  resistance	  groups	  or	  anti-­‐government	  sentiment.	  	  Finally,	  many	  Burmese	  have	  spent	  decades,	  if	  not	  their	  entire	  lives,	  within	  the	  camps.	  Even	  if	  conditions	  were	  to	  improve	  modestly	  in	  Burma,	  they	  have	  come	  to	  view	  the	  camps	  as	  their	  true	  home.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  among	  adolescents,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  born	  in	  the	  camps	  and	  had	  never	  even	  been	  to	  Burma.	  For	  them,	  resettlement	  often	  seems	  the	  best	  chance	  at	  finding	  a	  place	  to	  belong.	  Several	  interviewees	  reported	  that	  their	  parents	  had	  a	  much	  stronger	  desire	  to	  return	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home,	  but	  this	  did	  not	  always	  mean	  Burma—many	  expressed	  interest	  in	  returning	  back	  to	  their	  camp.	  When	  asked	  about	  voluntary	  repatriation,	  interviewees	  responded	  that	  it	  was	  rare	  for	  refugees	  to	  deliberately	  return	  to	  Burma.	  Family	  visits	  across	  the	  border	  were	  not	  uncommon,	  and	  sometimes	  people	  were	  arrested	  trying	  to	  cross	  back	  into	  Thailand.	  However,	  most	  people	  ultimately	  ended	  up	  returning	  to	  the	  camps.	  Those	  that	  did	  decide	  to	  return	  to	  Burma	  permanently	  often	  allegedly	  did	  so	  because	  of	  the	  financial	  incentive.	  “Sometimes	  officers	  would	  come	  by	  the	  camps,	  they	  would	  offer	  money	  and	  safe	  passage	  across	  the	  border	  in	  exchange	  for	  refugees	  giving	  up	  their	  cards,”	  one	  interviewee	  reported.	  “It	  was	  enough	  money	  that	  many	  people	  were	  tempted	  to	  take	  the	  offer.	  But	  once	  you	  give	  up	  your	  card,	  you	  can’t	  come	  back	  to	  the	  camp.”	  This	  account	  is	  a	  concerning	  reflection	  of	  the	  Thai	  military’s	  willingness	  to	  exploit	  the	  endemic	  poverty	  suffered	  by	  refugees	  living	  in	  camps	  to	  get	  them	  to	  sacrifice	  their	  legal	  rights	  and	  status	  and	  return	  to	  Burma.	  While	  the	  intent	  behind	  these	  actions	  is	  questionable,	  so	  is	  their	  effectiveness:	  “Some	  of	  the	  people	  who	  took	  this	  deal	  were	  tricked	  by	  the	  military.	  They	  would	  bribe	  leaders	  to	  tell	  people	  that	  it	  was	  safe	  to	  return,	  and	  people	  would	  listen.	  Some	  people	  who	  took	  the	  deal	  planned	  to	  just	  take	  the	  money	  and	  then	  cross	  back	  into	  Thailand	  to	  work.”	  This	  opportunity	  with	  the	  military	  allegedly	  only	  arose	  periodically.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  refugees	  wanting	  to	  try	  their	  luck	  living	  as	  migrant	  workers	  could	  always	  sell	  their	  refugee	  card	  to	  one	  of	  the	  thousands	  of	  unregistered	  camp	  residents.	  The	  price	  commanded	  for	  one	  of	  these	  cards,	  given	  the	  cessation	  of	  formal	  registration	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beginning	  in	  2005,	  is	  understandably	  high.	  Interviewees	  each	  knew	  of	  a	  few	  people	  from	  their	  camp	  that	  sold	  their	  cards	  with	  the	  hopes	  of	  returning	  to	  Burma,	  but	  were	  unsure	  of	  the	  fates	  of	  these	  individuals.	  	   Amongst	  the	  resettled	  refugees	  I	  spoke	  with,	  all	  adults	  reported	  a	  desire	  to	  return	  to	  either	  Thailand	  or	  Burma.	  The	  reasons	  they	  cited	  included	  a	  desire	  to	  “be	  buried	  in	  the	  homeland,”	  be	  reunited	  with	  family,	  or	  to	  help	  their	  community.	  Several	  adolescents	  expressed	  similar	  desires	  to	  return,	  but	  in	  the	  context	  of	  finishing	  their	  education	  in	  the	  US	  and	  returning	  in	  the	  capacity	  of	  social	  or	  health	  workers	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  camps.	  While	  many	  were	  interested	  in	  visiting	  Burma	  and	  some	  in	  working	  to	  help	  the	  country	  develop,	  most	  were	  born	  in	  the	  camps	  in	  Thailand	  and	  thus	  felt	  more	  allegiance	  to	  their	  countrymen	  than	  to	  Burma	  itself.	  When	  asked	  whether	  most	  camp	  inhabitants	  shared	  this	  sentiment,	  one	  interviewee	  confirmed	  that,	  while	  some	  members	  of	  older	  generations	  would	  like	  to	  return	  to	  Burma	  someday	  and	  some	  families	  were	  drawn	  to	  the	  educational	  and	  job	  opportunities	  promised	  by	  resettlement,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  camp	  population	  simply	  wanted	  to	  stay	  in	  Thailand.	  	   “It’s	  the	  only	  life	  they’ve	  ever	  known,”	  she	  told	  me,	  “and,	  all	  things	  considered,	  it	  isn’t	  that	  bad.	  Why	  would	  they	  give	  that	  up	  to	  move	  back	  to	  a	  country	  that	  doesn’t	  want	  them?”	  
b.	  Resettlement	  
	   Since	  the	  RTG	  first	  began	  allowing	  resettled	  in	  2005,	  approximately	  96,209	  refugees	  have	  been	  resettled	  to	  third	  countries.	  While	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  this	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number	  was	  resettled	  through	  the	  now-­‐ended	  US	  Group	  Resettlement	  Program,	  “a	  significant	  number	  remain	  in	  the	  pipeline”	  and	  the	  UNHCR	  will	  continue	  to	  process	  resettlement	  applications	  for	  purposes	  of	  family	  reunification	  (The	  Border	  Consortium	  10).	  While	  resettlement	  has	  been	  championed	  by	  both	  the	  international	  community	  and	  the	  RTG	  as	  a	  means	  for	  burden	  sharing	  and	  providing	  refugees	  with	  a	  higher	  quality	  of	  life,	  recent	  studies	  investigating	  the	  impact	  of	  resettlement	  reveal	  a	  mixed	  picture.	  Not	  much	  information	  is	  available	  about	  resettlement,	  and	  the	  information	  that	  is	  made	  available	  is	  often	  inaccessible	  to	  illiterate	  or	  working	  refugees	  (Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  2008).	  All	  of	  the	  refugees	  I	  interviewed	  reported	  hearing	  about	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  option	  for	  resettlement	  from	  their	  section	  leader	  within	  the	  camp	  during	  a	  town	  hall	  style	  meeting.	  	  While	  the	  Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  reports	  that	  “only	  2.4	  percent	  of	  those	  with	  no	  formal	  education	  have	  departed	  for	  resettlement;	  while	  of	  those	  with	  a	  post-­‐10	  education	  over,	  11.5	  percent	  have	  departed,”	  I	  experienced	  a	  more	  mixed	  demographic.	  This	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  a	  deliberate	  effort	  made	  by	  the	  US	  Group	  Resettlement	  Program	  to	  rectify	  imbalances	  in	  the	  initially	  resettlement	  demographics.	  Because	  some	  receiving	  countries	  gauged	  “integration	  potential”	  when	  selecting	  refugees	  for	  resettlement,	  the	  most	  educated	  and	  highly	  skilled	  camp	  residents	  were	  the	  first	  to	  be	  chosen.	  	  Despite	  efforts	  made	  by	  the	  US	  program,	  a	  report	  commissioned	  by	  the	  CCSDPT	  to	  gauge	  the	  impact	  of	  resettlement	  found	  that	  “a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  educated,	  skilled	  and	  experienced	  refugees	  have	  resettled	  first,	  relative	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population”	  (Banki	  and	  Lang	  44).	  The	  result	  was	  a	  “rapid	  depletion	  of	  skilled	  workers	  from	  the	  camps”	  that	  has	  continued	  despite	  the	  removal	  of	  integration	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potential	  criteria.	  This	  trend	  indicates	  that,	  even	  when	  resettling	  countries	  agree	  to	  accept	  refugees	  of	  all	  education	  and	  skill-­‐levels,	  refugees	  still	  tend	  to	  self-­‐select	  into	  resettlement	  based	  on	  their	  backgrounds.	  One	  key	  reason	  for	  this	  self-­‐selection	  could	  be	  how	  equipped	  for	  success	  refugees	  felt.	  While	  all	  of	  the	  families	  I	  interviewed	  ultimately	  resettled,	  several	  expressed	  initial	  misgivings	  about	  resettling	  because	  they	  were	  unsure	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  find	  work.	  One	  family	  that	  had	  a	  father	  working	  in	  what	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  skilled	  position	  in	  the	  camp,	  bemoaned	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  experience	  was	  not	  as	  valued	  in	  the	  US	  as	  they	  had	  hoped	  it	  would	  be.	  The	  subsequent	  loss	  of	  status	  and	  comparative	  wealth	  caused	  some	  degree	  of	  regret	  within	  the	  family.	  These	  accounts	  indicate	  that,	  as	  it	  is	  currently	  implemented,	  the	  resettlement	  program	  is	  doing	  little	  to	  target	  all	  camp	  inhabitants,	  and	  even	  less	  to	  prepare	  those	  interested	  in	  resettlement	  for	  their	  new	  lives.	  For	  the	  people	  left	  behind	  in	  the	  camps,	  the	  removal	  of	  community	  leaders	  and	  skilled	  workers	  has	  put	  a	  strain	  on	  service	  delivery,	  particularly	  in	  the	  health	  and	  education	  sectors	  (Banki	  and	  Lang	  44).	  Most	  school	  and	  hospital	  staff	  are	  refugees,	  and	  the	  high	  resettlement	  rate	  of	  these	  individuals	  has	  led	  to	  an	  unmet	  demand	  for	  trained	  workers	  as	  well	  as	  administrative	  personnel.	  Training	  replacements	  is	  time-­‐consuming,	  especially	  given	  the	  high	  turnover	  rate,	  and	  along	  with	  an	  absence	  of	  “educational	  guidance”	  caused	  by	  departed	  leaders	  the	  quality	  and	  duration	  of	  these	  trainings	  has	  taken	  a	  sharp	  drop	  (Banki	  and	  Lang	  45).	  Other	  primary	  employers	  of	  refugees	  within	  the	  camps,	  NGOs	  and	  Community	  Based	  Organizations	  (CBOs),	  had	  to	  replace	  approximately	  70%	  of	  their	  staff	  during	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  the	  resettlement	  program	  alone	  (Thompson	  28).	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   To	  rectify	  a	  perceived	  exclusion	  of	  refugee	  voices	  in	  assessing	  the	  success	  of	  the	  resettlement	  program,	  the	  Karen	  Women’s	  Organization	  (KWO)8	  released	  a	  formal	  statement	  claiming	  to	  represent	  popular	  sentiment	  regarding	  resettlement	  in	  2008.	  They	  echoed	  concerns	  about	  resettlement	  siphoning	  skilled	  labor	  away	  from	  where	  it	  is	  most	  needed	  in	  the	  camps,	  claiming	  that	  facilities	  and	  services	  have	  suffered,	  and	  that	  “since	  resettlement	  began,	  situation	  in	  the	  camps	  along	  the	  border	  has	  worsened	  significantly”	  (Karen	  Women’s	  Organization	  45).	  KWO	  added	  that	  these	  detrimental	  impacts	  were	  not	  only	  causing	  community	  structures	  to	  fall	  apart,	  but	  were	  also	  dividing	  families	  over	  whether	  they	  should	  stay	  and	  help	  their	  community	  or	  leave	  in	  the	  search	  of	  a	  better	  life	  (Karen	  Women’s	  Organization	  46).	  The	  main	  selling	  point	  for	  resettlement,	  they	  argue,	  is	  concern	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  children	  within	  the	  camps.	  Because	  the	  locally	  available	  education	  is	  not	  sufficient,	  parents	  feel	  that	  resettling	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  guarantee	  their	  children	  a	  decent	  education	  and	  a	  future.	  However,	  KWO	  believes	  that	  after	  20+	  years	  of	  surviving	  poor	  conditions	  in	  the	  camps	  together:	  “what	  has	  kept	  people	  going	  the	  hope—and	  the	  belief	  that	  one	  day	  we	  will	  return	  to	  our	  homeland,	  to	  a	  peaceful	  and	  democratic	  Burma.	  We	  have	  kept	  these	  dreams	  and	  have	  fought	  to	  educate	  our	  children	  and	  maintain	  a	  community	  structure	  which	  would	  sustain	  them	  when	  they	  return.”	  (Karen	  Women’s	  Organization	  45)	  Resettlement,	  they	  say,	  has	  undermined	  their	  ability	  to	  realize	  this	  dream.	  	   Concern	  for	  education	  and	  internal	  conflict	  regarding	  the	  resettlement	  decision	  were	  two	  common	  themes	  echoed	  by	  the	  currently	  resettled	  refugees	  I	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spoke	  with.	  In	  addition	  to	  expressing	  their	  desire	  to	  return	  to	  the	  camps	  because	  they	  felt	  a	  stronger	  sense	  of	  belonging	  there	  than	  in	  the	  US,	  many	  refugees	  described	  a	  sense	  of	  guilt	  associated	  with	  “abandoning	  their	  people.”	  One	  interviewee	  relayed	  the	  staunch	  opposition	  her	  father	  voiced	  to	  resettling	  the	  family	  to	  the	  US:	  “He	  had	  a	  good	  job,	  between	  the	  rations	  and	  his	  salary	  we	  had	  enough	  to	  live	  off	  of,	  and	  he	  felt	  that	  his	  work	  was	  benefitting	  the	  community.	  He	  lived	  most	  of	  his	  life	  in	  the	  camp,	  he	  didn’t	  want	  to	  leave	  his	  home.”	  Ultimately,	  the	  family	  ended	  up	  resettling	  so	  the	  children	  would	  have	  access	  to	  improved	  educational	  opportunities	  in	  the	  US.	  	  “Now	  that	  we	  are	  here,	  all	  he	  talks	  about	  is	  going	  back.”	  
C.	  Effect	  of	  refugee	  population	  on	  Thailand	  	   Despite	  the	  use	  of	  restrictive	  confinement	  policies,	  Thailand	  has	  still	  enjoyed	  economic	  benefits	  from	  the	  formal	  and	  informal	  employment	  of	  Burmese	  migrants.	  Two	  sectors	  that	  have	  traditionally	  employed	  extensive	  Burmese	  labor,	  agriculture	  and	  services,	  comprise	  12%	  and	  42%	  of	  Thailand’s	  annual	  GDP,	  respectively	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook	  2014).	  The	  reliance	  on	  migrant	  Burmese	  labor	  in	  these	  (and	  other)	  sectors	  was	  clearly	  evidenced	  in	  1997,	  when	  the	  mass	  deportation	  of	  undocumented	  Burmese	  workers	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  slew	  of	  bankruptcies	  in	  the	  areas	  and	  industries	  in	  which	  they	  had	  been	  predominantly	  employed	  (Arnold-­‐Fernández	  and	  Pollock	  92).	  The	  agricultural	  sector	  in	  particular	  has	  seen	  a	  recent	  increase	  in	  demand	  for	  low-­‐skilled	  labor	  as	  the	  native	  Thai	  workforce	  becomes	  more	  highly	  educated	  and	  turns	  away	  from	  3D	  (dirty,	  dangerous,	  and	  demeaning)	  jobs.	  The	  wages	  paid	  for	  this	  type	  of	  work	  are	  often	  well	  below	  minimum	  wage,	  and	  are	  thus	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viewed	  as	  unattractive	  to	  Thai	  workers	  that	  can	  command	  better	  pay	  elsewhere	  (Chalamwong	  3-­‐6).	  This	  demand	  combined	  with	  a	  sizable	  disparity	  between	  Thailand	  and	  Burma’s	  unemployment	  rates	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  long	  history	  of	  Burmese	  migrants	  laboring	  in	  the	  informal	  sector.	  The	  RTG	  has	  made	  attempts	  to	  regularize	  this	  practice	  by	  creating	  a	  formal	  migrant	  labor	  scheme	  that	  currently	  employs	  approximately	  1.3	  million	  Burmese	  migrant	  workers	  (Arnold-­‐Fernández	  and	  Pollock	  92).	  However,	  registration	  for	  a	  work	  visa	  under	  these	  regulations	  requires	  a	  Burmese	  issued	  national	  ID	  card	  as	  well	  as	  significant	  fees,	  which	  many	  migrant	  workers	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  are	  still	  an	  estimated	  1-­‐1.5	  million	  unregistered	  Burmese	  migrants	  continuing	  to	  work	  without	  formal	  permission	  (Arnold-­‐Fernández	  and	  Pollock	  92).	  	  	   A	  significant	  number	  of	  the	  Burmese	  migrants	  working	  in	  the	  informal	  sector	  in	  Thailand	  are	  likely	  de	  facto	  refugees.	  Refugees	  are	  at	  an	  even	  higher	  risk	  of	  being	  unable	  to	  secure	  legal	  working	  permits	  due	  to	  their	  fear	  of	  returning	  to	  Burma,	  or	  lack	  of	  legal	  recognition	  by	  the	  government.	  A	  recent	  study	  indicates	  that	  one	  solution	  may	  be	  to	  allow	  registered	  refugees	  to	  work	  in	  areas	  near	  the	  camp.	  In	  a	  survey	  of	  employers	  located	  near	  camps,	  27%	  admitted	  to	  already	  hiring	  displaced	  people	  illegally,	  while	  45%	  expressed	  interest	  in	  hiring	  displaced	  people.	  The	  most	  common	  reason	  cited	  for	  these	  preferences	  was	  a	  shortage	  of	  local	  labor	  (Chantavanich	  124).	  The	  study	  also	  cited	  a	  reported	  from	  the	  Federation	  of	  Thai	  Industry,	  which	  found	  that	  employers	  in	  Tak	  province9	  “could	  absorb	  more	  workers	  in	  the	  textiles,	  ceramics	  and	  electronics	  industries.”	  The	  report	  went	  on	  to	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  Home	  to	  several	  refugee	  camps,	  including	  the	  largest,	  Mae	  La	  Camp,	  which	  is	  home	  to	  45,000	  refugees.	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recommend	  the	  use	  of	  the	  local	  refugee	  population	  to	  shore	  up	  labor	  demands	  for	  seasonal	  agricultural	  work	  (Chantavanich	  124).	  However,	  these	  findings	  have	  been	  largely	  ignored	  by	  the	  RTG,	  which	  maintains	  that	  allowing	  refugees	  to	  work	  is	  tantamount	  to	  sanctioning	  local	  integration.	  Concerns	  that	  employing	  refugees	  “could	  induce	  future	  conflicts	  with	  the	  Myanmar	  government,”	  have	  also	  been	  expressed,	  along	  with	  a	  preference	  for	  using	  migrant	  workers	  to	  meet	  labor	  demands	  (Chalamwong	  6-­‐1).	  This	  viewpoint	  falsely	  assumes	  mutual	  exclusivity	  between	  migrant	  workers	  and	  Burmese	  that	  qualify	  for	  international	  protection.	  The	  majority	  of	  Burmese	  currently	  in	  Thailand	  are	  not	  living	  in	  the	  camps.	  They	  are	  working—documented	  or	  not—for	  minimal	  pay,	  living	  in	  precarious	  conditions,	  and	  often	  paying	  fines	  either	  directly	  or	  informally	  through	  bribes	  for	  the	  privilege	  to	  do	  so.	  Allowing	  refugees	  living	  in	  temporary	  camp-­‐settings	  to	  unleash	  their	  economic	  potential	  by	  regularizing	  their	  presence	  and	  work	  status	  within	  Thailand	  would	  benefit	  local	  economy	  and	  allow	  refugees	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  agency	  in	  their	  own	  lives.	  
D.	  Conclusion	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  Burmese	  refugee	  population	  has	  been	  living	  in	  Thailand	  for	  so	  long,	  they	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  considered	  temporary.	  Any	  impact	  on	  national	  security,	  culture,	  or	  the	  economic	  well-­‐being	  or	  border	  communities	  has	  already	  been	  absorbed.	  Through	  the	  tacit	  rejection	  of	  the	  camp-­‐based	  system,	  the	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  Burmese	  living	  and	  working	  in	  Thailand	  have	  made	  local	  integration	  an	  option	  for	  themselves,	  despite	  no	  legal	  protection	  from	  the	  RTG.	  Acknowledging	  and	  facilitating	  this	  arrangement	  would	  not	  only	  fulfill	  the	  requirements	  of	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international	  law	  by	  ensuring	  that	  the	  human	  rights	  of	  these	  migrants	  are	  respected,	  it	  would	  also	  save	  the	  RTG	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  money	  currently	  spent	  on	  immigration	  enforcement	  and	  humanitarian	  assistance.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  annual	  budget	  required	  to	  sustain	  the	  refugee	  population	  is	  currently	  spent	  on	  providing	  food,	  clothing,	  and	  shelter—all	  things	  that	  refugees	  could	  provide	  for	  themselves	  if	  they	  had	  permission	  to	  do	  so.	  Enabling	  more	  autonomy	  would	  reduce	  dependency	  on	  aid,	  thus	  better	  preparing	  refugees	  for	  a	  durable	  solution,	  and	  simultaneously	  reduce	  the	  financial	  burden	  of	  the	  population	  on	  the	  government.	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VII.	  Policy	  Outcomes	  in	  Thailand	  
A.	  Conditions	  within	  the	  Camps	  Living	  conditions	  within	  the	  camps	  are	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  poor.	  Conditions	  of	  long-­‐term	  confinement	  without	  opportunities	  for	  gainful	  employment	  or	  hope	  for	  a	  more	  permanent	  solution	  have	  led	  to	  a	  number	  of	  social	  problems.	  Camp	  residents	  must	  endure	  high	  rates	  of	  rape,	  domestic	  violence	  and	  substance	  abuse,	  periodic	  arrests	  and	  summary	  deportations,	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  youth	  gangs	  (CCSDPT	  2006).	  Many	  unaccompanied	  or	  separated	  children	  are	  living	  within	  the	  camps,	  and	  tend	  to	  be	  at	  a	  higher	  risk	  for	  abuse.	  The	  Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  estimates	  that	  70%	  of	  victims	  of	  rape	  and	  attempted	  rape	  within	  the	  camps	  are	  children.	  Further,	  as	  RTG	  policy	  forbids	  the	  use	  of	  permanent	  building	  materials	  within	  the	  camps,	  refugees	  must	  reside	  in	  temporary	  shelters	  constructed	  of	  bamboo.	  These	  living	  arrangements	  exacerbate	  existing	  social	  problems	  by	  making	  personal	  security	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  ensure.	  Approximately	  60,000	  of	  the	  140,000	  people	  living	  within	  the	  camps	  are	  unregistered.	  This	  figure	  is	  due	  partly	  to	  the	  cessation	  of	  formal	  registration	  processes	  in	  2005,	  and	  partly	  to	  the	  RTG	  practice	  of	  deregistering	  refugees	  that	  are	  caught	  attempting	  to	  work	  outside	  of	  a	  camp	  or	  are	  missing	  during	  a	  routine	  headcount.	  The	  unregistered	  population	  is	  of	  particular	  concern	  as	  they	  are	  only	  recognized	  by	  relief	  agencies,	  not	  the	  RTG.	  They	  subsequently:	  cannot	  get	  permission	  to	  travel	  to	  other	  camps	  for	  training,	  permission	  for	  medical	  referrals	  to	  the	  local	  Thai	  hospital	  takes	  longer,	  they	  cannot	  stand	  for	  the	  higher	  positions	  on	  camp	  committees	  and	  if	  they	  are	  caught	  outside	  of	  camp	  they	  are	  liable	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to	  arrest	  and	  deportation,	  whereas	  a	  registered	  refugee	  will	  usually	  be	  sent	  back	  to	  camp.	  (The	  Border	  Consortium	  9)	  Because	  of	  this	  large	  number	  of	  unregistered	  inhabitants,	  donors	  have	  begun	  reducing	  aid	  to	  avoid	  providing	  rations	  to	  economic	  migrants	  or	  others	  they	  fear	  are	  abusing	  the	  camp	  system.	  However,	  with	  no	  other	  means	  of	  earning	  income,	  this	  leaves	  many	  refugees	  experiencing	  cuts	  in	  basic	  assistance.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  camps	  are	  severely	  overcrowded,	  with	  insufficient	  food	  supplies	  and	  limited	  opportunities	  to	  supplement	  rations.	  	  
i.	  Work	  
Although	  there	  are	  an	  estimated	  2	  million	  Burmese	  working	  in	  Thailand	  supporting	  a	  number	  of	  key	  industries,	  refugees	  are	  not	  legally	  allowed	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  workforce	  (World	  Refugee	  Survey	  2009).	  To	  prevent	  local	  integration	  and	  emphasize	  the	  temporariness	  of	  their	  residence,	  the	  RTG	  has	  expressly	  forbidden	  working	  or	  earning	  money	  within	  the	  camps.	  As	  a	  result,	  refugees	  in	  the	  camps	  are	  entirely	  dependent	  upon	  humanitarian	  aid	  to	  survive.	  UNHCR	  cards	  and	  refugee	  status	  are	  not	  recognized	  outside	  of	  the	  camps,	  and	  a	  valid	  work	  permit	  is	  the	  only	  way	  a	  Burmese	  national	  is	  permitted	  to	  be	  in	  the	  country.	  If	  caught	  working	  without	  a	  valid	  work	  permit,	  regardless	  of	  camp	  residence,	  refugees	  are	  subject	  to	  arrest	  and	  deportation.	  Interviewees	  reported	  that	  arrested	  refugees	  were	  typically	  able	  to	  bribe	  their	  way	  out	  of	  jail	  or	  deportation,	  but	  could	  be	  subjected	  to	  physical	  abuse	  or	  forced	  labor	  if	  unable	  to	  pay	  the	  police.	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Despite	  the	  significant	  risks	  associated	  with	  seeking	  work	  outside	  of	  the	  camps,	  insufficient	  job	  opportunities	  and	  rations	  drove	  a	  reported	  40%	  of	  refugees	  to	  engage	  in	  income-­‐generating	  activities	  outside	  of	  the	  camps.	  Approximately	  23%	  of	  this	  population	  worked	  in	  the	  area	  around	  the	  shelter	  (Chantavanich	  124).	  Although	  many	  desperate	  refugees	  do	  venture	  outside	  of	  the	  camps	  in	  search	  of	  work,	  most	  job	  opportunities	  are	  made	  readily	  available	  to	  them	  due	  to	  a	  high	  demand	  for	  unskilled	  labor.	  Thai	  camp	  commanders	  reportedly	  help	  in	  organizing	  refugee	  work	  crews	  in	  collaboration	  with	  local	  Thai	  employers	  in	  exchange	  for	  a	  bribe	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  40).	  Some	  refugees	  reported	  finding	  work	  through	  these	  arrangements,	  but	  still	  being	  subjected	  to	  arrest	  and	  harassment	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  other	  police	  officers	  when	  caught	  outside	  of	  the	  camps.	  Other	  employers	  managed	  to	  hire	  refugees	  by	  circulating	  their	  information	  through	  informal	  networks	  within	  the	  camps,	  and	  then	  discreetly	  picking	  up	  refugee	  workers	  and	  ferrying	  them	  to	  the	  job	  site.	  Smugglers	  are	  also	  reportedly	  active	  within	  the	  camps,	  and	  offer	  to	  help	  refugees	  find	  a	  job	  and	  safe	  transportation	  for	  a	  fee.	  These	  arrangements	  make	  refugees	  vulnerable	  to	  human	  trafficking	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  exploitation	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  41).	  	   Indeed,	  all	  of	  the	  refugees	  I	  interviewed	  that	  had	  stayed	  in	  the	  camps	  reported	  engaging	  in	  supplementary	  income-­‐generating	  activities.	  Of	  these,	  only	  one	  reported	  holding	  a	  job	  within	  the	  camp.	  Most	  of	  the	  others	  reported	  working	  on	  farms	  nearby	  the	  camp,	  and	  one	  periodically	  lived	  in	  Bangkok	  to	  work	  as	  a	  housekeeper.	  Of	  the	  refugees	  that	  worked	  on	  farms,	  most	  worked	  for	  other	  people,	  and	  reported	  finding	  their	  jobs	  through	  word	  of	  mouth	  or	  through	  employers	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coming	  to	  the	  camps	  to	  advertise.	  One	  family	  was	  able	  to	  secure	  a	  small	  plot	  of	  land	  in	  the	  mountains	  near	  the	  camp	  and	  begin	  their	  own	  small	  farm.	  The	  woman	  that	  worked	  as	  a	  housekeeper	  reported	  that	  she	  heard	  about	  a	  group	  of	  women	  making	  the	  trip	  to	  Bangkok	  to	  become	  housekeepers,	  and	  was	  able	  to	  join	  after	  taking	  out	  a	  loan	  to	  pay	  a	  driver	  to	  sneak	  them	  out	  of	  the	  camp.	  While	  risky,	  she	  explained,	  this	  was	  a	  necessary	  measure	  for	  survival	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  jobs	  within	  the	  camp.	  	   There	  are	  few	  tracks	  for	  gainful	  employment	  within	  the	  camps:	  working	  for	  an	  NGO,	  teaching,	  serving	  as	  medical	  personnel,	  assisting	  with	  shelter	  management,	  and	  petty	  trading	  or	  weaving	  (Chantavanich	  125).	  Agriculture	  and	  animal	  husbandry	  respectively	  account	  for	  35%	  and	  25%	  of	  all	  income	  generated	  within	  the	  camps,	  and	  providing	  services	  or	  selling	  homemade	  products	  accounts	  for	  23%	  (Chalamwong	  3-­‐6).	  Teaching	  or	  working	  in	  the	  hospital	  are	  widely	  acknowledged	  as	  both	  the	  highest	  paying	  and	  most	  respectable	  job	  tracks,	  but	  these	  positions	  are	  limited	  to	  those	  that	  have	  finished	  their	  educations	  and	  received	  specialized	  training.	  For	  many	  of	  the	  younger	  generation,	  this	  is	  less	  of	  an	  issue,	  but	  the	  generation	  of	  refugees	  born	  and	  educated	  in	  Burma	  was	  limited	  by	  their	  incomplete	  schooling.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  majority	  of	  residents	  rely	  on	  agricultural	  activities,	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  camps,	  to	  supply	  their	  income.	  	   There	  has	  been	  some	  promising	  development	  regarding	  work	  opportunities	  in	  recent	  years.	  Driven	  primarily	  by	  NGO	  advocacy	  efforts,	  the	  RTG	  has	  allowed	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  pilot	  program	  establishing	  80	  refugee-­‐led	  agricultural	  activities	  just	  outside	  of	  Mae	  La	  Camp	  in	  northern	  Thailand.	  Refugees	  are	  permitted	  to	  farm	  this	  land	  and	  then	  sell	  their	  products	  at	  a	  market	  set	  up	  outside	  of	  the	  camp.	  This	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arrangement	  was	  negotiated	  by	  an	  NGO	  called	  ZOA	  Refugee	  Care	  working	  in	  concert	  with	  the	  RTG	  and	  local	  Thai	  Villagers	  (van	  der	  Stouwe	  and	  Oh	  47).	  The	  Border	  Consortium	  has	  also	  received	  permission	  to	  begin	  implement	  a	  Community	  Agriculture	  Program	  to	  provide	  the	  materials	  and	  land	  needed	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  more	  family	  gardens	  in	  and	  around	  camps,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  Entrepreneurship	  Development	  Program.	  This	  program	  supported	  the	  various	  entrepreneurial	  activities	  that	  have	  sprung	  up	  within	  camps	  by	  providing	  some	  training	  and	  start-­‐up	  capital	  (The	  Border	  Consortium	  17).	  However,	  these	  programs	  have	  only	  been	  implemented	  on	  a	  very	  small	  scale	  in	  some	  camps,	  and	  are	  threatened	  by	  recent	  funding	  cuts.	  
ii.	  Health	  
Health	  care	  within	  the	  camps	  is	  provided	  exclusively	  by	  NGOs,	  as	  refugees	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  national	  health	  plan	  or	  local	  health	  initiatives.	  There	  are	  programs	  in	  place	  to	  train	  refugees	  to	  become	  health	  workers,	  but	  retention	  is	  poor	  as	  these	  workers	  are	  frequently	  accepted	  for	  third	  country	  resettlement.	  Basic	  health	  services	  are	  provided,	  but	  a	  high	  incidence	  of	  infectious	  disease	  remains	  in	  most	  camps.	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  an	  unmet	  need	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  mental	  health	  services	  to	  refugees	  that	  are	  suffering	  from	  PTSD	  and	  other	  psychological	  disorders	  stemming	  from	  protracted	  confinement	  (CCSDPT	  2006).	  	  Most	  camps	  are	  served	  by	  one	  central	  hospital,	  which	  is	  funded	  and	  managed	  by	  NGOs	  and	  staffed	  primarily	  with	  refugees.	  While	  NGOs	  provide	  most	  services,	  occasional	  referrals	  to	  government-­‐provided	  services	  and	  hospitals	  are	  permitted	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(Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  2008).	  However,	  “while	  local	  Thai	  hospitals	  are	  willing	  to	  treat	  patients	  from	  camps,	  health-­‐focused	  NGOs	  pay	  the	  bills”	  and	  recent	  cuts	  in	  funding	  mean	  that	  these	  NGOs	  can	  only	  “refer	  the	  most	  urgent	  cases”	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  31).	  According	  to	  interviewees,	  this	  referral	  system	  was	  rarely	  used,	  and	  only	  in	  instances	  of	  life-­‐threatening	  accidents.	  Refugees	  suffering	  from	  chronic	  illnesses	  or	  other	  serious	  medical	  conditions	  had	  to	  make	  due	  with	  local	  hospital	  staff	  and	  over-­‐the-­‐counter	  medication.	  	   Funding	  cuts—as	  large	  as	  40%	  of	  the	  annual	  budget	  for	  some	  NGOs—has	  also	  resulted	  in	  the	  downsizing	  of	  health	  outreach	  staff	  and	  scaling	  back	  preventative	  care	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  30).	  Refugees	  additionally	  report	  noticing	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  health	  personnel,	  as	  the	  qualifications	  and	  training	  are	  abbreviated	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  need	  created	  by	  mass	  resettlement.	  While	  none	  of	  the	  refugees	  I	  interviewed	  had	  any	  complaints	  about	  the	  health	  care	  system	  within	  the	  camps,	  few	  had	  used	  it	  more	  than	  once.	  Refugees	  tended	  to	  view	  the	  hospitals	  as	  a	  place	  where	  they	  could	  go	  receive	  medicine	  if	  necessary,	  although	  supplies	  often	  ran	  short	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  what	  was	  available	  was	  over-­‐the-­‐counter.	  They	  appreciated	  that	  the	  hospital,	  treatment,	  and	  medication	  were	  all	  free-­‐of-­‐charge,	  and	  thus	  did	  not	  feel	  that	  critiquing	  the	  quality	  of	  care	  was	  appropriate.	  While	  some	  refugees	  reported	  the	  presence	  of	  foreign	  medical	  staff	  that	  provided	  a	  high-­‐level	  of	  care,	  the	  majority	  of	  hospital	  visits	  just	  involved	  seeing	  a	  nurse.	  Due	  to	  the	  short	  training	  and	  lack	  of	  medical	  equipment,	  there	  was	  a	  general	  distrust	  of	  the	  nurses’	  capability.	  However,	  refugees	  did	  report	  positive	  experiences	  with	  public	  health	  programs.	  Multiple	  interviewees	  reported	  the	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existence	  of	  healthcare	  personnel	  that	  would	  do	  home	  visits	  in	  the	  community	  to	  educate	  people	  about	  different	  health	  topics.	  Adolescents	  also	  reported	  receiving	  vaccinations	  on	  an	  annual	  basis.	  
iii.	  Education	  
Educational	  opportunities	  within	  the	  camps	  are	  restricted	  and	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  humanitarian	  aid.	  NGOs	  provide	  funding	  for	  school	  supplies,	  teacher	  training,	  and	  building	  fees.	  Only	  primary	  and	  secondary	  education10	  is	  available,	  and	  refugees	  themselves	  run	  the	  schools.	  There	  is	  no	  common	  curriculum	  utilized	  between	  camps,	  leading	  to	  wide	  disparities	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  education.	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  a	  high	  turn	  over	  rate	  among	  teachers,	  who	  are	  often	  prime	  candidates	  for	  resettlement,	  command	  very	  low	  wages,	  and	  are	  only	  required	  to	  complete	  a	  one	  month	  training	  course	  after	  finishing	  high	  school	  (CCSDPT	  2006).	  However,	  the	  possibility	  of	  utilizing	  non-­‐refugee	  teachers	  is	  hindered	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  nonresidents	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  camps	  overnight.	  Funding	  cuts	  has	  further	  hindered	  improvement	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  available	  in	  the	  camps,	  with	  teachers	  losing	  most	  of	  their	  stipends	  and	  school	  fees	  increasing	  by	  100%.	  Many	  families	  already	  found	  the	  cost	  of	  school	  fees,	  uniforms,	  and	  supplies	  to	  be	  prohibitive	  before	  these	  increases	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  33).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  only	  families	  that	  can	  afford	  to	  send	  their	  children	  to	  school	  are	  those	  that	  are	  wealthy	  or	  working,	  which	  further	  incentivizes	  parents	  to	  risk	  arrest	  or	  deportation	  by	  seeking	  work	  outside	  of	  the	  camps.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  highest	  level	  of	  education	  attainable	  in	  the	  camps	  is	  Grade	  10	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  Refugees	  are	  only	  allowed	  to	  achieve	  a	  post-­‐secondary	  level	  of	  education,	  and	  students	  are	  barred	  from	  leaving	  the	  camps	  to	  pursue	  higher	  education	  elsewhere	  in	  Thailand	  (van	  der	  Stouwe	  and	  Oh	  47).	  The	  curriculum	  used	  within	  the	  camps	  is	  developed	  based	  on	  multiple	  sources	  and	  is	  unaccredited	  within	  Thailand	  and	  Burma,	  thus	  offering	  little	  benefit	  or	  relevance	  to	  refugees	  once	  they	  have	  left	  the	  camp	  (van	  der	  Stouwe	  and	  Oh	  49).	  This	  is	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  service	  providers	  have	  been	  using	  a	  basic	  service	  delivery	  approach,	  which	  is	  ill-­‐equipped	  for	  protracted	  refugee	  crises	  as	  it	  places	  little	  emphasis	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  or	  sustainability.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  rising	  tuition	  costs	  and	  the	  perception	  that	  a	  camp	  education	  is	  not	  valuable,	  approximately	  18%	  of	  children	  have	  dropped	  out	  by	  the	  time	  they	  reach	  primary	  school	  (van	  der	  Stouwe	  and	  Oh	  47).	  Interviewees	  corroborated	  these	  figures,	  attesting	  that	  a	  large	  number	  of	  children	  stop	  attending	  school	  because	  they	  do	  not	  see	  the	  point	  of	  attending,	  or	  because	  their	  parents	  can	  no	  longer	  afford	  to	  send	  them.	  Many	  of	  these	  students	  end	  up	  seeking	  work	  outside	  of	  the	  camps,	  often	  leaving	  for	  months	  at	  a	  time	  to	  seek	  work	  in	  the	  city,	  leaving	  them	  extremely	  vulnerable	  to	  trafficking	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  exploitation.	  Assessments	  of	  educational	  opportunities	  within	  the	  camps	  have	  reported	  the	  existence	  of	  learning	  programs	  for	  adults	  and	  young	  people	  that	  are	  not	  attending	  school.	  These	  programs	  allegedly	  include	  courses	  in	  literacy,	  different	  languages,	  and	  vocational	  and	  community	  skills	  (van	  der	  Stouwe	  and	  Oh	  47).	  However,	  none	  of	  the	  refugees	  I	  interviewed	  were	  aware	  of	  any	  such	  programs.	  Even	  refugees	  that	  were	  from	  the	  biggest	  and	  most	  developed	  camp,	  Mae	  La,	  reported	  that,	  while	  there	  was	  school	  for	  children,	  there	  were	  no	  resources	  for	  them	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to	  improve	  their	  own	  language	  or	  literacy	  skills.	  They	  had	  similarly	  never	  heard	  of	  vocational	  training	  programs	  being	  offered	  within	  the	  camps,	  and	  did	  not	  have	  any	  friends	  that	  had	  attended	  such	  trainings.	  	  “Even	  if	  they	  did	  have	  trainings,”	  one	  woman	  asked,	  “what	  would	  be	  the	  point	  if	  there	  are	  no	  jobs?”	  	   Despite	  these	  less	  than	  ideal	  conditions,	  there	  have	  been	  a	  few	  promising	  changes	  made	  in	  refugee	  education	  policy	  in	  recent	  years.	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  particularly	  progressive,	  and	  has	  been	  pressuring	  the	  RTG	  to	  allow	  the	  implementation	  of	  more	  ambitious	  programs.	  This	  has	  allowed	  education-­‐oriented	  NGOs	  to	  advance	  their	  lobbying	  and	  advocacy	  efforts	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  opening	  up	  the	  camps	  and	  allowing	  more	  access	  to	  higher	  education	  options	  (van	  der	  Stouwe	  and	  Oh	  48).	  	   Such	  efforts	  seem	  to	  be	  gradually	  paying	  off.	  One	  refugee	  adolescent	  I	  interviewed	  spoke	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  scholarship	  a	  few	  years	  ago	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  allow	  refugee	  children	  to	  pursue	  higher	  education	  at	  a	  Thai	  university.	  Applicants	  had	  to	  return	  to	  teach	  in	  the	  camps	  after	  graduating,	  and	  it	  was	  only	  open	  to	  10	  students	  per	  year,	  but	  the	  symbolic	  value	  of	  the	  scholarship	  breaking	  the	  glass	  ceiling	  seemed	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  youth	  morale.	  She	  also	  discussed	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  schools	  that	  were	  funded	  and	  run	  by	  foreigners,	  and	  were	  of	  much	  better	  quality	  than	  the	  locally	  staffed	  schools.	  However,	  while	  these	  schools	  offered	  vital	  language	  skills	  and	  an	  improved	  curriculum,	  they	  were	  also	  far	  more	  expensive	  and	  thus	  inaccessible	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  camp	  population.	  	  
	   61	  
B.	  Refugees	  Outside	  of	  the	  Camps	  Although	  the	  camp	  system	  was	  developed	  to	  manage	  the	  flow	  of	  Burmese	  refugees	  into	  Thailand,	  it	  has	  been	  estimated	  that	  “fewer	  than	  one	  tenth	  of	  Burmese	  in	  Thailand	  have	  been	  able	  to	  access	  the	  camps”	  (Green	  et.	  al.	  31).	  Minority	  groups	  not	  deemed	  deserving	  of	  protection	  by	  the	  RTG	  (e.g.	  Mon,	  Shan,	  and	  Rohingya)	  are	  excluded	  entirely,	  and	  the	  RTG	  has	  sacrificed	  the	  consistency	  and	  objectivity	  of	  the	  admissions	  process	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  control	  the	  mushrooming	  camp	  population.	  In	  2005,	  the	  RTG	  issued	  a	  moratorium	  on	  refugee	  registration	  within	  the	  camps	  (Brees	  5).	  By	  2008,	  an	  estimated	  two	  million	  Burmese	  migrants	  were	  living	  in	  Thailand,	  many	  of	  whom	  had	  no	  opportunity	  to	  register	  for	  camp	  residency	  or	  refugee	  status	  (Brees	  5).	  The	  UNHCR	  is	  barred	  from	  conducting	  status	  determination	  interviews	  for	  Burmese	  asylum	  seekers	  in	  Bangkok,	  thus	  restricting	  access	  to	  documentation	  and	  resettlement	  to	  Burmese	  residing	  within	  the	  camps	  (Green	  et.	  al.	  31).	  This	  ban	  combined	  with	  the	  registration	  moratorium	  resulted	  in	  the	  thousands	  of	  Burmese	  continuing	  to	  flow	  into	  Thailand	  being	  forced	  to	  live	  outside	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  camps,	  under	  constant	  threat	  of	  deportation	  or	  detention,	  and	  without	  access	  to	  the	  UNHCR.	  While	  many	  of	  these	  migrants	  were	  undoubtedly	  moving	  in	  search	  of	  jobs	  or	  improved	  living	  conditions,	  a	  report	  by	  the	  International	  Rescue	  Committee	  (IRC)	  expressed	  concern	  “that	  there	  are	  significant	  numbers	  of	  Burmese	  living	  in	  Thailand	  who	  qualify	  for	  and	  deserve	  international	  protection	  and	  assistance,	  but	  who	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  proper	  registration	  processes”	  (Green	  et.	  al.	  31).	  Under	  this	  administrative	  framework,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  calculate	  an	  accurate	  estimate	  of	  both	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the	  total	  number	  of	  Burmese	  living	  in	  Thailand	  and	  what	  percentage	  of	  this	  population	  qualifies	  for	  international	  protection.	  The	  RTG	  has	  used	  this	  absence	  of	  data	  to	  brand	  all	  Burmese	  migrants	  living	  outside	  of	  the	  camps	  as	  illegal	  economic	  migrants,	  thus	  subjecting	  them	  to	  the	  1997	  Immigration	  Act.	  Even	  during	  periods	  of	  open	  registration	  within	  the	  camps,	  the	  mercurial	  admissions	  process	  has	  resulted	  in	  an	  incomplete	  system	  of	  protection.	  Because	  Thailand	  does	  not	  have	  a	  codified	  asylum	  policy,	  admissions	  procedures	  are	  subject	  to	  change	  frequently,	  with	  little	  to	  no	  transparency	  between	  the	  RTG,	  aid	  organizations	  working	  on	  the	  border,	  and	  the	  population	  of	  asylum	  seekers.	  As	  a	  result,	  “the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  Burmese	  in	  Thailand	  have	  either	  no	  legal	  status	  or	  only	  temporary	  migrant	  worker	  status”	  (Green	  et.	  al.	  31).	  For	  many	  migrants	  fleeing	  persecution	  in	  Burma	  the	  only	  viable	  option	  is	  to	  take	  up	  illegal	  residence	  in	  Thailand,	  “working	  in	  unsafe	  conditions,	  underpaid	  and	  at	  risk	  of	  trafficking	  and	  exploitation”	  (Green	  et.	  al.	  31).	  	   Little	  is	  known	  about	  the	  population	  of	  Burmese	  migrants	  living	  outside	  of	  the	  camps	  in	  Thailand.	  They	  are,	  as	  a	  rule,	  undocumented	  and	  thus	  exist	  on	  the	  peripheries	  of	  Thai	  society.	  Their	  status	  leaves	  them	  ineligible	  to	  apply	  for	  resettlement,	  and	  despite	  their	  ability	  to	  secure	  jobs	  and	  housing	  without	  the	  benefit	  of	  legal	  documentation,	  repatriation	  remains	  their	  only	  current	  legitimate	  option	  for	  a	  permanent	  solution.	  A	  survey	  of	  the	  Burmese	  populations	  living	  in	  Thai	  border	  towns	  conducted	  by	  the	  IRC	  found	  that	  approximately	  80%	  of	  this	  population	  had	  received	  no	  assistance	  from	  either	  the	  Thai	  government	  or	  international	  aid	  agencies	  (Green	  et.	  al.	  32).	  Despite	  the	  assertions	  of	  the	  RTG	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regarding	  the	  motives	  of	  this	  population	  in	  migrating	  to	  Thailand,	  the	  researchers	  found	  that	  “a	  great	  number	  of	  Burmese	  people	  currently	  living	  in	  Thailand	  without	  legal	  protection	  merit	  further	  investigation	  as	  to	  their	  refugee	  status”	  (Green	  et.	  al.	  32).	  These	  findings	  indicate	  not	  only	  negligence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  RTG	  in	  making	  legal	  protection	  accessible	  to	  all	  those	  fleeing	  persecution	  within	  its	  borders,	  but	  also	  a	  responsibility	  of	  the	  international	  community	  to	  target	  relief	  efforts	  at	  the	  entire	  asylum	  seeking	  population,	  rather	  than	  just	  those	  residing	  within	  the	  camps.	  Furthermore,	  although	  efforts	  to	  register	  undocumented	  Burmese	  workers	  have	  been	  made	  by	  the	  RTG,	  this	  solution	  provides	  only	  temporary	  legal	  status,	  and	  further	  leaves	  the	  family	  members	  of	  migrant	  workers	  unprotected	  and	  unable	  to	  access	  aid	  or	  resettlement	  options.	  As	  described	  by	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Watch:	  Burmese	  refugees	  in	  Thailand	  face	  a	  stark	  choice:	  they	  can	  stay	  in	  one	  of	  the	  refugee	  camps	  along	  the	  border	  with	  Burma	  and	  be	  relatively	  protected	  from	  arrest	  and	  summary	  removal	  to	  Burma	  but	  without	  freedom	  to	  move	  or	  work.	  Or,	  they	  can	  live	  and	  work	  outside	  the	  camps,	  but	  typically	  without	  recognized	  legal	  status	  of	  any	  kind,	  leaving	  them	  at	  risk	  of	  arrest	  and	  deportation.	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  1).	  However,	  some	  Burmese	  migrants	  have	  found	  a	  creative	  solution	  to	  this	  problem.	  	  
i.	  Family-­‐Splitting	  Arrangements	  
	   Despite	  patrolling	  by	  the	  Thai	  police	  force	  and	  strict	  entry	  and	  exit	  regulations,	  many	  Burmese	  have	  managed	  to	  maintain	  dual	  residency	  as	  a	  means	  of	  earning	  supplementary	  income.	  The	  2008	  Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  reports	  a	  common	  family-­‐splitting	  technique,	  in	  which	  some	  members	  remain	  within	  the	  camps	  to	  maintain	  their	  residency	  status	  and	  receive	  rations,	  while	  the	  others	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venture	  out	  in	  search	  of	  work.	  This	  existence	  of	  this	  arrangement	  was	  corroborated	  by	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  the	  local	  refugee	  population.	  Although	  all	  of	  the	  subjects	  interviewed	  have	  successfully	  applied	  for	  resettlement	  to	  the	  US	  and	  lived	  in	  the	  camps,	  all	  reported	  the	  existence	  of	  networks	  between	  the	  camp-­‐based	  population	  and	  the	  outside	  world.	  The	  environment	  they	  described	  was	  one	  characterized	  by	  a	  fluid	  population—the	  stringent	  rules	  restricting	  in-­‐camp	  employment	  opportunities	  and	  insufficient	  rations	  forced	  residents	  to	  seek	  opportunities	  for	  employment	  outside	  the	  perimeter	  of	  the	  camp.	  Although	  written	  approval	  is	  needed	  to	  enter	  or	  exit	  the	  camp,	  movement	  was	  so	  frequent	  that	  there	  were	  designated	  bus	  routes	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  camp.	  Refugees	  reported	  that	  the	  common	  course	  of	  action	  was	  for	  one	  or	  both	  parents	  to	  leave	  and	  find	  work	  in	  a	  Thai	  city	  for	  several	  months,	  leaving	  their	  children	  with	  a	  grandparent	  or	  other	  relative	  and	  returning	  every	  few	  months	  or	  as	  needed.	  Because	  UNHCR	  headcounts	  occurred	  sporadically	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  arrest	  and	  detention	  was	  high,	  the	  importance	  of	  cell	  phones	  was	  emphasized.	  Refugees	  would	  use	  cell	  phones	  to	  contact	  family	  members	  living	  or	  working	  outside	  of	  the	  camps	  to	  let	  them	  know	  to	  come	  home	  and	  to	  keep	  updated	  on	  the	  whereabouts	  of	  their	  loved	  ones.	  However,	  as	  the	  RTG	  became	  aware	  of	  this	  practice,	  refugees	  reported	  having	  their	  cell	  phones	  confiscated	  by	  the	  police	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  complicate	  family-­‐splitting	  arrangements.	  	  	   Despite	  control	  mechanisms	  utilized	  by	  the	  Thai	  police,	  refugees	  still	  reported	  the	  popularity	  of	  family-­‐splitting	  arrangements.	  Although	  the	  risk	  of	  arrest	  was	  high,	  so	  were	  the	  incentives	  to	  seek	  supplementary	  income.	  Job	  opportunities	  within	  the	  camps	  were	  limited,	  and	  nearby	  employment	  was	  often	  limited	  to	  low-­‐
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paying	  agricultural	  work.	  Working	  as	  a	  domestic	  helper	  or	  construction	  worker	  in	  a	  larger	  city	  such	  as	  Chiang	  Mai	  or	  Bangkok	  came	  with	  much	  greater	  risk,	  but	  equally	  greater	  compensation.	  As	  an	  added	  incentive	  to	  seek	  work	  outside	  of	  the	  camp,	  refugees	  reported	  being	  able	  to	  capitalize	  on	  the	  large	  unregistered	  population	  living	  within	  the	  camp	  by	  selling	  off	  unused	  portions	  of	  their	  monthly	  rations.	  For	  refugees	  that	  felt	  confident	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  survive	  outside	  of	  the	  camp	  or	  were	  more	  interested	  in	  integration	  than	  waiting	  for	  resettlement,	  selling	  one’s	  UNHCR	  card	  could	  fetch	  a	  hefty	  price.	  In	  this	  way,	  commuting	  between	  life	  inside	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  camp	  and	  navigating	  the	  tenuous	  distinction	  between	  a	  refugee	  and	  undocumented	  worker	  provided	  the	  opportunity	  for	  families	  to	  diversify	  risk	  and	  benefit	  from	  the	  “best	  of	  both	  worlds.”	  As	  one	  refugee	  reported,	  life	  outside	  of	  the	  camps	  appealed	  to	  many,	  regardless	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  arrest,	  but	  the	  provision	  of	  rations	  and	  option	  of	  applying	  for	  resettlement	  were	  too	  attractive	  to	  forego.	  The	  hybrid	  lifestyle	  chosen	  by	  many	  facing	  this	  dilemma	  further	  underscores	  the	  need	  for	  increased	  freedom	  of	  movement	  and	  employment	  opportunities	  within	  the	  camp,	  and	  the	  demand	  for	  a	  local	  integration	  option	  among	  the	  refugee	  population.	  	   One	  woman	  I	  interviewed	  had	  participated	  in	  a	  family-­‐splitting	  arrangement,	  in	  which	  she	  left	  to	  work	  in	  Bangkok	  while	  her	  husband	  remained	  in	  the	  camp	  with	  their	  children.	  She	  reports	  feeling	  conflicted	  and	  afraid	  about	  leaving	  to	  seek	  work	  because	  it	  was	  very	  difficult	  to	  find	  someone	  willing	  to	  ferry	  refugees	  to	  Bangkok,	  and	  they	  were	  often	  untrustworthy.	  She	  says	  that	  she	  was	  lucky,	  but	  after	  making	  the	  initial	  journey	  into	  the	  city	  she	  heard	  of	  refugee	  women	  that	  were	  promised	  housekeeping	  jobs	  instead	  being	  sold	  into	  sex	  slavery.	  Fortunately,	  due	  to	  the	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comparatively	  high	  salary	  she	  was	  able	  to	  earn	  working	  in	  the	  city,	  she	  was	  not	  forced	  to	  make	  this	  trip	  many	  times.	  	  	   While	  a	  family-­‐splitting	  arrangement	  was	  regarded	  as	  an	  attractive	  option	  given	  the	  circumstances	  by	  most	  of	  the	  families	  I	  interviewed,	  they	  also	  spoke	  of	  its	  inherent	  dangers.	  Because	  the	  camps	  are	  situated	  along	  the	  border,	  and	  far	  from	  any	  major	  cities,	  refugees	  often	  had	  to	  travel	  by	  bus	  to	  find	  work.	  Police	  would	  often	  stop	  these	  buses	  as	  they	  both	  came	  and	  left	  from	  the	  camps,	  and	  require	  documentation	  from	  all	  passengers.	  Those	  found	  to	  be	  without	  permission	  to	  leave	  the	  camp	  or	  a	  temporary	  work	  permit	  were	  arrested.	  Arrests	  within	  the	  cities	  during	  sweeps	  of	  known	  refugee-­‐employers	  were	  also	  common.	  In	  these	  instances,	  the	  ability	  to	  communicate	  with	  one’s	  family	  was	  critical	  for	  securing	  the	  bribe	  money	  necessary	  to	  escape	  detention.	  While	  the	  crackdown	  on	  cell	  phone	  ownership	  made	  this	  communication	  more	  difficult,	  refugees	  reported	  that,	  in	  most	  cases,	  word	  would	  eventually	  get	  back	  to	  the	  family	  and	  the	  individual	  would	  be	  able	  to	  return.	  Some	  people,	  however,	  left	  and	  were	  never	  heard	  from	  again.	  The	  lack	  of	  documentation	  and	  legal	  framework	  governing	  the	  existence	  of	  Burmese	  migrants	  in	  Thailand	  makes	  their	  permanent	  detention	  and	  sale	  into	  human	  trafficking	  networks	  not	  only	  possible,	  but	  common.	  	  
C.	  Documented	  Abuses	  There	  have	  been	  several	  well-­‐publicized	  incidents	  involving	  human	  rights	  abuses	  by	  the	  RTG	  that	  have	  elicited	  condemnation	  from	  the	  international	  community.	  Thousands	  of	  undocumented	  migrants,	  including	  refugees	  and	  asylum	  seekers,	  are	  detained,	  arrested,	  and	  deported	  each	  year.	  Poor	  conditions	  in	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immigration	  detention	  centers,	  mass	  deportations,	  and	  cases	  of	  refugees	  being	  detained	  indefinitely	  are	  also	  well	  documented.	  The	  US	  Committee	  for	  Refugees	  and	  Immigrants	  listed	  Thailand	  among	  the	  worst	  countries	  for	  refugees	  in	  a	  2009	  report.	  The	  report	  cited	  a	  well-­‐publicized	  instance	  in	  which	  the	  Thai	  navy	  intercepted	  a	  boat	  carrying	  around	  900	  asylum-­‐seekers	  from	  Burma,	  beat	  them,	  and	  then	  abandoned	  them	  at	  sea	  without	  functioning	  engines,	  food,	  or	  water.	  Although	  this	  event	  was	  unusual	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  international	  press	  attention	  it	  gained,	  it	  was	  far	  from	  atypical	  of	  the	  RTG’s	  hostile	  response	  to	  Burmese	  displaced	  persons	  and	  other	  migrants.	  A	  2006	  survey	  of	  2,299	  camp-­‐based	  refugees	  found	  that	  16%	  had	  experienced	  forcible	  return	  to	  Burma,	  33%	  had	  been	  arrested,	  and	  73%	  of	  those	  arrested	  claimed	  it	  was	  because	  they	  were	  caught	  outside	  of	  the	  camp	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  38).	  Aside	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  free	  movement	  to	  and	  from	  the	  camps,	  interviewees’	  most	  common	  complaints	  were	  about	  various	  abuses	  of	  power	  by	  the	  authority	  figures.	  One	  woman	  described	  the	  general	  relationship	  between	  the	  police	  and	  the	  refugee	  population	  as	  an	  uneasy	  peace.	  While	  most	  camp	  residents	  were	  afraid	  of	  police,	  they	  also	  grew	  accustomed	  to	  their	  constant	  presence	  and	  thus	  became	  desensitized	  to	  petty	  daily	  interactions	  and	  harassment.	  However,	  multiple	  refugees	  gave	  accounts	  of	  the	  military	  coming	  by	  their	  camp	  once	  a	  year	  and	  forcing	  all	  refugees	  to	  leave	  and	  wait	  in	  the	  mountains	  near	  the	  camp.	  The	  military	  would	  then	  search	  through	  the	  homes	  and	  belongings	  of	  the	  refugees,	  without	  explanation,	  before	  allowing	  them	  to	  return.	  One	  year,	  one	  woman	  reported,	  the	  military	  took	  all	  of	  the	  chickens	  out	  of	  the	  camp	  and	  slaughtered	  them.	  Several	  other	  incidents	  were	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reported	  of	  the	  police	  or	  military	  raiding	  refugee-­‐owned	  shops	  and	  taking	  money	  or	  goods.	  Because	  of	  this,	  said	  the	  interviewee,	  no	  one	  ever	  really	  felt	  like	  they	  “owned”	  anything—everything	  was	  subject	  to	  seizure.	  	  
i.	  Deportations	  
The	  most	  critical	  right	  for	  a	  refugee	  delineated	  in	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  is	  the	  protection	  from	  refoulement.	  Despite	  claims	  of	  recognizing	  the	  needs	  of	  “persons	  fleeing	  from	  fighting,”	  the	  RTG	  frequently	  deports	  Burmese	  citizens,	  many	  of	  whom	  are	  refugees.	  Reports	  estimate	  that	  deportations	  to	  Burma	  can	  range	  as	  high	  as	  10,000	  a	  month	  (CCSDPT	  2006).	  The	  two	  main	  types	  of	  deportation	  used	  by	  the	  RTG	  can	  be	  classified	  as	  “soft	  deportations”	  and	  formal	  deportations.	  The	  former	  refers	  to	  the	  return	  of	  individuals	  or	  small	  groups	  of	  Burmese	  to	  border	  areas	  controlled	  by	  “ethnic	  armed	  groups	  allied	  with	  the	  central	  authorities”	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  121).	  Formal	  deportations	  occur	  at	  official	  border	  checkpoints,	  and	  involve	  the	  return	  of	  deportees	  directly	  to	  the	  Burmese	  government.	  	  Soft	  deportations	  are	  by	  far	  the	  RTG’s	  preferred	  approach,	  2011	  alone	  saw	  an	  estimated	  143,000	  soft	  deportations,	  down	  from	  a	  staggering	  205,500	  in	  2010.	  When	  interviewed,	  many	  of	  these	  individuals	  stated	  that	  they	  returned	  to	  Thailand	  within	  a	  day	  or	  two	  of	  their	  deportation	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  121).	  The	  cyclical	  nature	  of	  deportation	  and	  return	  is	  due	  in	  part	  to	  an	  extremely	  porous	  border,	  and	  partly	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  RTG’s	  deportation	  practices.	  Soft	  deportations	  often	  result	  in	  migrants	  being	  handed	  over	  to	  ethnic	  military	  groups,	  who	  then	  demand	  a	  bribe	  or	  forced	  labor	  before	  releasing	  deportees	  and	  allowing	  them	  to	  re-­‐cross	  the	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border	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  38).	  In	  instances	  where	  deportees	  aren’t	  handed	  directly	  to	  military	  groups,	  smugglers	  and	  brokers	  are	  often	  waiting	  in	  Burma	  to	  recruit	  new	  customers.	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  members	  of	  the	  Thai	  military	  collude	  with	  these	  individuals	  in	  exchange	  for	  a	  bribe	  (Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  2008).	  	  Formal	  deportations	  are	  arranged	  between	  the	  RTG	  and	  Burmese	  governments	  directly,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  2002	  arrangement	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  deportation	  of	  over	  19,000	  Burmese	  over	  a	  four-­‐month	  period	  (Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  2008).	  While	  those	  being	  deported	  are	  not	  considered	  refugees	  by	  the	  RTG,	  many	  are	  likely	  de	  facto	  refugees	  and	  qualify	  for	  protection	  against	  refoulement.	  All	  returnees	  are	  required	  to	  provide	  information	  to	  the	  Burmese	  government	  about	  their	  reasons	  for	  leaving	  illegally.	  As	  the	  government	  views	  the	  Thai	  refugee	  camps	  as	  strongholds	  of	  rebels	  and	  dissenters,	  those	  admitting	  to	  seeking	  asylum	  in	  Thailand	  have	  been	  subjected	  to	  arrest	  or	  execution	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  126).	  Refugees	  have	  reported	  lying	  about	  their	  reasons	  for	  going	  to	  Thailand,	  claiming	  that	  being	  a	  migrant	  worker	  is	  much	  safer	  than	  being	  a	  refugee.	  Similarly,	  refugees	  reported	  leaving	  all	  documentation	  behind	  when	  crossing	  the	  border,	  for	  fear	  of	  being	  caught	  with	  a	  refugee	  or	  asylum	  seeker	  identification	  card.	  Among	  the	  refugees	  I	  interviewed,	  few	  had	  any	  personal	  experience	  with	  deportation,	  although	  all	  had	  multiple	  friends	  and	  relatives	  that	  had	  been	  deported.	  However,	  it	  was	  far	  more	  common	  for	  people	  to	  be	  detained	  and	  then	  bribe	  their	  way	  out	  of	  deportation.	  Interviewees	  also	  claimed	  that	  community	  service	  has	  also	  become	  an	  option	  for	  refugees	  that	  are	  caught	  outside	  of	  the	  camps	  and	  cannot	  
	   70	  
afford	  to	  pay	  off	  police	  officers.	  However,	  it	  was	  almost	  always	  possible	  to	  pay	  off	  the	  police	  due	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  lenders	  within	  the	  camp.	  One	  interviewee	  reported	  that	  her	  aunt	  and	  a	  few	  other	  wealthy	  individuals	  within	  her	  camp	  circulated	  their	  contact	  information,	  and	  were	  available	  to	  provide	  loans	  in	  the	  case	  of	  arrest	  or	  detention.	  These	  individuals	  allegedly	  charged	  a	  high	  interest	  rate	  for	  the	  repayment	  of	  these	  loans,	  which	  were	  given	  as	  a	  means	  of	  earning	  a	  profit	  rather	  than	  out	  of	  any	  sense	  of	  community	  solidarity.	  
ii.	  Immigration	  Detention	  Centers	  
	   Thailand’s	  Immigration	  Detention	  Centers	  (IDCs)	  have	  become	  internationally	  notorious	  for	  their	  inhumane	  conditions.	  Although	  Burmese	  nationals	  usually	  only	  spend	  a	  few	  days	  or	  weeks	  in	  IDCs	  before	  being	  deported	  or	  bribing	  their	  way	  to	  freedom,	  some	  individuals	  and	  refugees	  from	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  border	  Thailand	  are	  less	  fortunate.11	  Held	  without	  trial,	  these	  detainees	  must	  wait	  for	  their	  families	  to	  transfer	  them	  enough	  money	  for	  them	  to	  bribe	  their	  way	  out	  of	  detention	  and	  self-­‐deport	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  93).	  For	  many,	  this	  has	  resulted	  in	  indefinite	  detention	  with	  no	  access	  to	  the	  UNHCR	  or	  hope	  for	  future	  freedom.	  Conditions	  within	  the	  IDC	  are	  reported	  to	  be	  unhygienic	  and	  overcrowded,	  with	  no	  access	  to	  adequate	  food,	  healthcare,	  or	  contact	  with	  the	  outside	  world.	  The	  fear	  of	  being	  sent	  to	  an	  IDC	  is	  so	  deep,	  many	  urban	  refugees	  report	  being	  unable	  to	  go	  to	  school	  or	  to	  work,	  and	  only	  leaving	  the	  house	  to	  buy	  food.	  Refugee	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  This	  group	  includes	  the	  Rohingya	  ethnic	  minority	  group.	  They	  are	  stateless	  individuals	  and	  not	  recognized	  as	  Burmese	  nationals,	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  formally	  deported	  back	  to	  Burma.	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identification	  cards	  do	  not	  provide	  for	  release	  in	  the	  event	  of	  arrest,	  and	  the	  UNHCR	  is	  unable	  to	  intervene	  on	  behalf	  of	  detained	  refugees	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  93).	  Although	  the	  UNHCR	  has	  no	  legal	  standing	  to	  intervene	  in	  these	  circumstances,	  Thailand	  is	  party	  to	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (ICCPR),	  which	  prohibits	  arbitrary	  arrest	  or	  detention.	  Indefinite	  detention	  is	  in	  direct	  violation	  of	  the	  ICCPR,	  yet	  legal	  experts	  and	  advocates	  have	  so	  only	  made	  minor	  headway	  in	  securing	  UNHCR	  access	  and	  trials	  for	  detained	  refugees.	  
iii.	  Minority	  Groups	  
Recognition	  of	  refugee	  status	  by	  the	  RTG	  has	  traditionally	  occurred	  along	  ethnic	  lines,	  with	  the	  government	  making	  status	  determination	  decisions	  on	  a	  macro	  rather	  than	  individual	  level.	  As	  a	  result,	  ethnic	  groups	  like	  the	  Shan,	  Mon,	  and	  Rohingya	  have	  been	  denied	  access	  to	  the	  refugee	  camps	  and	  subject	  to	  deportation	  despite	  facing	  ethnic	  persecution	  in	  Burma.	  These	  minorities	  are	  	  at	  the	  greatest	  risk	  of	  being	  trafficked,	  and	  they	  experience	  various	  abuses	  that	  may	  indicate	  trafficking,	  including	  the	  withholding	  of	  travel	  documents,	  migrant	  registration	  cards,	  work	  permits,	  and	  wages.	  They	  may	  also	  experience	  illegal	  salary	  deductions	  by	  employers,	  physical	  and	  verbal	  abuse,	  and	  threats	  of	  deportation	  (TiP	  Report	  2014	  373)	  The	  two	  most	  populous	  minority	  groups	  present	  in	  Thailand	  without	  access	  to	  legal	  protection	  are	  the	  Shan	  and	  Rohingya.	  	  There	  are	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  Shan	  asylum	  seekers	  living	  within	  Thailand,	  fleeing	  forced	  relocation	  and	  oppressive	  policies	  by	  the	  Burmese	  government,	  that	  are	  forced	  to	  live	  as	  undocumented	  workers	  (Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  2008).	  However,	  the	  plight	  of	  the	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Rohingya,	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  persecuted	  minorities	  in	  the	  world,	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  egregious	  ongoing	  human	  rights	  abuse	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  RTG	  against	  refugees.	  	   The	  Rohingya	  are	  a	  stateless	  minority	  originating	  from	  the	  Rakhine	  state	  in	  northwest	  Burma.	  The	  Burmese	  government	  does	  not	  recognize	  their	  citizenship	  claims,	  which	  has	  led	  to	  mass	  persecution	  and	  violent	  suppression.	  This	  also	  means	  that	  they	  are	  ineligible	  for	  the	  Thai	  work	  visa	  program	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  75).	  The	  RTG	  considers	  all	  Rohingya	  to	  be	  economic	  migrants,	  and	  thus	  has	  banned	  them	  from	  admittance	  into	  any	  of	  the	  camps.	  The	  UNHCR	  is	  also	  not	  allowed	  to	  process	  Rohingya	  for	  refugee	  status	  determinations	  or	  statelessness	  assessments.	  However,	  despite	  recently	  negotiated	  ceasefires	  and	  some	  easing	  of	  tensions	  elsewhere	  in	  Burma,	  Rohingya	  continue	  to	  be	  persecuted	  and	  thus	  continue	  to	  stream	  across	  the	  border.	  Estimates	  of	  the	  Rohingya	  population	  currently	  in	  Thailand	  range	  from	  the	  tens	  to	  hundreds	  of	  thousands,	  all	  of	  whom	  are	  forced	  to	  work	  illegally	  to	  survive	  (Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  2008).	  	   There	  have	  been	  several	  international	  incidents	  regarding	  the	  treatment	  of	  Rohingya	  refugees	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Thai	  military.	  The	  official	  policy	  of	  the	  RTG	  regarding	  Rohingya—who	  typically	  come	  to	  Thailand	  via	  boat—was	  to	  have	  the	  navy	  push	  the	  boats	  back	  out	  to	  sea.	  However,	  the	  RTG	  was	  forced	  to	  change	  this	  policy	  following	  a	  2008	  incident	  in	  which	  the	  Thai	  Navy	  was	  accused	  of	  causing	  the	  death	  of	  over	  550	  Rohingya	  refugees	  after	  abandoning	  them	  in	  international	  waters	  with	  insufficient	  supplies	  and	  fuel	  (Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  2008).	  A	  2013	  Reuters	  special	  report	  on	  the	  fishing	  industry	  in	  Thailand	  revealed	  the	  new	  informal	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policy:	  to	  sell	  Rohingya	  detainees	  into	  slavery.	  The	  report	  indicted	  a	  number	  of	  Thai	  officials	  and	  naval	  officers	  who	  profited	  from	  the	  apprehension	  and	  sale	  of	  Rohingya	  refugees	  to	  human	  traffickers,	  who	  then	  elicited	  bribes	  from	  their	  families	  or	  sold	  them	  into	  forced	  labor	  on	  fishing	  vessels	  (TiP	  Report	  2014	  373).	  According	  to	  the	  US	  Trafficking	  in	  Persons	  (TiP)	  Report	  from	  2014,	  Thai	  officials	  profited	  so	  greatly	  from	  this	  venture	  that	  they	  began	  actively	  diverting	  vessels	  carrying	  Rohingya	  to	  Malaysia	  and	  systematically	  removing	  Rohingya	  men	  from	  detention	  facilities	  (TiP	  Report	  2014	  373).	  These	  actions	  not	  only	  perpetuate	  the	  exploitation	  of	  an	  already	  persecuted	  minority,	  but	  also	  indicate	  the	  complicity	  in	  the	  mistreatment	  of	  refugees	  by	  officials	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  the	  RTG.	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VIII.	  Asylum	  Policy	  in	  Malaysia	  
A.	  Background	  	   Malaysia	  has	  become	  an	  increasingly	  popular	  destination	  for	  asylum	  seekers	  in	  recent	  years,	  and	  currently	  hosts	  a	  registered	  refugee	  population	  that	  is	  roughly	  the	  same	  size	  as	  Thailand’s.	  Although	  Malaysia	  does	  not	  share	  a	  border	  with	  Burma,	  it	  is	  close	  enough	  for	  migrants	  to	  reach	  via	  boat	  or	  overland	  journey	  through	  the	  south	  of	  Thailand.	  This	  has	  become	  an	  important	  pull	  factor	  for	  Burmese	  asylum	  seekers,	  as	  they	  cannot	  be	  deported	  back	  to	  Burma	  directly	  from	  Malaysia.	  Other	  pull	  factors	  to	  Malaysia	  include	  its	  diverse	  population,	  location,	  strong	  economy,	  and	  policy	  of	  allowing	  refugees	  to	  live	  in	  urban	  centers	  rather	  than	  in	  camps.	  The	  population	  of	  Malaysia	  is	  only	  50%	  ethnically	  Malay,	  with	  Chinese,	  Indian,	  and	  indigenous	  peoples	  making	  up	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  other	  half.	  This	  ethnic	  diversity	  is	  accompanied	  by	  religious	  diversity,	  with	  only	  60%	  of	  the	  population	  practicing	  the	  official	  religion,	  Islam,	  followed	  by	  20%	  practicing	  Buddhism,	  9%	  practicing	  Christianity,	  and	  about	  6%	  practicing	  Hinduism	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook	  2014).	  This	  diverse	  environment,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  religion,	  is	  particularly	  enticing	  to	  ethnic	  or	  religious	  minorities	  fleeing	  persecution	  in	  Burma.	  	  	   Migrants	  from	  all	  over	  Southeast	  Asia	  chose	  Malaysia	  as	  a	  destination	  country	  due	  to	  its	  strong	  economy—as	  of	  2013	  Malaysia’s	  unemployment	  rate	  was	  a	  mere	  3.1%.	  Further,	  only	  3.8%	  of	  Malaysia’s	  30	  million	  citizens	  are	  currently	  living	  below	  the	  poverty	  line	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook	  2014).	  As	  a	  result,	  Malaysia	  is	  currently	  host	  to	  an	  enormous	  migrant	  population	  that	  includes	  economic	  migrants	  from	  all	  over	  Southeast	  Asia,	  primarily	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  Philippines,	  and	  asylum	  seekers	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from	  Burma,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  countries.	  This	  population	  has	  been	  estimated	  to	  be	  as	  high	  as	  5	  million	  people	  (FIDH).	  Along	  with	  approximately	  70%	  of	  the	  native	  population,	  most	  migrants	  can	  be	  found	  in	  urban	  centers,	  with	  Kuala	  Lumpur	  serving	  as	  a	  primary	  destination	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook	  2014).	  	   The	  US	  Trafficking	  in	  Persons	  (TiP)	  Report	  from	  2014	  placed	  Malaysia	  on	  the	  Tier	  3	  Watch	  List	  due	  to	  its	  status	  as	  a	  destination	  country	  for	  forced	  labor	  and	  sex	  trafficking.	  More	  common,	  however,	  is	  the	  exploitation	  of	  migrant	  workers	  by	  employers	  or	  smugglers	  upon	  arrival.	  The	  report	  found	  that	  debt	  bondage	  and	  subsequent	  forced	  labor	  to	  repay	  debts	  was	  common	  for	  many	  economic	  migrants	  (TiP	  Report	  2014).	   	  
B.	  Asylum	  Policy	  Malaysia,	  like	  Thailand,	  has	  not	  ratified	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  nor	  developed	  a	  comprehensive	  policy	  for	  handling	  asylum-­‐seekers	  and	  refugees.	  Refugees	  are	  accordingly	  not	  legally	  recognized	  within	  Malaysia,	  and	  are	  subject	  to	  punishments	  for	  illegal	  migration	  such	  as	  arrest,	  imprisonment,	  caning,	  and	  deportation	  under	  the	  Immigration	  Act	  of	  1950/1963	  (Palmgren	  2011).	  However,	  despite	  the	  absence	  of	  formal	  protection	  issued	  by	  the	  Malaysian	  government,	  refugees	  holding	  UNHCR	  certification	  cards	  are	  “able	  to	  enjoy	  a	  basic	  de	  facto	  status”	  which	  “provides	  them	  with	  status	  in	  international	  law,	  and	  some	  very	  limited	  dispensation	  from	  the	  enforcement	  of	  immigration	  law	  in	  Malaysia”	  (FIDH	  9).	  Although	  this	  protection	  is	  informal,	  it	  stems	  from	  written	  directions	  issued	  by	  the	  Attorney	  General,	  and	  in	  statements	  made	  by	  the	  Immigration	  Department	  and	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various	  enforcement	  agencies	  (FIDH	  9).	  Therefore,	  although	  technically	  subject	  to	  arrest	  for	  illegal	  immigration,	  law	  enforcement	  tries	  to	  avoid	  arresting	  UNHCR-­‐recognized	  persons,	  and	  coordinates	  with	  the	  UNHCR	  in	  the	  event	  of	  refugees	  or	  asylum-­‐seekers	  facing	  arrest	  or	  detention	  (FIDH	  9).	  Malaysia	  is	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  resettlement	  hubs	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  had	  approximately	  10,500	  refugees	  depart	  for	  third	  countries	  in	  2013	  alone	  (Mathew	  and	  Harley	  15).	  The	  majority	  (about	  93%)	  of	  the	  125,000	  asylum	  seeker	  and	  refugee	  population	  come	  from	  Burma,	  with	  the	  Chin	  and	  Rohingya	  ethnic	  groups	  being	  the	  most	  numerous	  (US	  DoS).	  Despite	  this	  large—and	  growing—population,	  Malaysia	  has	  not	  established	  any	  formal	  refugee	  camps,	  instead	  opting	  to	  allow	  refugee	  populations	  to	  settle	  within	  its	  urban	  centers.	  
i.	  History	  
Malaysia	  has	  a	  long	  history	  of	  hosting	  refugees,	  which	  has	  contributed	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  its	  current	  asylum	  policy.	  Malaysia’s	  first	  significant	  refugee	  population	  came	  from	  the	  Philippines	  in	  the	  1970s,	  and	  it	  experimented	  with	  refugee	  camps	  during	  later	  flows	  of	  Vietnamese.	  However,	  the	  government	  switched	  to	  allowing	  refugees	  to	  settle	  in	  urban	  areas	  following	  the	  arrival	  of	  Bosnian	  refugees,	  and	  has	  retained	  this	  stance	  since.	  Despite	  earlier	  refugee	  flows,	  the	  government	  did	  not	  actively	  engage	  with	  the	  UNHCR	  until	  the	  early	  2000s.	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  UNHCR	  was	  advocating	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  UNHCR	  cards	  as	  legal	  documentation,	  but	  was	  not	  making	  much	  headway.	  This	  dynamic	  changed	  in	  2005	  due	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  approximately	  25,000	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Achenese	  displaced	  by	  the	  tsunami.	  The	  Malaysian	  government	  enlisted	  the	  UNHCR’s	  aid	  in	  providing	  emergency	  humanitarian	  assistance	  to	  these	  arrivals,	  marking	  the	  first	  formal	  partnership	  between	  the	  two.	  Following	  this	  crisis,	  the	  UNHCR	  was	  able	  to	  effectively	  lobby	  for	  enforcement	  agencies	  to	  begin	  recognizing	  UNHCR	  cards	  during	  immigration	  raids	  and	  keeping	  refugees	  and	  asylum	  seekers	  from	  deportation.	  In	  exchange,	  they	  established	  a	  24	  hour	  hotline	  that	  officers	  could	  call	  to	  verify	  the	  authenticity	  of	  a	  detainee’s	  UNHCR	  documents.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  new	  partnership,	  2005	  saw	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  administrative	  framework	  that	  recognizes	  the	  UNHCR	  card	  as	  legal	  documentation,	  which	  was	  the	  first	  significant	  example	  of	  policy	  solutions	  succeeding	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Convention.	  UNHCR	  describes	  this	  arrangement	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  a	  closer	  and	  more	  collaborative	  relationship.	  A	  cabinet	  paper	  was	  also	  released	  in	  2005	  that	  gave	  Rohingya	  refugees	  the	  right	  to	  work	  and	  for	  their	  children	  to	  attend	  school.	  This	  measure	  was	  carried	  out	  through	  the	  issuance	  of	  IMM13	  permits,	  which	  are	  temporary	  residence	  permits	  that	  entitle	  the	  holder	  to	  full	  employment	  opportunities,	  and	  for	  his	  or	  her	  children	  to	  have	  access	  to	  public	  schools	  (FIDH	  10).	  These	  permits	  are	  issued	  under	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  the	  Interior,	  under	  section	  55	  of	  the	  Immigration	  Act,	  which	  allows	  for	  the	  MOI	  to	  “exempt	  any	  person	  or	  class	  of	  persons,	  absolutely	  or	  conditionally,	  from	  any	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act”	  (FIDH	  10).	  Refugee	  advocates	  have	  championed	  section	  55	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  issue	  legal	  protection	  to	  de	  facto	  refugees	  currently	  living	  in	  Malaysia.	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The	  granting	  of	  IMM13	  permits	  to	  Rohingya	  was	  a	  promising	  step	  towards	  more	  integrative	  policies,	  but	  must	  be	  taken	  in	  context.	  Rohingya	  have	  been	  present	  in	  Malaysia	  for	  decades,	  and	  have	  already	  achieved	  a	  fairly	  high	  level	  of	  integration	  into	  society.	  Intermarriage	  and	  adoption	  of	  Rohingya	  children	  by	  Malaysian	  parents	  is	  not	  uncommon,	  and	  is	  facilitated	  by	  the	  cultural	  and	  religious	  similarities	  shared	  between	  the	  Rohingya	  and	  the	  native	  population	  (Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Year	  2008).	  Furthermore,	  later	  attempts	  to	  use	  this	  case	  as	  a	  precedent	  have	  been	  largely	  unsuccessful.	  IMM13s	  have	  not	  been	  issued	  to	  any	  other	  group	  of	  Burmese	  refugees,	  and	  a	  2009	  attempt	  to	  issue	  the	  permits	  to	  newly	  arrived	  Rohingya	  had	  to	  be	  terminated	  early	  due	  to	  allegations	  of	  rampant	  corruption.	  
ii.	  UNHCR	  
The	  UNHCR	  in	  Malaysia	  is	  located	  in	  Kuala	  Lumpur,	  where	  many	  asylum-­‐seekers	  reside.	  The	  UNHCR	  is	  the	  sole	  organization	  in	  Malaysia	  responsible	  for	  conducting	  status	  determination	  and	  protecting	  refugees’	  rights.	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  organization	  has	  been	  granted	  greater	  access	  to	  detention	  centers	  to	  both	  conduct	  status	  determinations	  for	  detainees	  and	  facilitate	  the	  release	  of	  those	  that	  have	  already	  been	  certified	  (Palmgren	  2011).	  During	  2013,	  the	  UNHCR	  conducted	  203	  missions	  to	  detention	  facilities	  and	  secured	  the	  release	  of	  6,351	  refugees	  from	  IDCs	  from	  January	  through	  October	  (US	  DoS).	  UNHCR	  staff	  were	  also	  able	  to	  provide	  services	  such	  as	  counseling	  and	  legal	  representation	  for	  refugees	  in	  detention	  centers	  during	  these	  visits.	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Refugees	  do	  have	  access	  to	  the	  courts,	  and	  are	  allowed	  to	  legally	  challenge	  their	  detention	  or	  arrest	  (World	  Refugee	  Survey	  2009).	  Although	  there	  are	  still	  instances	  of	  corrupt	  or	  inept	  immigration	  officials,	  the	  police	  do	  generally	  recognize	  the	  authority	  of	  UNHCR	  cards.	  These	  cards	  also	  provide	  for	  freedom	  of	  movement	  to	  refugees,	  as	  they	  can	  be	  used	  as	  legal	  identification	  (World	  Refugee	  Survey).	  Arrivals	  of	  Rohingya	  by	  boat	  have	  also	  been	  referred	  to	  the	  UNHCR	  following	  a	  brief	  initial	  processing	  (US	  DoS).	  In	  terms	  of	  its	  relationship	  with	  state	  officials,	  the	  government	  generally	  cooperated	  with	  the	  UNHCR	  and	  occasionally	  reported	  potential	  persons	  of	  concern	  to	  the	  UNHCR	  (US	  DoS).	  According	  to	  UNHCR	  Malaysia	  spokesperson	  Yante	  Ismail,	  “UNHCR	  is	  in	  regular	  discussions	  with	  the	  Government	  to	  see	  how	  the	  protection	  of	  refugees	  can	  be	  improved	  and	  strengthened”	  (Sipalan	  and	  Chi).	  UNHCR	  has	  achieved	  this	  level	  of	  cooperation	  through	  cultivating	  close	  relationships	  with	  several	  key	  ministries,	  including	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Home	  Affairs,	  Ministry	  of	  Health,	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Education.	  Through	  tackling	  issues	  individually	  and	  through	  various	  ministerial	  partnerships,	  UNHCR	  is	  aiming	  for	  a	  series	  of	  parallel	  policies	  that	  enable	  unique	  collaborations	  and	  strategies	  to	  address	  the	  issues	  facing	  refugees.	  They	  feel	  that	  this	  approach	  is	  overall	  more	  feasible	  and	  efficient	  than	  pushing	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  refugee	  law,	  which	  could	  take	  years	  to	  develop	  and	  would	  likely	  prove	  politically	  unviable.	  While	  UNHCR	  Malaysia	  acknowledges	  developing	  a	  national	  asylum	  policy	  or	  ratifying	  the	  Convention	  are	  good	  long	  term	  goals,	  they	  cannot	  wait	  to	  provide	  services	  in	  the	  meantime,	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  proactive	  interim	  policies	  thus	  becomes	  critical.	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   UNHCR	  officials	  report	  that	  a	  closer	  working	  relationship	  with	  different	  ministries	  not	  only	  allows	  them	  to	  exert	  greater	  influence	  over	  administrative	  responses,	  but	  also	  to	  advocate	  for	  more	  comprehensive	  policy	  changes.	  	  “(In)	  particular	  we	  believe	  the	  protection	  of	  refugees	  is	  best	  achieved	  through	  closer	  cooperation	  between	  UNHCR	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Malaysia,	  particularly	  to	  find	  viable	  alternatives	  to	  detention”	  (Sipalan	  and	  Chi).	  UNHCR’s	  primary	  advocacy	  goal	  is	  currently	  securing	  legal	  status	  for	  all	  refugees.	  Refugees	  themselves	  tend	  to	  have	  ambivalent	  feelings	  about	  the	  UNHCR.	  Due	  to	  the	  massive	  caseload,	  relatively	  small	  staff,	  and	  limited	  budget,	  the	  UNHCR	  office	  in	  Kuala	  Lumpur	  is	  often	  unable	  to	  provide	  refugees	  with	  the	  amount	  of	  assistance	  they	  would	  prefer.	  There	  are	  long	  wait	  times	  to	  receive	  identification,	  and	  to	  file	  petitions	  for	  assistance	  (Nah	  29).	  The	  registration	  and	  status	  determination	  process	  can	  take	  up	  to	  2	  years,	  and	  the	  UNHCR	  reports	  that	  they	  are	  currently	  registering	  about	  1,000	  refugees	  per	  month,	  but	  have	  a	  backlog	  of	  30,000	  to	  work	  through.	  Each	  refugee	  from	  Malaysia	  I	  interviewed	  also	  raised	  complaints	  about	  the	  long	  wait	  time	  to	  be	  registered.	  Because	  so	  much	  is	  determined	  by	  one’s	  status,	  refugees	  expressed	  frustration	  at	  being	  kept	  in	  limbo	  for	  months,	  or	  even	  years.	  Police	  allegedly	  did	  not	  always	  recognize	  the	  temporary	  card	  given	  to	  asylum	  seekers,	  and	  would	  still	  demand	  bribes	  from	  those	  caught	  with	  them.	  No	  welfare	  assistance	  is	  provided	  to	  refugees,	  so	  the	  ability	  to	  work	  and	  earn	  income	  is	  critical.	  However,	  refugees	  reported	  feeling	  afraid	  at	  work	  every	  day	  that	  they	  could	  be	  caught	  in	  a	  raid	  or	  stopped	  by	  police	  while	  going	  home.	  All	  reported	  feeling	  much	  safer	  after	  receiving	  their	  refugee	  card,	  but	  expressed	  frustration	  at	  the	  constant	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persecution	  they	  faced	  before	  receiving	  the	  card.	  Two	  refugees	  named	  the	  refugee	  cards	  as	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  for	  asylum-­‐seekers	  to	  have	  access	  to	  in	  Malaysia.	  
iii.	  Factors	  Influencing	  Policy	  Development	  
	   Aside	  from	  historical	  precedent,	  Malaysia’s	  asylum	  policy	  has	  been	  shaped	  by	  a	  number	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  factors.	  The	  major	  consideration	  of	  the	  government,	  though,	  has	  always	  been	  concern	  about	  the	  large	  undocumented	  migrant	  population	  (FDIH	  6).	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  national	  asylum	  policy,	  the	  government	  has	  expressed	  a	  desire	  to	  remain	  flexible	  in	  its	  approach	  to	  dealing	  with	  the	  refugee	  population	  (FIDH	  9).	  Because	  Malaysia	  “views	  providing	  assistance	  to	  refugees	  and	  asylum-­‐seekers	  as	  a	  humanitarian	  act,”	  this	  flexibility	  allows	  for	  the	  government	  to	  make	  decisions	  based	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  with	  no	  obligation	  to	  continue	  providing	  protection	  or	  support	  (Mathew	  and	  Harley	  13).	  Malaysia	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  fairly	  sensitive	  to	  its	  international	  reputation	  with	  regard	  to	  its	  treatment	  of	  asylum	  seekers.	  This	  concern	  began	  around	  2010,	  when	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  State	  released	  a	  condemning	  report	  exposing	  the	  collusion	  of	  Malaysian	  police	  forces	  with	  human	  traffickers,	  just	  as	  Malaysia	  was	  attempting	  to	  secure	  a	  seat	  on	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Council.	  Although	  the	  Malaysian	  government	  had	  not	  typically	  paid	  much	  attention—rhetorically	  or	  otherwise—to	  human	  rights,	  the	  international	  backlash	  following	  the	  release	  of	  the	  report	  resulted	  in	  massive	  reforms	  within	  the	  police	  force.	  The	  Malaysian	  government	  has	  subsequently	  used	  this	  clean	  up,	  along	  with	  its	  treatment	  of	  asylum	  seekers,	  as	  an	  example	  of	  its	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willingness	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  UN	  and	  respect	  international	  human	  rights	  standards.	  To	  further	  rehabilitate	  its	  international	  image,	  the	  Malaysian	  government	  attempted	  to	  broker	  a	  deal	  with	  Australia	  in	  2011	  that	  would	  allow	  Australia	  to	  deport	  unprocessed	  asylum	  seekers	  to	  Malaysia	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  permanent	  resettlement	  of	  registered	  refugees	  from	  Malaysia.	  The	  Malaysian	  government	  was	  interested	  in	  this	  deal	  not	  only	  because	  it	  would	  provide	  a	  durable	  solution	  for	  several	  thousand	  registered	  refugees,	  but	  also	  because	  it	  would	  symbolically	  equate	  Malaysia’s	  asylum	  policy	  with	  Australia’s	  (a	  signatory	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Convention).	  However,	  the	  deal	  was	  scrapped	  due	  to	  objections	  citing	  poor	  living	  conditions	  for	  asylum	  seekers	  in	  Malaysia—thus	  generating	  more	  negative	  international	  press	  for	  Malaysia	  and	  achieving	  an	  unintended	  result.	  	   An	  interesting	  note	  is	  that,	  while	  Malaysia	  is	  sensitive	  to	  international	  influence,	  its	  primary	  concern	  is	  with	  developed	  countries.	  While	  Thailand	  has	  gone	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  stay	  friendly	  with	  the	  Burmese	  government,	  the	  Malaysian	  government	  was	  openly	  critical	  of	  the	  military	  junta,	  and	  has	  continued	  to	  echo	  concerns	  about	  human	  rights	  violations	  in	  Burma.	  	   As	  influential	  as	  the	  international	  community	  has	  been	  in	  shaping	  Malaysia’s	  asylum	  policy,	  domestic	  political	  concerns	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  at	  least	  as	  influential.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Malaysian	  civil	  society	  has	  grown	  more	  active	  in	  recent	  years.	  The	  2008	  general	  election	  saw	  increased	  activity	  from	  human	  rights	  groups	  and	  opposition-­‐linked	  NGOs,	  and	  ruling	  party	  suffered	  some	  substantial	  losses.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  political	  environment	  emerged	  in	  which	  it	  was	  more	  acceptable	  to	  criticize	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the	  state.	  Refugee	  advocates	  and	  organizations	  took	  this	  opportunity	  to	  begin	  organizing	  and	  pressing	  the	  Malaysian	  government	  for	  reform.	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  certain	  measures	  for	  liberalizing	  asylum	  policy	  have	  proven	  politically	  controversial.	  Allowing	  asylum	  seekers	  to	  work	  has	  been	  especially	  contentious,	  with	  Malaysians	  voicing	  concerns	  about	  ballooning	  migrant	  populations	  changing	  the	  culture	  of	  their	  country	  and	  taking	  native	  jobs.	  Because	  the	  ruling	  party	  currently	  feels	  threatened	  by	  the	  success	  of	  the	  opposition,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  attempt	  any	  radical	  new	  policy	  changes	  that	  have	  the	  potential	  of	  alienating	  voters.	  To	  help	  change	  negative	  public	  opinions	  of	  refugees,	  UNHCR	  has	  used	  its	  Social	  Protection	  Fund	  to	  fund	  community	  projects	  that	  not	  only	  help	  refugees	  adjust	  to	  life	  in	  Malaysia,	  but	  also	  help	  to	  make	  them	  better	  community	  members.	  One	  such	  project	  organized	  refugees	  to	  help	  clean	  up	  their	  neighborhood	  on	  a	  weekly	  basis.	  The	  project	  was	  apparently	  met	  with	  great	  success,	  and	  refugees	  reported	  more	  amicable	  interactions	  with	  their	  Malaysian	  neighbors	  (Ismail).	  	   Another	  important	  internal	  factor	  that	  has	  impeded	  the	  liberalization	  of	  Malaysia’s	  asylum	  policy	  is	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  (NSC).	  Because	  of	  its	  position	  as	  designated	  head	  organization	  for	  coordinating	  the	  Malaysian	  response	  to	  asylum	  seeker	  arrivals,	  the	  Council	  still	  wields	  a	  sizable	  amount	  of	  power.	  However,	  the	  UNHCR	  reports	  that	  the	  NSC	  is	  the	  most	  refugee	  unfriendly	  ministry.	  The	  NSC	  still	  views	  refugees	  as	  a	  security	  threat,	  and	  wants	  to	  discourage	  potential	  asylum	  seekers	  from	  arriving	  to	  Malaysia.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  NSC	  consistently	  opposes	  to	  policy	  proposals	  that	  grant	  more	  liberties	  to	  refugees,	  and	  because	  it	  has	  the	  power	  to	  kill	  a	  proposal	  before	  it	  comes	  to	  a	  public	  forum,	  this	  opposition	  has	  proven	  potent.	  
	   84	  
Although	  the	  UNHCR	  has	  still	  been	  able	  to	  negotiate	  concessions	  from	  other	  ministries,	  the	  NSC’s	  fears	  of	  “opening	  a	  floodgate”	  of	  more	  asylum	  seekers	  has	  hindered	  much	  of	  this	  progress.	  The	  Malaysian	  government	  has	  primarily	  relied	  on	  a	  cost-­‐based	  argument	  against	  ratifying	  the	  Refugee	  Convention.	  Due	  to	  the	  large	  number	  of	  refugees	  and	  asylum	  seekers	  currently	  living	  in	  Malaysia,	  they	  argue,	  having	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  upkeep	  “such	  as	  shelter,	  food,	  education,	  and	  healthcare”	  would	  impose	  a	  heavy	  financial	  burden	  (Mathew	  and	  Harley	  12).	  The	  UNHCR	  has	  not	  been	  extremely	  active	  in	  pushing	  for	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Convention.	  For	  one	  thing,	  their	  position	  within	  Malaysia	  is	  already	  tenuous	  and	  they	  serve	  exclusively	  by	  the	  permission	  and	  goodwill	  of	  the	  government.	  UNHCR	  Malaysia	  has	  also	  found	  that	  legal	  frameworks	  are	  more	  important	  and	  effective	  for	  meeting	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  displaced	  population	  because	  they	  account	  for	  how	  stakeholders	  behave.	  While	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  provides	  a	  set	  of	  guidelines	  and	  legal	  instruments	  ensuring	  the	  rights	  that	  refugees	  should	  be	  guaranteed,	  it	  does	  not	  contain	  specific	  implementation	  or	  measurement	  guidelines.	  Pushing	  for	  different	  administrative	  frameworks	  allows	  the	  UNHCR	  to	  exert	  more	  influence	  in	  how	  the	  government	  specifically	  achieves	  certain	  goals,	  thus	  creating	  more	  of	  an	  opportunity	  to	  shape	  outcomes.	  Further,	  there	  is	  a	  fear	  that	  Malaysia	  would	  ratify	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  as	  a	  means	  of	  placating	  critics,	  but	  then	  do	  little	  to	  actually	  implement	  more	  protective	  policies.	  The	  enforcement	  mechanism	  of	  the	  UNHCR	  is	  weak,	  and	  few	  provisions	  are	  in	  place	  to	  elicit	  compliance	  from	  signatories.	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iv.	  Conclusion	  
UNHCR	  Malaysia	  believes	  that	  legalizing	  refugees’	  status	  is	  a	  key	  step	  forward.	  They	  hold	  that	  this	  approach	  would	  allow	  refugees	  to	  access	  the	  same	  rights	  and	  benefits	  as	  other	  foreign	  workers,	  result	  in	  a	  higher	  rate	  of	  documentation	  amongst	  migrants,	  contribute	  sizable	  tax	  revenue	  to	  the	  Malaysian	  government,	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  welfare	  dependence.	  Refugees	  would	  thus	  be	  safe	  from	  deportation,	  guaranteed	  freedom	  and	  movement,	  and	  able	  to	  maintain	  their	  own	  livelihoods.	  This	  approach	  is	  appealing	  because	  it	  can	  succeed	  without	  the	  need	  for	  Malaysia	  to	  ratify	  the	  Refugee	  Convention.	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IX.	  Policy	  Outcomes	  in	  Malaysia	  
A.	  Living	  Conditions	  Living	  conditions	  for	  displaced	  persons	  in	  Malaysia	  are	  generally	  poor.	  Housing	  is	  generally	  of	  low	  quality	  and	  shared	  by	  multiple	  people	  and	  work	  is	  hard	  to	  come	  by.	  A	  variety	  of	  factors	  conspire	  to	  make	  quality	  of	  life	  generally	  low:	  “Unreliable	  income,	  exploitation	  at	  work	  (in	  particular,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  unpaid	  wages),	  extortion	  by	  law	  enforcement	  officers,	  robbery	  by	  local	  gangsters,	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  rent,	  health	  services	  and	  education,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  need	  to	  support	  those	  unable	  to	  find	  work,	  make	  poverty	  endemic	  amongst	  refugees	  in	  Malaysia”	  (Nah	  29).	  In	  interviews,	  refugees	  corroborated	  this	  description,	  citing	  cramped	  and	  unhygienic	  living	  conditions	  shared	  by	  multiple	  people.	  Even	  refugees	  that	  were	  in	  Malaysia	  long	  enough	  to	  save	  up	  money	  and	  buy	  a	  house	  described	  feeling	  uncomfortable	  due	  to	  their	  quasi-­‐illegal	  status.	  Life	  was	  good	  for	  them,	  one	  man	  told	  me,	  but	  he	  did	  not	  want	  his	  children	  to	  grow	  up	  in	  a	  place	  with	  no	  security	  or	  full	  legal	  recognition.	  The	  living	  arrangements	  made	  available	  to	  refugees	  can	  be	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  two	  broad	  categories:	  jungle	  sites	  and	  urban	  sites.	  Jungle	  sites	  refer	  to	  pockets	  of	  undeveloped	  jungle	  near	  city	  centers,	  where	  refugees	  build	  their	  own	  huts	  (Nah	  29).	  Urban	  sites	  refer	  to	  low-­‐cost	  apartments	  within	  the	  city.	  These	  apartments	  are	  often	  of	  poor	  quality,	  and	  multiple	  families	  will	  typically	  inhabit	  one	  unit	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  keep	  costs	  low	  (Nah	  29).	  The	  type	  of	  work	  refugees	  are	  trying	  to	  find	  often	  determines	  where	  a	  refugee	  will	  live.	  Jungle	  sites	  are	  often	  proximate	  to	  construction	  sites	  or	  plantations,	  while	  urban	  sites	  offer	  accessibility	  to	  markets,	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restaurants,	  and	  shops	  (Nah	  29).	  As	  a	  result,	  refugee	  populations	  tend	  to	  cluster	  in	  certain	  areas	  within	  cities,	  focused	  around	  the	  availability	  of	  low-­‐cost	  housing,	  informal	  work,	  and	  ethnic	  enclaves.	  In	  both	  sites,	  refugees	  tend	  to	  shift	  residences	  frequently	  to	  avoid	  detection	  and	  arrest	  by	  immigration	  officials.	  As	  most	  refugees	  cluster	  to	  cities,	  Kuala	  Lumpur	  in	  particular	  given	  the	  location	  of	  the	  UNHCR,	  community	  networks	  in	  these	  areas	  have	  become	  increasingly	  prevalent.	  Networks	  are	  established	  along	  family	  or	  ethnic	  lines,	  and	  facilitate	  the	  connection	  of	  new	  arrivals	  to	  work	  and	  low	  cost	  housing	  (Nah	  2010).	  NGOs,	  church	  groups,	  and	  general	  group	  collectivization	  also	  contribute	  to	  the	  burgeoning	  sense	  of	  community.	  Refugee	  have	  started	  creating	  organizations,	  often	  along	  ethnic	  or	  regional	  lines,	  which	  serve	  a	  useful	  role	  in	  terms	  of	  service	  provision	  and	  rights	  protection	  within	  the	  refugee	  and	  asylum-­‐seeker	  community.	  Membership	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  especially	  valuable	  in	  the	  protection	  against	  abuse	  or	  injustice,	  as	  groups	  can	  mobilize	  to	  intervene	  by	  paying	  a	  bribe	  or	  contacting	  the	  UNHCR.	  These	  organizations	  also	  function	  as	  a	  safety	  net,	  in	  which	  working	  refugees	  will	  help	  support	  those	  who	  are	  still	  looking	  for	  work.	  Many	  NGOs	  partner	  directly	  with	  refugee	  groups	  to	  provide	  services	  to	  the	  community.	  A	  UNHCR	  official	  confirmed	  the	  importance	  of	  community	  networks,	  stating	  that	  newly	  arrived	  asylum	  seekers	  rely	  heavily	  on	  these	  networks	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  UNHCR	  and	  the	  option	  of	  resettlement.	  One	  of	  the	  men	  I	  interviewed	  assisted	  in	  the	  founding	  of	  one	  of	  these	  refugee	  organizations.	  He	  first	  came	  to	  Malaysia	  in	  2000,	  and	  the	  refugee	  community	  was	  not	  yet	  large	  enough	  to	  be	  organized.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Malaysian	  government	  was	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not	  recognizing	  UNHCR	  documentation	  at	  this	  time,	  and	  many	  refugees	  were	  being	  arrested	  and	  deported	  on	  illegal	  immigration	  charges.	  To	  help	  new	  arrivals	  adjust	  to	  life	  in	  Malaysia,	  and	  to	  provide	  some	  form	  of	  insurance	  against	  abuse,	  he	  and	  5	  other	  families	  established	  a	  community	  organization.	  He	  told	  me	  that	  he	  bonded	  with	  the	  other	  families	  due	  to	  their	  shared	  background	  and	  desire	  for	  a	  space	  in	  which	  they	  could	  worship	  and	  celebrate	  holidays	  together.	  He	  reports	  that	  the	  organization	  grew	  fairly	  quickly	  as	  they	  were	  connected	  to	  other	  families	  of	  the	  same	  ethnicity,	  and	  some	  new	  members	  had	  backgrounds	  that	  were	  useful	  in	  running	  the	  organization.	  Initial	  funding	  came	  from	  20-­‐30	  families	  in	  their	  target	  community,	  and	  was	  lent	  out	  to	  people	  in	  need	  of	  food,	  housing,	  or	  bribe	  money	  to	  be	  released	  from	  a	  detention	  center.	  Just	  before	  he	  left	  to	  be	  resettled,	  the	  government	  formally	  recognized	  the	  organization	  as	  an	  NGO.	  The	  UNHCR	  has	  developed	  a	  micro-­‐finance	  initiative,	  called	  the	  Social	  Protection	  Fund,	  to	  encourage	  refugee-­‐led	  projects.	  So	  far,	  about	  84	  projects	  have	  been	  funded,	  spanning	  everything	  from	  providing	  designated	  safe	  housing	  to	  building	  grocery	  stores	  to	  training	  community	  leaders	  (UNHCR	  Malaysia).	  The	  Social	  Protection	  Fund	  was	  developed	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  empowering	  the	  refugee	  community	  to	  take	  initiative	  and	  solve	  problems	  within	  their	  own	  communities.	  The	  greatest	  strength	  of	  this	  program	  is	  its	  ability	  to	  teach	  refugees	  important	  skills	  about	  things	  like	  community	  organizing	  and	  fundraising	  while	  simultaneously	  addressing	  immediate	  problems	  and	  fostering	  independence.	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i.	  Work	  
Finding	  work	  in	  Malaysia	  is	  inherently	  easier	  than	  in	  Thailand	  due	  to	  the	  urban	  refugee	  arrangement,	  which	  allows	  more	  freedom	  of	  movement	  than	  a	  camp-­‐based	  system.	  However,	  refugees	  and	  asylum-­‐seekers	  are	  not	  technically	  permitted	  to	  work	  under	  the	  Immigration	  Act.	  Employment	  of	  asylum-­‐seekers	  is	  still	  widespread,	  this	  law	  is	  usually	  only	  enforced	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  collecting	  a	  small	  fine	  or	  bribe	  for	  infractions	  (World	  Refugee	  Survey).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  well-­‐established	  legal	  employment	  framework	  asylum-­‐seekers	  are	  left	  vulnerable	  to	  exploitation	  by	  employers,	  such	  as	  withheld	  wages	  or	  inhumane	  working	  conditions.	  However,	  the	  Home	  Affairs	  Ministry	  is	  currently	  working	  with	  the	  Immigration	  Department	  and	  UNHCR	  to	  devise	  a	  plan	  to	  provide	  both	  job	  training	  and	  legal	  work	  to	  refugees	  (Azizen	  2013).	  A	  number	  of	  home	  ministers	  have	  made	  statements	  regarding	  refugees	  and	  the	  right	  to	  work,	  all	  of	  which	  acknowledge	  that	  allowing	  refugees	  to	  work	  is	  the	  best	  path	  forward.	  However,	  so	  far	  there	  have	  been	  no	  formal	  policy	  changes	  to	  follow	  through	  on	  these	  statements.	  Although	  refugees	  are	  not	  legally	  authorized	  to	  work,	  the	  government	  typically	  did	  not	  interfere	  with	  registered	  refugees	  doing	  odd	  jobs.	  The	  UNHCR	  reported	  there	  were	  a	  few	  cases,	  however,	  in	  which	  the	  government	  brought	  charges	  against	  employers	  for	  hiring	  them.	  During	  the	  year	  there	  were	  official	  announcements	  concerning	  deliberations	  about	  allowing	  refugees	  to	  work	  and	  the	  discussion	  continued	  in	  the	  media.	  Refugees	  usually	  work	  alongside	  other	  undocumented	  migrants	  for	  the	  equivalent	  of	  US$5-­‐9	  for	  an	  8-­‐12	  hour	  long	  day	  (Nah	  29).	  Although	  jobs	  are	  easier	  to	  come	  by	  for	  urban	  refugees,	  only	  between	  30-­‐
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60%	  of	  refugees	  are	  employed	  at	  any	  one	  time	  in	  a	  given	  area,	  and	  this	  figure	  is	  subject	  to	  change	  as	  refugees	  move	  jobs	  and	  locations	  frequently	  (Nah	  29).	  All	  of	  the	  refugees	  I	  interviewed	  reported	  working	  in	  Malaysia,	  and	  many	  expressed	  that	  finding	  a	  job	  was	  relatively	  simple	  due	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  vast	  refugee	  networks.	  Most	  people	  worked	  in	  restaurants,	  while	  some	  were	  able	  to	  find	  work	  as	  auto-­‐mechanics	  or	  in	  factories.	  Finding	  a	  job,	  I	  was	  told,	  became	  much	  easier	  with	  the	  possession	  of	  a	  refugee	  card.	  However,	  even	  with	  the	  card,	  it	  was	  apparently	  still	  common	  for	  police	  to	  loiter	  outside	  of	  workplaces	  known	  to	  employ	  refugees,	  and	  hassle	  workers	  for	  bribes.	  
ii.	  Health	  
Refugees	  that	  have	  been	  certified	  by	  the	  UNHCR	  are	  allowed	  to	  access	  publicly	  provided	  medical	  services	  at	  a	  half	  of	  the	  typical	  “foreigner”	  rate.	  The	  approach	  to	  providing	  health	  care	  for	  refugees	  has	  been	  another	  example	  of	  successful	  collaboration	  between	  the	  UNHCR,	  the	  Malaysian	  government,	  and	  various	  implementing	  partners.	  Refugees	  and	  asylum-­‐seekers	  alike	  are	  also	  allowed	  access	  to	  HIV/AIDS	  treatment,	  and	  are	  included	  in	  the	  National	  Strategic	  Plan	  for	  HIV/AIDS	  (World	  Refugee	  Survey).	  Additionally,	  persons	  suffering	  from	  infectious	  diseases	  such	  as	  TB	  are	  treated	  immediately,	  regardless	  of	  their	  legal	  status.	  Vaccines	  are	  similarly	  provided	  for	  all	  child	  refugees	  and	  asylum	  seekers.	  Providing	  healthcare	  to	  displaced	  persons	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  easiest	  areas	  to	  push	  for	  progressive	  reform	  in—its	  focus	  on	  national	  public	  health	  objectives	  lent	  it	  resilient	  political	  viability.	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None	  of	  the	  refugees	  I	  interviewed	  expressed	  any	  issues	  with	  the	  health	  care	  that	  was	  made	  available	  to	  them.	  One	  family	  had	  a	  child	  with	  a	  birth	  defect	  that	  required	  brain	  surgery,	  and	  found	  the	  procedure	  to	  be	  both	  affordable	  and	  handled	  professionally.	  In	  another	  family,	  a	  woman	  gave	  birth	  while	  in	  Malaysia,	  and	  stated	  that	  the	  level	  of	  care	  she	  received	  from	  the	  doctors	  there	  was	  very	  professional.	  All	  of	  the	  refugees	  I	  spoke	  to	  had	  utilized	  the	  public	  hospital	  at	  some	  point	  and	  felt	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  service	  and	  medicine	  was	  very	  affordable.	  In	  fact,	  when	  asked	  if	  Malaysia	  treats	  refugees	  well,	  many	  interviewees	  cited	  the	  health	  discount	  as	  the	  best	  thing	  the	  Malaysian	  government	  has	  done	  for	  refugees.	  
iii.	  Education	  
While	  refugee	  children	  are	  not	  permitted	  to	  attend	  public	  schools,	  the	  government	  does	  allow	  refugees	  access	  to	  the	  many	  private	  schools	  in	  the	  country.	  A	  number	  of	  local	  and	  international	  NGOs	  have	  collaborated	  attempt	  to	  meet	  demand,	  and	  some	  schools	  even	  offer	  partial	  or	  full-­‐scholarships	  for	  refugee	  children,	  facilitated	  by	  the	  UNHCR	  (World	  Refugee	  Survey).	  However,	  because	  access	  to	  education	  for	  refugees	  is	  limited	  to	  NGO	  and	  ethnic	  community-­‐run	  schools,	  the	  UNHCR	  estimates	  no	  more	  than	  40	  percent	  of	  refugee	  children	  attend	  school	  (US	  DoS).	  Educational	  opportunities	  for	  refugees	  are	  also	  limited	  by	  shortages	  of	  qualified	  teachers	  and	  resources.	  Refugee	  communities	  have	  attempted	  to	  address	  this	  problem	  by	  starting	  informal	  schools,	  which	  operate	  on	  funding	  from	  individuals	  and	  occasionally	  from	  civil	  society	  groups	  (Burma	  Human	  Rights	  Yearbook	  2008).	  After	  lobbying	  by	  the	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UNHCR	  and	  various	  education-­‐focused	  NGOs,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  has	  begun	  certifying	  some	  of	  these	  refugee	  learning	  centers.	  This	  step	  will	  allow	  for	  more	  regulation	  and	  oversight,	  thus	  bringing	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  received	  at	  the	  centers	  closer	  in	  line	  with	  Malaysian	  public	  schools.	  Due	  to	  age,	  only	  one	  individual	  I	  interviewed	  had	  extensive	  experience	  with	  the	  educational	  opportunities	  for	  refugee	  children	  in	  Malaysia.	  She	  was	  14	  when	  her	  family	  first	  arrived	  in	  Malaysia,	  and	  she	  initially	  attended	  a	  refugee	  learning	  center	  for	  school.	  However,	  her	  parents	  soon	  pulled	  her	  out	  and	  enrolled	  her	  in	  a	  private	  school	  nearby.	  Although	  the	  private	  school	  was	  more	  expensive,	  she	  says,	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  education	  was	  much	  better.	  Refugee	  learning	  centers	  are	  often	  developed	  through	  community	  organizations,	  and	  are	  thereby	  organized	  along	  ethnic	  lines.	  The	  center	  this	  interviewee	  attended	  was	  for	  Chin	  refugees	  only.	  She	  describes	  the	  center	  as	  being	  staffed	  by	  some	  refugees	  and	  some	  foreigners,	  all	  of	  whom	  were	  working	  on	  a	  volunteer-­‐basis.	  Her	  mother	  estimated	  that	  they	  spent	  about	  15MYR	  ($4USD)	  per	  year	  for	  tuition	  at	  the	  learning	  center.	  However,	  it	  was	  commonly	  accepted	  that	  the	  learning	  centers	  were	  only	  really	  appropriate	  for	  younger	  children,	  as	  the	  curriculum	  was	  not	  very	  advanced	  and	  only	  a	  few	  of	  the	  teachers	  held	  degrees.	  Although	  her	  two	  younger	  siblings	  remained	  at	  the	  refugee	  learning	  center,	  the	  interviewee	  thus	  decided	  to	  transfer	  to	  a	  nearby	  private	  school.	  The	  private	  school	  she	  attended	  was	  not	  for	  refugees	  only,	  there	  were	  Malaysian	  and	  foreign	  students	  as	  well.	  Compared	  to	  the	  refugee	  center,	  her	  parents	  found	  this	  school	  to	  be	  very	  expensive	  (approximately	  100MYR	  per	  year,	  $27USD).	  However,	  they	  did	  not	  have	  to	  pay	  the	  full	  tuition	  because	  the	  school	  offers	  scholarships	  for	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refugee	  students.	  The	  interviewee	  recounts	  that	  this	  scholarship	  was	  primarily	  made	  possible	  through	  individual	  donations	  made	  to	  the	  school,	  although	  she	  believes	  that	  the	  UNHCR	  may	  have	  been	  involved	  as	  well.	  She	  felt	  that	  the	  academic	  rigor	  was	  greatly	  improved	  at	  the	  private	  school,	  with	  a	  curriculum	  resembling	  what	  she	  is	  being	  taught	  now	  in	  the	  US.	  She	  feels	  that	  this	  experience	  prepared	  her	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  the	  US,	  but	  knows	  that	  many	  other	  refugee	  adolescents	  were	  unable	  to	  attend	  school	  because	  the	  costs	  were	  too	  high,	  and	  feels	  that	  this	  has	  made	  adjusting	  to	  life	  in	  the	  US	  more	  difficult	  for	  them.	  A	  UNHCR	  official,	  when	  asked	  about	  education,	  emphasized	  the	  role	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  improving	  access	  for	  refugee	  youth.	  Private	  donors	  and	  corporate	  sponsorships	  are	  critical	  to	  keeping	  refugee	  schools	  open,	  and	  other	  private	  schools	  affordable	  for	  refugee	  children.	  UNHCR	  also	  extolled	  the	  virtues	  of	  the	  many	  volunteers,	  both	  from	  Malaysia	  and	  abroad,	  which	  staff	  various	  learning	  centers.	  These	  volunteers,	  private	  donors	  and	  churches	  have	  cooperated	  with	  refugee	  communities	  to	  facilitate	  integration	  into	  Malaysia	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  language	  tutoring,	  increase	  access	  to	  educational	  opportunities,	  and	  develop	  programs	  that	  encourage	  post-­‐secondary	  education.	  These	  efforts	  have	  developed	  entirely	  through	  volunteer	  efforts,	  there	  are	  guided	  by	  no	  government	  links	  or	  support	  whatsoever.	  
B.	  Documented	  Abuses	  
	  A	  2009	  report	  by	  the	  US	  Committee	  for	  Refugees	  and	  Immigrants	  named	  Malaysia	  as	  one	  of	  the	  worst	  countries	  for	  refugees,	  citing	  the	  illicit	  sale	  of	  deportees	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to	  gangs	  of	  human	  traffickers.	  It	  was	  estimated	  that	  around	  1,000	  of	  these	  deportees	  were	  refugees	  or	  asylum-­‐seekers.	  The	  report	  also	  condemned	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  volunteer	  immigration	  enforcement	  militia,	  RELA,	  for	  its	  violent	  practices	  (World	  Refugee	  Survey	  2009).	  Refugees	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  arrest	  by	  the	  police,	  immigration	  officials	  and	  RELA,	  but	  RELA	  remains	  the	  most	  notorious	  (Palmgren	  2011).	  The	  organization	  was	  given	  extensive	  powers	  at	  its	  inception,	  including	  “the	  right	  to	  use	  firearms,	  search	  and	  demand	  documents,	  raid	  premises,	  and	  arrest	  without	  warrant	  anyone	  they	  believed	  could	  be	  a	  ‘terrorist,	  undesirable	  person,	  illegal	  immigrant	  or	  occupier’	  “	  (SUARAM	  2010).	  A	  report	  by	  Amnesty	  International	  in	  2010	  estimates	  that	  about	  6,800	  registered	  asylum-­‐seekers	  were	  detained	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  recognition	  of	  their	  status	  by	  RELA	  and	  other	  immigration	  authorities.	  Once	  detained,	  various	  forms	  of	  various	  abuse	  such	  as	  beatings	  and	  whippings	  have	  been	  reported	  to	  human	  rights	  organizations	  within	  Malaysia	  (TENAGANITA	  2008).	  	   Despite	  its	  past	  of	  well-­‐documented	  human	  right	  abuses	  against	  Burmese	  refugees,	  Malaysia	  has	  recently	  begun	  taking	  steps	  towards	  improving	  circumstances	  for	  asylum-­‐seekers	  residing	  within	  its	  borders.	  In	  the	  past	  few	  years	  the	  government	  has	  announced	  initiatives	  to	  combat	  human	  trafficking	  in	  the	  context	  of	  displaced	  persons,	  establish	  a	  sub-­‐unit	  on	  refugees	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Home	  Affairs,	  and	  to	  register	  refugees	  in	  the	  Ministry’s	  migrants	  database	  (Idris	  2012).	  Additionally,	  RELA	  began	  being	  stripped	  of	  its	  powers	  gradually	  beginning	  in	  2009	  following	  a	  bout	  of	  well-­‐publicized	  incidents	  involving	  excessive	  use	  of	  force.	  The	  government	  is	  also	  ending	  the	  practice	  of	  deporting	  detainees	  to	  the	  Thai	  border	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  curb	  human	  trafficking	  (UNHCR	  Malaysia).	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In	  recent	  years,	  the	  Malaysian	  police	  force	  has	  relaxed	  significantly	  in	  regards	  to	  crackdowns	  on	  undocumented	  refugee	  workers.	  Although	  no	  formal	  policy	  changes	  have	  been	  enacted,	  statement	  by	  upper	  level	  Malaysian	  officials	  acknowledging	  the	  contributions	  of	  refugees	  in	  the	  informal	  sector	  have	  loosened	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  current	  immigration	  law	  regarding	  asylum	  seekers.	  Immigration	  raids	  still	  occur,	  but	  the	  police	  now	  make	  a	  conscious	  effort	  to	  avoid	  the	  refugee	  communities	  and	  no	  longer	  target	  known	  refugee	  employers.	  However,	  because	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  overlap	  between	  the	  refugee	  and	  economic	  migrant	  communities—the	  real	  target	  of	  immigration	  raids—arrests	  do	  still	  occur.	  The	  police	  force	  now	  works	  with	  the	  UNHCR	  to	  verify	  the	  refugee	  or	  asylum	  seeker	  status	  of	  any	  detainees	  with	  the	  UNHCR,	  and	  allows	  the	  UNHCR	  into	  detention	  centers	  to	  conduct	  status	  determinations	  for	  asylum	  seekers	  that	  have	  not	  yet	  initiated	  the	  status	  determination	  process.	  The	  high	  number	  of	  arrests	  and	  detentions	  of	  displaced	  persons	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  was	  due	  in	  great	  part	  to	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  police	  force	  to	  distinguish	  between	  economic	  migrants	  and	  refugees,	  but	  this	  new	  close	  working	  relationship	  with	  UNHCR	  (in	  the	  absence	  of	  formal	  policy)	  has	  remedied	  this	  misunderstanding	  and	  expanded	  protection.	  Enforcement	  agencies	  and	  their	  top	  officials	  are	  reportedly	  now	  more	  concerned	  with	  their	  public	  image	  and	  protecting	  against	  abuses	  of	  power	  to	  insulate	  themselves	  against	  critique	  by	  domestic	  and	  international	  human	  rights	  organizations.	  Due	  to	  pressure	  from	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  crackdown	  on	  corruption	  following	  the	  release	  of	  the	  US	  report	  on	  human	  trafficking,	  the	  police	  force	  has	  undergone	  a	  major	  clean	  up	  that	  included	  the	  heads	  of	  multiple	  
	   96	  
departments	  being	  charged	  with	  corruption.	  UNHCR	  reported	  that	  they	  no	  longer	  hear	  about	  police	  officers	  engaging	  in	  human	  trafficking	  at	  the	  border	  from	  the	  refugee	  population.	  Maritime	  law	  enforcement	  has	  likewise	  been	  good	  about	  providing	  assistance	  to	  boats	  carrying	  asylum	  seekers.	  The	  current	  practice	  is	  to	  provide	  humanitarian	  assistance	  before	  sending	  them	  through	  processing	  and	  allowing	  the	  UNHCR	  to	  conduct	  status	  determinations	  for	  them.	  Despite	  progress	  with	  enforcement	  agencies,	  many	  in	  the	  community	  are	  still	  wary	  of	  the	  police	  due	  to	  the	  recent	  history	  of	  mass	  crackdowns,	  arrests,	  and	  deportations.	  All	  of	  the	  refugees	  I	  interviewed	  had	  experienced	  harassment	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  police,	  and	  all	  relayed	  living	  in	  constant	  fear	  of	  being	  arrested	  and	  sent	  to	  a	  detention	  facility.	  While	  some	  of	  this	  anxiety	  was	  lessened	  once	  refugees	  received	  their	  UNHCR	  card,	  they	  were	  still	  subject	  to	  harassment	  by	  police	  and	  had	  to	  pay	  bribes	  to	  avoid	  any	  trouble.	  During	  the	  waiting	  period	  before	  receiving	  a	  refugee	  card	  (which	  was	  up	  to	  three	  years	  amongst	  the	  people	  I	  spoke	  with),	  some	  refugees	  were	  afraid	  to	  leave	  the	  house	  at	  all.	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X.	  Conclusion	  Despite	  formal	  policy	  similarities	  between	  Malaysia	  and	  Thailand,	  the	  informal	  implementation	  of	  these	  policies	  has	  created	  a	  disparity	  in	  local	  contexts	  and	  outcomes	  for	  refugees	  and	  asylum-­‐seekers.	  Malaysia	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  an	  increasingly	  popular	  destination	  among	  Burmese	  asylum-­‐seekers,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  Burmese	  asylum	  seekers	  moving	  to	  Malaysia	  rather	  than	  Thailand	  each	  year.12	  Increasing	  numbers	  of	  Burmese	  migrants	  seeking	  asylum	  in	  Malaysia	  has	  coincided	  with	  the	  gradual	  liberalization	  in	  Malaysia’s	  migration	  policy	  implementation,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  increased	  cooperation	  with	  the	  UNHCR	  and	  the	  relaxation	  of	  immigration	  enforcement	  for	  refugees.	  Although	  Malaysia’s	  approach	  still	  falls	  far	  short	  of	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Convention,	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  significantly	  closer	  to	  this	  standard	  than	  neighboring	  Thailand.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  camps	  in	  Malaysia	  has	  proven	  critical	  for	  the	  development	  of	  its	  refugee	  population.	  Refugees	  have	  greater	  freedom	  of	  movement,	  allowing	  them	  to	  form	  communities	  and	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  agency.	  These	  communities	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  resilient	  in	  the	  face	  of	  hostile	  conditions,	  and	  used	  innovation	  to	  unite	  refugees	  to	  tackle	  external	  threats	  and	  issues.	  As	  Malaysia	  continues	  to	  gradually	  liberalize	  its	  refugee	  policy	  through	  a	  series	  of	  informal	  and	  administrative	  changes,	  Thailand	  has	  only	  become	  more	  entrenched	  in	  maintaining	  its	  policy	  of	  confinement.	  The	  development	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Please	  refer	  to	  Figure	  2	  in	  Appendix	  I	  for	  a	  graph	  comparing	  the	  registered	  refugee	  populations	  in	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia	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adherence	  to	  these	  policy	  approaches	  can	  be	  traced	  through	  each	  country’s	  history.	  While	  both	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia	  have	  historically	  played	  host	  to	  a	  number	  of	  large	  refugee	  flows,	  Malaysia’s	  policy	  approach	  reflects	  a	  susceptibility	  to	  international	  pressures	  and	  willingness	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  UNHCR,	  while	  Thailand’s	  reflects	  susceptibility	  to	  Burmese	  pressures	  and	  a	  complete	  unwillingness	  to	  work	  with	  the	  UNHCR.	  When	  facing	  similar	  international	  human	  rights	  scandals	  (the	  implication	  of	  Malaysian	  police	  and	  the	  Thai	  navy’s	  in	  human	  trafficking	  rings	  exposed	  by	  two	  separate	  reports)	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia’s	  reactions	  conform	  to	  their	  general	  policy	  approaches.	  Malaysia	  folded	  to	  international	  pressure	  and	  engaged	  in	  a	  systematic	  reform	  of	  its	  police	  force,	  while	  Thailand	  brought	  charges	  against	  journalists	  and	  papers	  for	  reprinting	  the	  story.	  Aside	  from	  enabling	  community	  building,	  the	  outcomes	  of	  these	  policy	  differences	  represent	  slight—but	  important—differences	  in	  the	  lived	  realities	  for	  refugees	  in	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia.	  Both	  have	  access	  to	  affordable	  healthcare,	  but	  refugees	  in	  Malaysia	  have	  access	  to	  the	  same	  quality	  of	  healthcare	  that	  the	  local	  population	  receives.	  While	  Thailand’s	  refugees	  must	  hope	  for	  a	  referral	  to	  a	  Thai	  hospital	  in	  the	  case	  of	  grave	  illness	  or	  injury,	  Malaysia’s	  have	  consistent	  access	  to	  a	  public	  hospital	  and	  other	  health	  services.	  	  Access	  to	  work	  follows	  a	  similar	  pattern	  to	  healthcare.	  While	  many	  refugees	  in	  Thailand	  still	  find	  ways	  to	  work,	  they	  must	  sneak	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  camps	  and	  risk	  arrest	  and	  deportation	  to	  do	  so.	  Although	  Malaysia	  provides	  no	  more	  legal	  documentation	  for	  refugees	  to	  work	  than	  Thailand	  does,	  the	  implementation	  of	  its	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immigration	  policy	  has	  been	  amended	  to	  allow	  registered	  refugees	  to	  work	  without	  facing	  legal	  repercussions.	  Although	  the	  pseudo-­‐legal	  status	  of	  refugees	  relegates	  them	  to	  work	  in	  the	  informal	  sector	  alone,	  this	  arrangement	  is	  still	  a	  marked	  improvement	  over	  the	  current	  working	  conditions	  in	  Thailand.	  	   Educational	  opportunities	  are	  poor	  in	  both	  Malaysia	  and	  Thailand.	  Both	  countries	  have	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  the	  refugee	  population	  that	  is	  unable	  to	  afford	  basic	  schooling.	  Curricula	  in	  both	  countries	  are	  poor,	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  teachers	  is	  low.	  One	  difference	  that	  does	  exist	  is	  the	  end	  goal	  of	  education.	  In	  Thailand,	  there	  are	  few	  jobs	  available	  within	  the	  camps,	  and	  they	  typically	  do	  not	  pay	  well.	  There	  are	  no	  opportunities	  for	  post-­‐secondary	  education,	  and	  most	  refugee	  adolescents	  living	  in	  the	  camps	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time	  were	  born	  there—they	  know	  no	  other	  life.	  The	  motivation	  for	  attaining	  an	  education	  could	  only	  then	  be	  to	  prepare	  for	  repatriation	  or	  resettlement	  down	  the	  road,	  but	  these	  prospects	  likely	  seem	  dim	  after	  17	  years	  of	  confinement.	  Malaysia,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  does	  allow	  refugee	  children	  to	  enroll	  in	  universities,	  and	  there	  are	  scholarships	  available	  at	  the	  secondary	  and	  post-­‐secondary	  levels.	  While	  it	  may	  still	  be	  unreasonably	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  an	  adequate	  education	  in	  Malaysia,	  refugee	  children	  at	  least	  fight	  this	  battle	  with	  the	  hope	  of	  one	  day	  being	  able	  to	  use	  it.	  	   Finally,	  Malaysia	  has	  a	  better	  track	  record	  in	  the	  past	  few	  years	  regarding	  the	  forced	  deportation	  and	  refoulement	  of	  refugees.	  However,	  a	  large	  piece	  of	  this	  advantage	  comes	  solely	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  Malaysia	  does	  not	  border	  Burma,	  and	  does	  not	  invest	  in	  ensuring	  that	  deportees	  are	  taken	  back	  to	  their	  country	  of	  origin.	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Another	  key	  component	  of	  this	  picture,	  though,	  is	  the	  Malaysian	  government’s	  increasing	  recognition	  of	  the	  humanity	  and	  rights	  of	  the	  refugee	  population.	  	   Differences	  in	  outcomes	  were	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  opinions	  of	  refugees	  themselves.	  While	  most	  refugees	  that	  came	  from	  Thailand	  did	  not	  know	  of	  the	  large	  Burmese	  refugee	  population	  living	  in	  Malaysia	  until	  they	  came	  to	  the	  US,	  refugees	  in	  Malaysia	  transited	  through	  Thailand	  and	  know	  of	  the	  camps.	  When	  asked	  if	  they	  would	  have	  made	  the	  same	  decision	  given	  perfect	  information,	  all	  of	  the	  families	  that	  resettled	  through	  Malaysia	  answered	  yes.	  One	  interviewee	  explained	  that	  it	  is	  better	  to	  be	  a	  refugee	  in	  Malaysia	  because	  you	  can	  live	  in	  the	  city	  and	  interact	  with	  other	  people,	  there	  are	  more	  educational	  opportunities,	  and	  not	  being	  trapped	  in	  a	  camp	  allows	  refugees	  to	  “improve	  more	  in	  every	  way.”	  Another	  interviewee	  that	  lived	  in	  Thailand	  stated	  that	  “refugees	  seem	  better	  off	  in	  Malaysia,	  there’s	  more	  access	  to	  work	  and	  to	  school”	  and	  that	  her	  friends	  from	  Malaysia	  speak	  better	  English	  and	  perform	  better	  in	  school	  than	  her	  counterparts	  in	  Thailand.	  The	  UNHCR	  Malaysia	  official	  I	  interviewed	  accurately	  summarized	  the	  situation	  for	  Burmese	  refugees	  simply	  as:	  “It’s	  not	  an	  easy	  life,	  being	  an	  urban	  refugee,	  but	  there	  are	  opportunities	  to	  survive	  and	  grow.”	  	   In	  the	  absence	  of	  national	  asylum	  policy	  frameworks	  and	  the	  guidance	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  disparities	  in	  approaches	  and	  outcomes	  can	  arise	  between	  countries—even	  in	  seemingly	  similar	  contexts.	  Despite	  several	  commonalities,	  the	  trajectories	  of	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia’s	  respective	  asylum	  policies	  have	  differed	  significantly,	  and	  these	  variations	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  lived	  realities	  of	  refugees.	  While	  Malaysia’s	  semi-­‐integrative	  approach	  is	  flawed,	  it	  is	  more	  in	  keeping	  with	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international	  human	  rights	  standards,	  and	  has	  created	  a	  more	  inhabitable	  environment	  for	  refugees	  by	  protecting	  their	  basic	  rights.	  The	  findings	  of	  this	  case	  study	  analysis	  thus	  indicate	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  more	  liberal	  and	  integrative	  asylum	  policies	  and	  administrative	  frameworks	  during	  protracted	  refugee	  crises	  produce	  better	  outcomes	  than	  restrictive	  policies.	  	   There	  is	  a	  great	  potential	  for	  further	  research	  in	  a	  number	  of	  directions.	  The	  situation	  of	  refugees	  in	  Malaysia	  is	  only	  just	  now	  being	  researched,	  and	  holds	  a	  wealth	  of	  promise	  for	  discovering	  more	  about	  the	  plight	  of	  urban	  refugees	  and	  how	  ad	  hoc	  policy	  responses	  can	  be	  used	  successfully.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  illuminating	  extension	  of	  this	  research	  would	  be	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  relative	  success	  of	  refugees	  experiencing	  different	  transit	  situations	  once	  they	  are	  repatriated	  or	  resettled.	  I	  can	  anecdotally	  attest	  to	  the	  greater	  capability	  of	  refugees	  from	  Malaysia	  with	  regards	  to	  successful	  resettlement	  and	  integration,	  but	  a	  larger	  scale	  quantitative	  study	  testing	  this	  theory	  could	  underscore	  the	  importance	  of	  comprehensive	  policies	  in	  transit	  countries.	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Appendix	  I:	  Figures	  Figure	  1:	  The	  population	  and	  demographic	  breakdown	  within	  each	  camp	  as	  of	  June	  2014,	  according	  to	  The	  Border	  Consortium.	  	  
	  	   Source:	  The	  Border	  Consortium,	  67	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  Figure	  2:	  Registered	  refugee	  populations	  within	  Thailand	  and	  Malaysia	  in	  recent	  years	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Appendix	  II:	  Interview	  Questions	  
Working	  Conditions	  Had	  job	  in	  (transit	  country):	   y/n	  If	  yes:	  	   What	  kind	  of	  job(s)	  did	  you	  have?	  	   How	  did	  you	  find	  this	  job	  (family/friend	  network	  etc.)?	  	   Did	  you	  receive	  documentation	  to	  work?	  Did	  your	  status	  as	  an	  asylum-­‐seeker	  make	  it	  harder	  for	  you	  to	  find	  or	  keep	  a	  job?	  Did	  your	  work	  experience	  make	  it	  easier	  for	  you	  to	  find	  a	  job	  here	  in	  the	  US?	  
Education	  Did	  you	  have	  access	  to	  language	  classes	  (English,	  Thai,	  Malay,	  other)?	  Who	  provided	  these	  classes?	  Did	  you	  have	  access	  to	  job	  training	  or	  other	  courses	  for	  adults?	  If	  has	  children:	  	   Did	  your	  child(ren)	  go	  to	  school	  in	  (transit	  country)?	  	   If	  yes:	  	   Who	  ran	  the	  school?	  (Government,	  non-­‐profit	  etc.)	  Did	  you	  have	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  school?	  Was	  it	  affordable?	  In	  your	  opinion,	  was	  the	  education	  your	  child(ren)	  received	  adequate?	  Were	  there	  any	  problems	  with	  the	  educational	  opportunities	  for	  refugee	  children	  in	  (transit	  country)?	  	   	   Did	  this	  schooling	  help	  prepare	  your	  child(ren)	  for	  life	  in	  the	  US?	  	   If	  no:	  	   	   Why	  did	  your	  child(ren)	  not	  attend	  school?	  Were	  other	  opportunities	  available	  for	  your	  child(ren)	  to	  receive	  an	  education?	  (Ex:	  tutors,	  home	  schooling	  etc.)	  Were	  there	  any	  problems	  with	  the	  educational	  opportunities	  for	  refugee	  children	  in	  (transit	  country)?	  	   	   Did	  this	  system	  help	  prepare	  your	  child(ren)	  for	  life	  in	  the	  US?	  
Health	  Care	  What	  would	  you	  do	  if	  you	  got	  sick	  while	  in	  (transit	  country)?	  Did	  you	  have	  regular	  access	  to	  a	  doctor,	  hospital,	  or	  clinic?	  Who	  provided	  the	  doctor/hospital/clinic?	  (Ex:	  the	  government,	  NGO	  etc.)	  Was	  seeing	  a	  doctor	  and	  buying	  needed	  medicine	  affordable?	  In	  your	  opinion,	  did	  you	  receive	  adequate	  treatment	  from	  this	  provider?	  Were	  there	  any	  problems	  with	  the	  available	  health	  care	  resources	  in	  (transit	  country)?	  
UNHCR	  Was	  it	  easy	  for	  you	  to	  find	  UNHCR	  or	  a	  UNHCR	  representative	  and	  apply	  for	  refugee	  status?	  How	  did	  you	  first	  learn	  about	  the	  UNHCR?	  How	  long	  did	  you	  have	  to	  wait	  to	  receive	  your	  refugee	  identification	  card	  from	  the	  UNHCR?	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Do	  you	  feel	  that	  the	  UNHCR	  was	  responsive	  to	  your	  needs?	  Did	  the	  UNHCR	  make	  you	  feel	  protected	  and	  safe?	  Were	  there	  any	  other	  organizations	  that	  were	  more	  helpful	  or	  that	  you	  interacted	  with	  more	  than	  the	  UNHCR?	  	   If	  yes:	  Which	  organizations	  and	  how	  did	  they	  help	  you?	  
Community	  Did	  you	  have	  friends	  or	  family	  in	  (transit	  country)?	  Once	  in	  (transit	  country)	  were	  you	  able	  to	  find	  people	  of	  your	  same	  ethnicity	  or	  religion	  from	  Burma	  to	  spend	  time	  with?	  Were	  you	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  your	  cultural	  or	  religious	  events	  and	  holidays	  as	  normal?	  Did	  you	  feel	  like	  a	  member	  of	  a	  community?	  If	  yes:	  How	  did	  this	  community	  support	  you/your	  family?	  
General	  Questions	  Why	  did	  you	  choose	  (transit	  country)?	  Did	  you	  know	  anything	  about	  the	  living	  conditions	  in	  (transit	  country)	  before	  beginning	  your	  journey?	  	  If	  you	  had	  known	  more	  about	  the	  living	  conditions	  in	  (transit	  country)	  would	  you	  have	  made	  the	  same	  decision?	  Would	  or	  have	  you	  recommended	  a	  family	  member	  or	  friend	  from	  Burma	  seek	  asylum	  in	  (transit	  country)?	  At	  any	  point	  in	  time,	  were	  you	  made	  to	  feel	  afraid	  of	  the	  local	  government	  or	  police	  force?	  Do	  you	  feel	  like	  the	  government	  of	  (transit	  country)	  treats	  refugees	  well?	  	   If	  no:	  What	  do	  you	  think	  (transit	  country)	  should	  do	  differently?	  What	  do	  you	  think	  is	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  asylum-­‐seekers	  should	  have	  access	  to?	  (Ex:	  access	  to	  resettlement	  options,	  work,	  education,	  health	  care	  etc.)	  Overall,	  how	  do	  you	  feel	  about	  your	  time	  in	  (transit	  country)?	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